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Abstract
The thesis is concerned with gaining understanding of the dynamics of job loss
in the U.S. manufacturing sector through analyzing the magnitude of and reasons for
employment change in Rhode Island industry between 1978 and 1983. It is posited that
a lack of understanding regarding these dynamics hinders the development of effective
regional economic development policies. The data base for the study was formed using
ES-202 establishment data, a telephone survey, secondary sources and personal inter-
views. The data base covers all 583 manufacturing establishments in the state which
had 50 or more employees in at least one year between 1977 and 1983.
The analysis of the components of employment change at the plant level indi-
cates that plant contractions are the primary source of gross job loss; that a significant
portion of jobs lost to contractions are regained the next year; and that plant closings
contribute substantially to job loss, and increasingly as economic conditions worsen. A
comparison of the findings of the gross flows analysis in this study with others in the
field indicates that the latter were seriously flawed because data bases were not truly
longitudinal.
A combination of logit regression models and qualitative analysis indicates that
a strong and complex set of relationships exists between plant organizational character-
istics and the frequency of plant closure. Some organizational characteristics reflect
firms' abilities to avoid management error that results in unintended plant closures and
to perceive and opportunities; others guide firms' perceptions regarding viable options
for plant site and product investment. Plant closures of four types occur--firm fail-
ures, product terminations, capacity reductions, and factor cost relocations. It is sug-
gested that plant closures are the results of institutional responses to structural and
macroeconomic opportunities and constraints. Structural and macroeconomic op-
portunities and constraints strongly influence the range of investment choices which a
firm perceives before it.
There appears to be little relationship between organizational characteristics and
contractions and expansions in open plants. An analysis of the relationship between
plant operating characteristics and employment change, using U.S. Census Bureau data,
could not be completed because of significant spurious plant closures in the file.
The study findings have a number of implications for economic development re-
search and policy.
Thesis Supervisor: Bennett Harrison, Professor, Political Economy
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Plant Closings and Contractions in U.S. Manufacturing
-- Restructuring and Its Effects
Since the late 1970's, the U.S. manufacturing sector has been undergoing a
restructuring with negative effects for workers and their communities unparalleled
since the Depression.' The result has been the permanent dislocation of millions of
workers from decent jobs, with consequent negative effects on these individuals, their
families and their communities. Employment in the U.S. manufacturing sector has
decreased every year since 1979, except for 1984. Compared to peak employment o~f 21
million workers in 1979, the total number of workers was down 9% (to 19.2 million) in
1986. The decline in production employment has been even steeper--14%. (See Figure
1.1.) The employment figures are barely 4% higher today than they were in 1983, at
the bottom of the worst recession in the postwar period.
Change in aggregate employment statistic3 gives a sense of net em!oynpent
decline. The gross job loss in manufacturing is of course greater. The U.S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics estimates that between 1981 and 1986, over 2.5 million manufacturing
workers with 3 or more years job tenure were laid off from their jobs.2 In a previous
BLS survey, covering the years 1979-84, it was estimated, disregarding length of job
tenure, that 4.25 million manufacturing workers were displaced. 3 Though manufactur-
ing provided less than 20% of the nation's jobs, 50% of all displaced workers came
from the manufacturing sector.
Job displacement has not been evenly distributed across all manufacturing in-
dustries. Since the late 1970's, the primary metals, machinery, fabricated metals, tex-
tiles, and apparel industries each has lost over 200,000 net jobs. The leather goods, pri-
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Figure 1.1
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mary metals and textiles industries each has lost 25% or more net employment. The ap-
parel, motor vehicles, and stone, clay and glass industries also have lost significant
numbers of workers. 4
This downsizing and restructuring of the manufacturing sector has had a nega-
tive effect on relative wage scales--many lost jobs paid quite well and much of what
manufacturing job growth has taken place has been in lower-wage sectors such as elec-
tronic components and plastics. In a recent study undertaken for the Joint Economic
Committee of the U.S. Congress, Bluestone and Harrison indicate that the only segment
of manufacturing jobs which showed any growth between 1979 and 1984 were those
that paid less than $7,400 annually (in 1986 dollars).5
While the nation as a whole has suffered as a result of manufacturing job dis-
placement, those who have suffercd the most are of course the individuals directly in-
volved, with their families and their communities. Numerous studies have examin:d
the ccnsequences of job displacement. At the personal level, these consequences have
included extended unemployment, lower pay when reemployed, loss of health and pen-
sion benefits, exhaustion of unemployment benefits, forced early retirement, geog-
raphic relocatica In order to find new work, and mental and physical stress. Those
workers most negatively affected are older workers, less skilled workers, minorities and
women.6 The impact of these consequences do not stop with the workers involved, but
extend directly to their families and communities. At the family level, the stress levels
on spouses and children increase, as do divorce rates and child behavior problems.
Regions which suffer significant manufacturing job loss feel compounded im-
pacts in the economic, fiscal and social spheres. Manufacturing is at the heart of most
regions' traded sector (or economic base), that portion of the economy exports goods
and services to other regions, and so provides the income which allows the importation
of goods not produced locally. Moreover, average annual manufacturing pay is 29%
above the average annual pay in other sectors, so the multiplier effect of consumer
9
purchases by workers is significant. 7 Further, manufacturing tends to have more com-
plex local backward and forward linkages than do other sectors. Consequently, the loss
of a large number of good factory jobs can have a substantial negative impact on
regional economic well-being. In addition to these economic effects, communities may
be faced with a decreased tax base, increased expenditures for such social services as
welfare, health care and counseling, decreased social cohesion and increased anti-social
behavior.8
The costs of manufacturing job loss have been unevenly distributed across
regions of the U.S. Areas dependent on manufacturing jobs in declining industries,
particularly in the Midwest and Middle Atlantic areas, have felt the heaviest conse-
quences.9 However, no area of the country is immune. In fact, some of highest rates
of plant closure occur in areas of the South newly industrialized by branch plants. 10
-- Factors in the Rastructuring Process
While there is little room for doubt that a restructuring in manufacturing has
been occurring, with its attendant costs, there is less agreement about the factors which
cause job loss. As the economic world is a complex place, a large number of causes
have been proposed. For the most part, these perceptions are not mutually exclusive;
each offers a different emphasis. What is unclear is the extent to which the various
causes suggested are inmportant in explaining the restructuring process. Suggested
causes of job loss can be roughly grouped into three categories--macroeconomic, struc-
tural and institutional.
Macroeconomic factors. The thrust of the macroeconomic argument is that cur-
rency exchange rates and sluggish aggregate demand are behind the decline in
manufacturing. Falling domestic demand brought on by the recessions of the early
1980's produced plant closings and job loss. In its latest annual report, the President's
Council of Economic Advisers states that the problems of the U.S. manufacturing sector
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have been primarily the result of a strong dollar, making imports cheap and exports ex-
pensive. It adds sluggish foreign demand as a factor.1 '
Structural factors. The structuralist orientation to economic development seeks
to explain dynamics behind patterns in the spatial, technological and corporate organi-
zation of economic activity. Industrial restructuring appears as a logical outgrowth of
increasing national and international capitalist competition, made possible by improve-
ments in communications and transportation technology and spurred by increases in the
manufacturing capacity of newly developed nations. While industrial restructuring is
not new, it has taken on increased speed and force in the last decade. Three
manifestations of the restructuring process directly result in job loss: technological
change that increases labor productivity; the geographic dispersion of the productive
capacity cf large multi-plant companies in order to reduce the labor and social costs of
production; and the elimination of productive capacity in a number of firms, including
outright firm failures, because they are no longer cost competitive.
Government statistics show a startling increase in the productivity of production
workers in the last two decades. While the number of production workers today is
down 12% (1.75 million workers) compared to 1969, factories are producing 60% more
output, as measured by the Federal Reserve Board's index of manufacturing output.1i
When the employment and output figures are transformed into a measurement of the
number of production workers it takes to produce one index point's worth of output,
we can see that manufacturing labor productivity has almost doubled in 17 years.
What once took 183,000 workers now takes 101,000.13 (See Figure 1.2.) Bluestone, et.al.,
suggest that for the majority of industries with job loss in the 1970's, productivity en-
hancement was the leading cause of job loss.14
The structuralist perspective on the geographic dispersion of manufacturing,
dubbed the profit cycle theory of industrial location by Ann Markusen, has been sug-
gested by many theorists and supported by a humber of empirical studies.1
5 Over the
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Figure 1.2
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last 40 years, there has been a well-documented flow of new manufacturing capacity
into the less industrialized areas of the U.S. and, more recently, overseas by U.S. corpo-
rations. This movement is perceived as representing the drive to find lower-cost sites
of production for operations in the standardized portion of the product life cycle, sites
with what in present-day parlance is known as good "business climate"--the availability
of low-wage labor, the absence of unions and a relatively low degree of state interven-
tion in the form of taxes and regulation. In a landmark study of the business location
decisions of Fortune 500 firms, Roger Schmenner found that a favorable labor climate
was the most frequently mentioned influence on plant location. 16 Further weight to
this perspective is lent by the beneficiaries of "good business climate" themselves. Each
year, the accounting firm of Grant Thornton publishes an index of state manufactur-
ing climates based primarily on the types of criteria mentioned above--wage costs, un-
ionization, unempioyment and workers' compensation costs, and tax rates. Labor-
related costs account for 63% of each state's final score. Moreover, it is thc opinion of
state manufacturing associations vhich determine the weights of each factor in
determining the rankings.17
From a structural point of view, a third source of major job loss is the elimina-
tion of productive capacity that is unable to compete on the basis of cost. For the most
part, this means reductions in the ranks of smaller firms who cannot attain the
economies of scale of larger ones and contractions in plants of all sizes who cannot
compete with plants in low-wage locations.1 8
In large part, the causes of manufacturing job loss suggested by the structuralist
perspective revolve around increases in the concentration of manufacturing capacity.
Many firms have been tantalized by and acted on the belief that bigger is better in
terms of control of market share, economies of scale, and profits. The merger and ac-
quisition binge of the last decade is testimony to that. The growth in the concentration
of capital has stimulated the development and implementation of labor-saving technol-
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ogy, the geographic dispersion of productive capacity and the competitive weakness of
smaller and higher-cost firms.
Institutional factors. Institutionalist suggestions regarding manufacturing job
loss flow out of a perception that certain characteristics of U.S. manufacturing and
economic institutions encourage corporate behavior that looks profitable in the short-
run, but is self-defeating in the long-run for both the companies and the economy.
One basic institutionalist argument is that the domination of the U.S. stock market by
institutional investors looking for quick, high returns and their lack of hesitancy in
jumping from one stock to another has encouraged a corporate emphasis on short-term
profitability at the expense of long-term investment and profitability. Structural
theory emphasizes as the motivating factor in the restructuring process large corpo-
rations' search for better ways to compete over cost; institutionalists point out corpo-
rate overemrhasis on lowering costs as the means to quicker profits and to the detri-
ment of innovation and product development, those factors which determine the long-
run profitability of the firm. It is suggested that the short-term orientation has per-
vaded corporate attitudes towards investment (by undervaluing it), labor relations (by
undervaluing the contribution which can be made by workers who are treated with
dignity and respect), promotions (rewarding quarterly, Pot long-term results), operations
management (underemphasizing it in favor of marketing and finance) and.risk
(penalizing failure for risk-taking too highly).19
The second thread of the institutionalist argument parallels the first. Not only
have minority investors shifted investment from firm to firm in search of profits, but
so have controlling owners. The theory that shareholders should have a diversified
portfolio of stocks to even out unsystematic risk was transferred to the realm. of con-
glomerate ownership beginning in the 1960's.20 From the 1960's through the next
decade, the trend was for large corporations to develop a stable of diversified firms.
However, for reasons of omission and commission, this approach seems to not have
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worked well. A corollary to the diversified portfolio theory was for conglomerate
ownership to "milk" the profits of subsidiaries with low returns and reinvest these
funds in the more profitable subsidiaries. When the "milked" subsidiary could no
longer meet the required rate of return, it was scrapped. 21 Many times, the tax ad-
vantages of liquidating the subsidiary were greater than the benefits of selling or rein-
vesting to make it profitable again.
The problem of omission simply was that new owners with little experience in
the market of the acquired firm did not know how to run it and so ran it poorly. A
study by Ravenscraft and Scherer indicates that the performance of conglomerate-
acquired subsidiaries tended to decrease significantly after acquisition because of lack
of managerial competence. 22
Some observers suggest that manufacturers who are not headquartered at or near
the site of production are much more likely to disperse production activity than are
firms headquartered locally. One apparent consequence of non-local buyouts of once
locally-owned firms by conglomerates and non-conglomerates alike is loweied stability
of local employment. local firms are much more likely to maintain local operations
because of local ties to family and community. 23
The third thread of an institutional approach concerns plant closings as a result
of firm failures due to management error. At any point in time a certain number of
firms will fail regardless of industry or cyclical conditions. Researchers investigating
the characteristics of failed firms have found that lack of necessary management skills
provides the major explanation of firm failure in manufacturing. Firm failure as
result of lack of management skills most frequently occurs in privately-held, locally-
owned firms. Often, failure occurs soon after firm startup or change of ownership. 24
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-- Economic Development Policy Responses to Manufacturing Job Loss
The Reagan Administration's economic development policy response to the prob-
lems of restructuring has been noticeable by its absence. Attention has been paid
primarily to macroeconomic issues, and with little results. Ideology has dictated a
hands-off approach to issues which the Administration sees as being in the domain of
the private sector and state and local governments. State and local governments are
left to respond to the economic problems engendered by restructuring.
With or without Federal support, states and localities would have been forced to
undertake active development policies. Because each regional economy is unique in
terms of the structure and health of its industrial base, the problems that each region
faces are unique as well. Therefore, to some extent each must come to its own solu-
tions. The pain of past layoffs, the economic necessity of not standing still in times of
a global cconomy, and political pressures have forced local politicians and
policymakers to take a more active and thoughtful role in economic development than
they traditionally have in the past.
Slowly but surely, many states and regions are stri-ing to create effective devel-
opment policies which seek to maintain existing good manufacturing jobs and create
new ones. This is not an easy task. Many issues are beyond the capabilities of states
and cities, e.g., those of trade, the dollar, and foreign entrants. Moreover, with growth
coming so easily in the past, expertise in economic development is in short supply.
However, state and local policies can make a difference. One lesson being learned is
that effective economic development policies cannot be blindly copied from other
regions. Because the structure of each regional economy is to some extent unique, ef-
fective policies best grow out of an in-depth understanding of the dynamics of change
in the regional manufacturing base. However, hand in hand with lack of expertise in
economic development is lack of information that provides such understanding.
16
The Purpose and Structure of the Dissertation
--The Need for Information on the Dynamics of Region Industrial Change
Regarding recent patterns in regional manufacturing employment, researchers
and policymakers lack sufficient information in two key areas. First, they do not have
an adequate sense of gross flows of iob losses and job gains. While a number of nation-
al and regional studies have utilized Dun and Bradstreet or ES-202 unemployment in-
surance data to track gross job flows over a period of time, these studies have a major
failing in that they identify establishment births and deaths through account commen-
cements and terminations. However, it appears that a large number, if not the majori-
ty, of account terminations are the result of changes on ownership or legal structure,
not actual deaths and births. 25 Consequently, the counts of gross job flows aie inac-
curate.
Second, researchers and policymakers need more information regarding the
macroeconomic, structural and institutional factors associated with changes in
manufacturing plant employment. Policy design would be strongly aided by a better
understanding of the extent to whizh particular factors seem to induce job lo3s. As in-
dustrial structure varies by region, the 'mportancc and interaction of assorted factors
will vary as well. Even so, there is little solid statistical evidence in any region regard-
ing the role of various factors.
The lack of information on gross job flows and the underlying factors hampers
the development of effective state and local economic development policies aimed at
maintaining existing decent manufacturing jobs and creating new ones. In the absence
of good information, policies are primarily designed around folk wisdom and anecdotal
evidence.
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-- The Structure of the Dissertation
The purpose of this dissertation is help fill the informational and meth-
odological vacuum through the examination of the 582 manufacturing plants in the
state of Rhode Island which had 50 or more employees in at least one year during the
1977-83 period. First, using ES-202 data, I describe gross job change through plant
deaths, contractions and expansions between 1978 and 1983, years which represent the
peak and nadir, respectively, of recent manufacturing employment in Rhode Island. In
contrast to most other studies, plant births and deaths have been verified through a tel-
ephone survey and newspaper clipping research. Second, using data gathered in the tel-
ephone survey, I examine the statistical relationships between the plant characteristics
and employment change, i.e. the frequency of plant closings and actual and percentage
change in plant emplcyment in the 1978-83 period.
Rhode Island is a logical choice for a case study. Its small size allows the
manufacturing base of the whole state to be examined in detail. The state has been
relatively dependent on manufacturing in general and on a few industries hit by sig-
nificant job loss in particular. Thus, its study should offer insights into the dynamics
of manufacturing job loss.
A prior section described a large number of factors to which manufacturing job
loss cn be reasonably ascribed. To fully explore the influences of and interactions
among the various factors in Rhode Island plant closings would require analyses not
only at the level of the firm, but at the level of each plant's industry, to get at struc-
tural dynamics. Of course, the latter type of analysis is not feasible for a population
of plants that represents hundreds of industries. The primary research here is focussed
at the level of plant and firm characteristics, though secondary source material on par-
ticular industry structures, particularly jewelry and textiles, is introduced as context.
Specifically, I examine relationships between employment change and organizational
characteristics that seem relevant in light of the suggested causes of closings and
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contractions--e.g., firm age, location of headquarters, firm run by original family or ac-
quired, presence or absence of a union, and plant product. This approach is a cost- and
time-effective method for gathering information on and testing a relatively large num-
ber of variables over a whole population.
I originally had hoped that the effect of plant operating characteristics, such
as wage rates and labor productivity, could be analyzed through use of the Census
Bureau's Longitudinal Establishment Data file (LED). Unfortunately, as with other
account-based establishment data bases, the analysis contained significant numbers of
spurious plant births and deaths, so the results were not meaningful.
One consequence of the methodological focus on quantifiable organizational
characteristics is that I do not directly measure a number of factors external to the
firm or not easily quantified, e.g., the effects of the strong dollar, changes in foreign
demand and supply, change in production technology, and quality of management
However, some of the variables will be proxies for these factors. For instance, firm
age is a stand-in for management skills, under the hypcthesis that the younger the
firm, the shakier the enterprise. One variable, national empl:yment change in the
plant's industry, reflects a number of external forces whose effect cannot be clearly
seen at the plant level in this analysis, e.g., technological change, foreign competition,
and shifts in aggregate demand and currency exchange rates.
In Chapter 2, I provide background information on that state's economy and its
manufacturing sector. Using Rhode Island Department of Employment Security (DES)
ES-202 establishment data, Chapter 3 gives us a sense of the gross job losses and gains
between 1978-83, both on a year-to-year basis and over the period as a whole. Job
losses are distributed between plant closings and contractions. Patterns in job recovery
in the year subsequent to contraction are examined. In addition, the methodology and
results with be compared to those of other such studies.
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In Chapter 4, I examine the statistical relationships between plant characteristics
and the frequency of plant closings. The core of this chapter is comprised of logit
regression analyses, with the categorical dependent variable being plant was
opened/closed as of December 31, 1983. The regressions are followed by an examina-
tion of the closed plants regarding the reasons for closure, both to explicate the regres-
sion findings and to see if additional patterns emerge.
In Chapter 5, I analyze the statistical relationships between plant organizational
characteristics and plant employment change, using ordinary least squares regressions.
The dependent variable is percentage plant employment change from 1978 to 1983, as
measured using ES-202 data. The independent variables will be those used in Chapter
4 (or variations thereof).
Originally, Chapter 6 was to have consisted of an examination of the rela-
tionship between plant operating data (such as wage rates, cost of materials and labor
productivity) and employment change (as measured by plant closings, actual and per-
centage employment change). The source of data for this analysis was to have been the
LED, which covers all manufacturing establishments surveyed by the quinquennial
Census of Manufactures. Because the LED is a confidential file, its plant operating
data could not be integrated with the other analyses. Rather, I had to hire the Census
Bureau to undertake a separate analysis. Unfortunately, it became clear that the extent
to which the LED is actually longitudinal is severely diminished for the same reason
that prior DMI and ES-202 studies are inaccurate. Plant closures could only be identi-
fied through plant number terminations, but many, if not most, plant number termina-
tions in actuality represent changes in ownership. This fact was ascertained through a
comparison of plant closure rates based on the DES/survey data base with those for the
LED. Unlike DMI and DES, in theory the plant number terminations are to occur only
in cases of actual closures, but this is not the case. Consequently, the chapter sets out
20
the planned analytic methodology and then provides the analysis that determined that
the LED is not as fully longitudinal as I had hoped.
In the final chapter, I explore the policy implications of the findings of Chap-
ters 3-5 for economic development policymakers. I end with a few concluding remarks
regarding what I perceive to be the contributions of the thesis to the field of economic
development.
21
CHAPTER NOTES
'While the negative effects of the Depression certainly were much worse, those
job losses were cyclical rather than structural in nature. Regional restructuring with
large-scale negative effects has occurred, e.g., the loss of the New England shoe and
textile industry in the 1940's and 1950's. However, on a national level, the sum total of
recent job loss for reasons of structural change is unparalleled.
2 U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, "Reemployment Increases Among Displaced
Workers," News Release 86-414, October 14, 1986.
3Michael Podgursky and Paul Swaim, "Labor Market Adjustment and Job
Displacement: Evidence from the January, 1984 Displaced Worker Survey," Department
of Economics, University of MA, January 1986. The number of displaced manufactur-
ing workers in the 1979-84 period with 3 or more years job tenure totalled 2.48 million,
so the total job loss figure of 4.25 million should be roughly comparable to the 1981-86
total job loss figure, which has not been published.
4U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment, Hours and Earnings. United
States, 1909-1984, Volume I (March i985) and Supplement (June 1936), Washington, DC:
Government Printing Office.
5 Barry Bluestone and Bennett Harrison, "The Great American Job Machine: The
Proliferation of Low Wage Employment in the U.S. Economy," prepared for the Joint
Fconomic Committee of the U.S. Congress, December 1986.
6 The most recent compilation of studies of the consequences of job loss is con-
tained in Office of Technology Assessraent, U.S. Congress, Technology and Structural
Unemployment: Reemploving Displaced Adults (Washington, DC: U.S. Government
Printing Office, February 1986), Chapter 3: "Worker Displacement."
7U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, "Average Annual Pay by State and Industry,
1984," News Release 85-320, August 13, 1985.
8 For a review of studies of the community effects of job loss, see Barry
Bluestone and Bennett Harrison, The Deindustrialization of America: Plant Closings,
Community Abandonment, and the Dismantling of Basic Industry (New York: Basic
Books, 1982), pp. 67-81.
9 U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Displaced Workers: 1979-83, Bulletin 2240
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, July 1985).
ioBluestone and Harrison, The Deindustrialization of America.
1 Council of Economic Advisers, "Annual Report," in the Economic Report of
the President (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, January 1987), Chapter 3:
"Growth, Competitiveness, and the Trade Deficit." See also Robert Lawrence, "The
Myth of U.S. Deindustrialization," Challenge, November-December 1983.
12Economic Report of the President, Table B-45.
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13This 44% decrease in the number of workers per index point of production
does not take into account changes in the industrial mix over the period. However,
measures at the two-digit industry level show similar change: machinery (51%
decrease), foods (42%), motor vehicles (40%) and apparel (35%).
14Barry Bluestone, Bennett Harrison and Lucy Gorham, "Storm Clouds on the
Horizon: Labor Market Crisis and Industrial Policy," (Brookline, MA: Economic Edu-
cation Project, May 1984), p. 17.
15 See Ann Markusen, Profit Cycles, Oligopolv and Regional Development
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985); Richard Walker and Michael Storper, "Capital and
Industrial Location," Progress in Human Geography, v.? n.4, 1981; Richard Walker,
"Two Sources of Uneven Development under Advanced Capitalism: Spatial Dif-
ferentiation and Capital Mobility," Review of Radical Political Economics, Fall 1978;
John Rees, Geoffrey Hewings and Howard Stafford, eds., Industrial Location and
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CHAPTER 2
OVERVIEW OF THE RHODE ISLAND MANUFACTURING SECTOR
Rhode Island Industrial History to 19501
-- Historical Review
From its founding in 1636 through the early 1700's, the Rhode Island economy
was based primarily on agriculture. In the second half of the 18th century, economic
emphasis shifted to maritime commerce and rum distilling. However, with the estab-
lishment of Samuel Slater's water-powered textile mill in 1793, Rhode Island quickly
entered the industrial age. After 50 years of slow but steady growth, the state's indus-
trial employment grew at a rapid pace--from 18,000 in 1840 to 153,500 in 1919. This
industrial growth was centered around the cotton and wool textiles, machinery and
jewelry industries.
The industrialization process was led by the cottou textile industry. The num-
ber of cotton mill spindles in the state climbed from 76,000 In 1815 to 500,000 in 1840
to 3 million by 1920. By the latter year, 35,000 people were employed in the cotton
mills. The woolen textile industry also grew significantly--from 1,000 workers in 1840
to over 25,000 by 1920. Initially, growth of the textile industry depended on access to
water for power and a ready supply of unemployed farm workers. The development of
steam power and power looms, the building of large stone mills, and a massive and
steady influx of work-hungry immigrants all propelled the state textile industry to its
peak employment of over 70,000 workers in the early 20th century.
Hand in hand with growth in the textile industry in the late 19th century went
increased concentration of mill ownership and harsher working conditions. The compe-
tition for profits led to the development and introduction of a series of production-
boosting technologies. However, the utilization of these technologies led to overproduc-
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tion, which in turn produced falling prices, meager profits and some staggering losses.
Only the largest firms could meet the capital demands for newer machinery and ride
out, or attempt to control through acquisition, the fluctuations of the market. In the
attempt to be profitable in the production of standardized commodities, owners became
obsessed with reducing costs. They assigned more machines to each worker, ran the
machines faster and cut wages. Workers reacted to the increasingly intolerable condi-
tions by unionization, strikes and work stoppages.
Rhode Island's machinery industry initially was established to produce equip-
ment for the textile factories. In the second half of the 19th century, the industry de-
veloped to the point where Providence became the leading center of American industri-
al technology. The town boasted the nation's foremost producer of steam engines
(Corliss) and machine tools (Browne and Sharpe). America's rush to industxialization
meant a booming business for the state's machinery manufacturers. The first
machinists' local in the state was formed in 1891.2
The jewelry and silverware industry got its start in Rhode Island in 1794. With
the introduction of mechanized production equipment at the end of the i800's, the in-
dustry was transformed from a craft to a mass production orientation. By 1910 Pro-
vidence alore had nearly 300 jewelry firms and was the silverware capital of the coun-
try. With the spread of mass production, firm specialization took place--finding houses,
refiners, and job shops specializing in electroplating, enameling, engraving casting and
lapidary work appeared. In a pattern which has remained true through today, most of
these companies were small because of the risks of heavy investment in expansion in
an industry which was very sensitive to changes in fashion and fluctuations in the gen-
eral economy.
The shift to mass production brought with it the de-skilling of traditional
jewelry jobs, the fall of wage rates, job instability and increased hiring of women, who
tended to be more willing than men to take such jobs. For a number of reasons, the
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jewelry industry had very few labor unions. Firms tended to be small, often short-
lived and required little capital investment to start. The women workers were gener-
ally more resigned to working conditions and money worries made them fearful of
losing their jobs. These dynamics remain true today.3
The growth in Rhode Island manufacturing employment reached a halt at
153,500 in 1919. Half of the state's industrial employment was in the textile industry.
In 1920, the textile industry began its 50-year move to the South, where it could enjoy
lower labor costs and a more tractable workforce. The cotton mills were the first to
go--by 1939, the state had lost two-thirds of its spindle capacity and cotton mill jobs.
However, worsted mill employment was steady in the 1930's and jobs in synthetics ac-
tually grew significantly. The state's jewelry industry was hard hit by the Depression,
as consumers could only afford low-cost items. By 1939, overall manufacturing
employment was down to 125,000.4
The 1910's through the 1930's were a time of significant labor organizing and
unrest ip Rhode Island's textile industry. The Industrial Workers of the World in-
stigated a wave of strikes among recent Italian immigrants in the textile industry in
1914-15. After the First World War, when textiie mill owners increased the work hours
and reduced wages, workers reacted by organizing new union locals and strikes.
Facing job losses and wage cuts in the 1930's, textile workers both in Rhode Island and
across the country went on an industry-wide United Textile Workers-led strike that
resulted in several days of street riots. However, the thread that ties each of these
episodes is that for the most part workers failed to reverse the industry trends imposed
by the owners and economic conditions.5
The state's industrial base was reinvigorated by the demands of war production.
Total plant employment jumped to 171,000 by 1943. All sectors of the industrial base
were busy producing war materiel. Seventy percent of employment in production in
the jewelry industry was devoted to war-related goods such as small radar and radio
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parts, proximity fuses for motors and artillery shells, and small precision assemblies.
The state's electrical and electronic components industry grew out of this conversion.
Manufacturing employment remained relatively strong immediately after the
war, standing at 155,000 in 1947. Consistent with the past, the state's economy and in-
dustrial base were dominated by the textile industry, which employed 67,000 workers.6
The state's jewelry industry doubled in size between 1939 and 1947 in the face of
booming consumer demand. With 20,000 workers, the state provided 44% of the coun-
try's jewelry jobs.
-- The Le2acies of the State's Core Industries at Mid-Century
In the first half of the 20th century, Rhode Island's textile, machinery and
jewelry industries provided the state with a number of legacies. First, they helped
spawn a number of other industries in the state. For instance, a significant wire end
cable industry grew because the covering for most wire and cable was textile. When
plastic sheaths replaced textile ones, a viable plastics industry developed. Skills
learned in the jewelry and machinery industries encouraged the establishment of firms
in fabricated metals--plating, valves and fittiigs, and hardware and cutlerv--and in
other jewelry-type work such as shoe and handbag ornaments and optical goods. The
diversification of the plastics industry into custom molding also was stimulated by
p-oximity to the jewelry industry. The spinning off of electrical components firms
from the jewelry industry was noted above.
The second legacy of the textile and jewelry industries was a tradition of a
manufacturing work force paid low wages, with low educational achievement, and with
a higher-than-average representation of women, characteristics quite related to one an-
other. With mill jobs readily available and requiring little training of education,
Rhode Island workers typically left school at an early age. Employers offering low-
wage, low-skilled jobs often sought women to fill them because women were more will-
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ing than men to take such jobs. In 1950, 38% of the Rhode Island industrial workforce
was comprised of women, compared to 25% for the U.S. Forty-three percent of textile
workers and 60% of jewelry workers were women. 7
A third legacy of the state's textile and machinery industries was a tradition of
a strong union presence in the state. In this heavily industrialized state, union strength
translated itself to the ballot box. In the 1930's, the labor movement, the working class
and the Democratic party created an alliance which ensured that the party governed
the state for decades.8 The legislature itself periodically had a number of union mem-
bers on its rolls.
Fourth, Rhode Island had developed a tradition of entrepreneurial activity. In
the 1800's and early 1900's, some of the country's largest firms in textiles, machinery
and rubber were headquartered in Rhode Island. By mid-century, many of them were
gone, but there were still a very high number of small, locally-owned firms spread
throughout Rhode Island's industries such as in specialized textiles, jewelry and ma-
chinery.
The final legacy of the state's major manufacturing industries was the eco-
nomy's high vulnerability to structural shifts. In 1947, 52% of Rhode Island employ-
ment was in manufacturing, compared to 36% for the U.S. (See Figure 2.1.) Employ-
ment in the state's three major industry groups--textiles, metals and non-electrical ma-
chinery, and jewelry and silverware--accounted for 76% of ail manufacturing jobs
(compared to 32% for the U.S.). 9 The state's textile industry employed 44% of all
manufacturing workers and 23% of all workers. With such concentration, the state was
enormously vulnerable to a restructuring of the textile industry, as it soon found out.
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Rhode Island Manufacturing Employment and Wages in the Postwar Period' 0
The postwar major trends in Rhode Island manufacturing employment and
wages are consistent with its prior industrial history:
o The manufacturing sector dominated the state economy to a far greater degree
than for the U.S. as a whole (Figure 2.1);
o the manufacturing sector itself continued to be dominated by textiles, jewelry
and metals and machinery, though that dominance declined over time (Figure
2.2);
o such dependence brought about large swings in aggregate manufacturing
employment (Figure 2.3);
o the cyclical sensitivity of manufacturing generally and high state dependence
on manufacturing in general and a few industries in particular also brought
about swings in unemployment rates more volatile than for the U.S. as a
whole (Figu-e 2.4);
o the manufacturing sector, dominated as it has been by textiles and jewelry,
tends towards low-wage, low-skill jobs--RI manufacturing wages and value-
added per worker are among the lowest in the country (Figures 2.5 and 2.6).
The remainder of this section looks at the manifestation of these themes in the
1947-78 period. The next section examines in grepter detail RI manufacturing employ-
ment and wages in 1978-83, the focus period of this dissertation.
1947-1964: The Devastation of the Textile Industry. Between 1951 and 1958,
Rhode Island manufacturing employment fell from 150,900 to 113,200, a plunge of 25%.
The primary reason for this massive loss was the decimation of the textile industry,
which lost 50% of its jobs (29,000) in the seven years, as operations either were liqui-
dated or moved South. (See Figure 2.7.) These losses were almost entirely in wool tex-
tiles, whose market share was being seriously eroded by Southern-produced synthetic
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products."1 A steep decline also occurred in the machinery industry, which was
centered in textile machinery. For the state, this was restructuring with a vengeance.
The state's dependence on textiles meant that throughout the late 1940's and
1950's it suffered an unemployment rate far above that for the U.S. as a whole. More-
over, the ups and downs in the movement of the rate were quite volatile, as Figure 2.4
shows. While the U.S. was feeling the negative economic effects of the end of Korean
War, Rhode Island was experiencing that plus a one-year loss of 10,000 textile jobs
(almost as many as are left in the state today.)
Rhode Island's real average hourly wage grew in the 1950's as it did elsewhere
in the country, though at a far slower rate. In 1948, the state average wage was 93% of
the U.S. average. In ten years, the figure had plummeted to 83%. The first reason for
this drop is that textile wages, still the state's dominant industry, failed to keep up
with wag- growth in othei sectors. 12 The second is that the state developed one of the
most labor-intensive, low value-added industrial sectors in the country. In 1947, Rhode
Island value-added per production worker was 83% of the U.S. figure; in 1958, the state
figure was 68% of that for the U.S.1 3 This wage structure resulted from a combination
of industry mix and pay that was less than for similar work elsewhere. 4
From the late 1950's through the mid-1960's, overall manufacturing employment
remained fairly stagnant. Textile employment continued to slide, with the losses were
made up by machinery, electrical goods, and increased diversification inlto such in-
dustries as chemicals, paper products and instruments. As the massive loss of textile
jobs receded in time, the state unemployment rate fell close to the national figure.
1964-1969: Machinery- and Jewelry-Led Growth. As a result of several trends,
state manufacturing employment grew by 10% from the mid- to late 1960's. First, the
slide in textile employment stopped. Second, jobs in the growth industries of the pre-
vious period continued to be added--in machinery, electrical components, chemicals,
and plastics. Third, additional growth came from jewelry-related firms. The dominant
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force in the industrial sector became metals and machinery, which provided 23% of the
manufacturing jobs in 1969. For the first time in decades, the state's unemployment
rate not only fell below 4% and but also was at the same level as that for the U.S.15
1969-1975: Recessions. Between 1969 and the twin recessions of the early and
mid-1970's, manufacturing employment fell 15% (compared to 9% for the U.S.).
Employment in the textile industry again fell in half, from 21,100 to 11,800. Other
losers included metals, machinery and rubber and plastics. In 1970, for the first time
in the state's history, jewelry employment surpassed textile employment. Jewelry
employment actually grew 20% between 1969 and 1975 on the strength of changes in
fashion and the growth in the young adult market.
Once again, the state's economic woes were compounded by a dependence on
manufacturing in general and on textiles and machinery in particular (textiles still had
a 17% share of industrial employment in 1969). The state's unemployment rate jumped
well above that for the U.S.--hitting 11.2% in 1975, compared to 8.5% for the U.S. Eco-
nomic difficulties were exacerbated by the closing of the Quonset Naval Yard in 1971-
4 period, which resulted in the loss of 22,000 jobs.
1975-1978: Jewelry-Led Boom. After steep job losses in 1971 and 1975, the
state's manufacturing sector hit the up-side of the roller coaster between i975 and
1978. The state's manufacturing employment jumped 19% to over 134,000, a level
which had not been achieved since 1953. In comparison, the U.S. manufacturing
employment rose 12% in the 3 years.
Fueling the increase was a one-third jump in jewelry employment. While fash-
ion trends continued to favor the jewelry industry, employment also jumped because of
the deregulation of gold. As the price of gold rose, so did consumer demand for both
costume and precious jewelry, the former because it was affordable and the latter be-
cause it was seen as a good investment. Rhode Island jewelry-makers' orders also
climbed with the entrance of several national sales companies into the jewelry retail
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business. Even jewelry manufacturers with little business experience found business
quite profitable. 16
Almost all categories of industrial employment showed increases, even textiles.
Besides jewelry, other significant sources of new employment included transportation
equipment, a source of well-paying jobs, and electrical goods. The transportation jobs
were provided primarily by General Dynamics, which started building submarines soon
after the Navy pulled out of Quonset.
Even with the growth in industries across the board, the explosive growth in
jewelry gave the state a new industry on which to be overly dependent. In 1978, 24.2%
of all industrial jobs were in jewelry, compared to 15.8% in 1969. The growth in ag-
gregate manufacturing employment in that decade was provided entirely by jewelry.
(Total manufacturing employment was up 6,500, jewelry employment 12,000.)
Primarily as a result of the growth in the low-wage jewelry industry, the state's
real average hourly manufacturing wage steadily declined through the 1970's. Nation-
ally, the jewelry industry paid among the lowest wages in manufacturing--an average
$4.07/hr. in 1978, just 66% of the all-manufacturing average. The state's average
manufa:turing wage as a p'ercentage of the U.S. average dropped to 76%.
1978-1983: Industrial Decline
-- Overview of Trends in Employment and Wages
Employment. The manufacturing employment peak reached in 1978 could not
be sustained. Again, the state felt the effects of a volatile manufacturing base. Be-
tween 1978 and 1983, the number of manufacturing jobs fell by over 18,000, a drop of
14% (compared to 10% for the U.S.). The worst year of net job loss was 1982, when
employment declined by 11,100. During this period, the state's unemployment rate
went from 6.7% to 10.3%, with most of the jump occurring in 1982.
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The jewelry industry provided over half of the net job loss as its employment
level plummeted by 9,600, a one-third drop. When jobs related to the jewelry industry
were counted (e.g., in metal services, display boxes, and shoe buckles), total jewelry-
related job loss was about 12,000, or two-thirds of the total net job loss. Machinery,
textiles, leather, primary metals, and stone, clay and glass accounted for another 8,500
lost jobs. The only industry which managed gains was transportation equipment, on
the strength of a single employer, General Dynamics.
Wages. Throughout the period, the state continued its tradition of having a
low value added, low-wage industrial base. In 1983, Rhode Island's value added per
production worker was 66% of the U.S. figure. The state ranked 50th of the 50 states
both in value added per production worker and in capital expenditures per production
worker. 17 Rhode Island's 1979 average hourly wage of $5.10 ranked 48th among all
states, ahead only of Mississippi and North Carolina.1 8
Over the period, the average wage in 13 of 14 major RI industry groups was
below the U.S. tverage, witn the only exception being apparel. In fact, the majority of
RI 2-digit industries paid wages that were less than 90% of those paid in these in-
dustries elsewhere in the country. For instance, in 1973, (he state's manufacturing
boom year, primary metals paid 67% of the national average, paper 70%, transportation
equipment 74%, and fabricated metals 75%.
Given the state's traditional dependence on low-wage manufacturing, it is not
surprising that the state's average annual pay for all wage and salary workers has been
well below that for the U.S. The state's figure has remained at 87% of the U.S. figure
since 1978.19
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--The Structure of the Manufacturing Sector, 1978-83
In preparation for the next three chapters, this section provides a more disag-
gregated picture of Rhode Island's manufacturing industries in 1978 and the employ-
ment changes they experienced as of 1983. Table 2.1 provides a picture of Rhode Is-
land manufacturing employment in 1978 and 1983 by 2-digit industry and across a
number of dimensions--total employment, distribution of employment, employment
change and percent employment change 1978-83, and location quotient. Table 2.2 pro-
vides similar information on selected 3- and 4-digit industries.
Overview. In 1978, the dominant industrial sectors in the state were jewelry,
textiles, electrical goods, and fabricated metals. The state had some competitive ad-
vantage in 8 major industry groups (location quotient of over 1), particularly in
jewelry and textiles, and was at a competitive disadvantage in 12 industry groups. The
only industry in which the state had a signiificant national presence was jewelry, fcr
which it had a 33% share of U.S. employment.
After the 14% employment decline between 1978 and 1983, the state's manufac-
turing case looked more diversified because of the large job loss ill jewelry. Only the
transportation equipment industry snowed any significant job growth. Jewelry
remained the largest industrial employer by far.
As Table 2.3 indicates, Rhode Island manufacturing workers were employed to a
greater degree in small establishments than were manufacturing workers for the U.S. as
a whole. Whereas one-quarter of U.S. workers were employed in plants of under 100
people, one-third of Rhode Island workers were. On the other hand, relatively few
Rhode Islanders were employed in plants of over 1000 workers. These facts on the dis-
tribution of employment by establishment size will be important in interpreting the
results of the next several chapters.
Jewelry and Jewelry-Related Industries. 20 In 1978, the jewelry industry and re-
lated industries--e.g., metal services, paperboard containers, signs and displays, shoe and
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Table 2.1
RHODE ISLAND MANUFACTURING EMP'.OYMENT BY MAJOR INDUSTRY GROUP
1976, 1983
Employment (009's) Location Quotient Establishments
Major Industry Group 1978 1983 Change % Change 1978 1983 1978 1983
All Manufacturing 134.4 116.2 (18.2) (14%) 1.44 1.45 3351 3071
Food 3.6 3.1 (0,5) (14) .46 .44 150 133
Textiles 12.6 10.9 (1.7) (13) 3.07 3.38 220 188
Apparel 4.0 3.4 (0.6) (15) .66 .67 79 64
Lumber & Wood 0.5** i.2** 0.7 140 .15 .42 50* 54*
Furniture& Fixtures 1.3* 1.3* 0.0 0 .58 .67 32* 32*
Paper Products 3.1 2.5 (0.6) (19) .97 .87 62 63
Printing & Publishing 5.1 5.7 0.6 12 .94 1.01 199 203
Chemicals 3.1 3.0 (0.1) (3) .62 .66 87 72
Rubber & Plastics 7.1 6.2 (6.9) (13) 2.06 2.00 114 118
Leather 3.0* 1.5* (1.5) (50) 2.56 1.68 23* 18
Stone, Clay, Glass 3.1 2.0 (1.1) (35) .97 .81 59 48
Primary Metals 7.2 6.0 (1.2) (17) 1.30 1.66 106 117
Fabricated Metals 10.0 9.2 (0.8) (8) 1.31 1.54 402 397
Machinery 9.3 6.3 (3.0) (32) .88 .71 281 270
Electrical & Electronic 11.5 11.2 (0.3) (3) 1.26 1.28 70 94
Trans. Equipment 6.2 8.9 2.7 44 .68 1.17 47* 52*
Instruments 5.3 4.6 (0.7) (13) 1.78 1.53 64 71
Jewelry 32.5 22.9 (9.6) (30) 72.42 69.95 1193 1039
Misc. Mfg. 5.7 5.3 (0.4) (7) 3.53 4.12 233* 167*
Source: ES-790 tables, RI Dept. of Employment Security and U.S. Bureau of Labor Stctistics,
except as noted.
* U.S. Bureau of the Census, County Business Patterns
** U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Manufactures (1977, 1982)
Table 2.2
RHODE ISLAND EMPLOYMENT IN SELECTED MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES
1978, 1983
Employment (000's)
Industry
Textiles
Wool Weaving
Narrow Fabrics
Knitting Mills
Textile Finishing
Yarn & Thread
Rubber & Plastics
Rubber Products
Misc. Plastics
Primary Metals
Nonferrous Rolling & Drawinj
Blast Furnaces & Basic Steel
Fabricated Metals
Screw Machine Products
Metal Forging & Stamping
Metals Services-- Plating,
Polishing, Coating
Non-electrical Machinery
Metalworking Machinery
Textile Machinery
Electrical and Electronic
Lighting and Wiring
Communications Equipment
Components and Accessories
Jewelry
Precious Metal Jewelry
Jewelers' Materials
Costume Jewelry
1978
1.1
3.1
2.1
1.9
1.7
1.9*
5.2*
5.6
2.1
1.4
1.1
3.8
4.9
1.4
4.0
2.1 (est.)
1.9
9.5
5.9 (est.)
16.1
1983
1.0+
2.4
0.9
1.6
0.8
1.3*
4.9*
5.1
1.2
1.2
1.2
Cha.ge
n.a.
(0.7)
(1.2)
(0.3)
(1.1)
(0.6)
(0.3)
(0.5)
(0.9)
(0.2)
0.1
2.5 0.3)
3.3
0.7
2.8
2.5-3.0
1.9
5.7 (esc.)
1.9
11.5
(1.6)
(0.7)
(1.2)
(.4-0.9
0.0
(3.8)
(4.0)
(4.7)
% Chainge
n.a.
(23%)
(57)
(16)
(54)
(32)
(6)
(9)
(43)
Establishments
1978 1983
16
39
14
23
19
15
91
25
7
49
34
(14)
9
(34)
(331
(50)
(30)
19-43
0
(40)
(68)
(29)
12
34
14
28
17
19
97
25
5
45
45
163 154
108
22
14
5
23
244
177
278
95
21
16
10
30
211
132
276
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, County Business Patterns, except as nuted.
Figures are for March.
* RI Department of Employment Security, ES-202 tables. FigLres are annual averages.
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Table 2.3
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF EMPLOYMENT BY ESTABLISHMENT SIZE
RHODE ISLAND AND U.S., 1978 AND 1983
Establishment 1978 1983
Size Class RI US RI uS
1-19 9.5% 6.7% 10.0% 7.7%
20-49 11.8 8.7 13.1 9.6
50-99 12.0 9.9 13.1 10.7
100-249 19.9 17.7 19.5 18.4
250-499 15.8 15.3 16.0 15.2
500-999 15.9 13.7 14.3 12.8
1000+ 15.1 28.0 14.0 25.5
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, County Business Patterns
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handbag buckles, and watch cases--employed approximately 40,000 workers, 30% of the
manufacturing workforce. The heart of the jewelry industry was costume jewelry,
which employed over 16,000 workers. In 1978, Rhode Island employed nearly 60% of
U.S. costume jewelry workers. Other jewelry industries with significant presence in-
cluded precious metal jewelry and jewelry findings (component jewelry pieces such as
earposts and decorations). The state's share of U.S. employment in these other two in-
dustries also was high, 23% and 56% respectively. The share of precious jewelry
employment was lower than the others primarily because the jobs in that industry are
of a higher skill and Rhode Island's competitive advantage in jewelry has been low-
wage, lower-skilled labor.
Between 1978 and 1983, the number of jewelry establishments dropped from 699
to 619. Employment in the jewelry industry and related fields dropped approximately
12,000, which accounted for two-thirds of the total net employment loss in manufactur-
ing. Much of the jewelry loss occurred because of industry sensitivity to declining per-
sonal income, changing tastes, mismanagement (Ps we will see) and import penetration,
particularly for precious jewelry 2 '
As mentioned earlier, the jewelry industry is comprised primarily of small estab-
lishments, because changes in fashions and sensitivity to economic conditions make
large-scale investment very risky. About 80% of Rhode Island's jewelry plants have
less than 50 workers.
Textiles. After the massive reduction in textile employment between 1947 and
1978, the firms that remained generally produced short-run, specialty items that re-
quired a higher mix of skilled labor than the commodity-type products produced else-
where. 2 2 In order of importance, textile employment in Rhode Island in 1978 was con-
centrated primarily in narrow fabrics (i.e., elastic fabrics and braided fabrics), knitting
mills, textile finishing, and yarn and thread. The state still had some comparative ad-
vantage in textiles in 1978--its location quotient was 3.1. Between 1978 and 1983, state
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textile employment dropped by 1,700, the third biggest loss after jewelry and ma-
chinery.
Machinery. In 1978, most of the state's 9,300 machinery workers were located in
the metalworking machinery industry (particularly at Browne and Sharpe) and in the
textile machinery industry (despite the fact that the latter industry was less than a
tenth of its size in 1951). The state still produced over 5% of the country's textile ma-
chinery. By 1983, machinery employment had fallen to 6,300 (down 30%). The losses
were primarily a result of a long-term strike at Browne and Sharpe, depressed demand
in machine tools, and the elimination of half of the remaining textile machinery
employment.
Primary metals. In 1978, the bulk of the state's primary metals employment
(7,200) was in nonferrous wire drawing and insulating (over 5,000), with the remainder
mostly in blast furnaces and basic steel. While employment in wire and cable fell
slightly, employment in blast furnaces and basic steel was cut almost in half. Employ-
ment in 1983 for the orimary metals group was 6,00U. Major wire and cable employers
included Carol Cable (bought a few years ago from Avr.et), Leviton and Kaiser
Aluminum.
Electric and Electronic Eouioment. In 1978, employment in the electrical goods
industry was located primarily in electric lighting and wiring, communications equip-
ment and electric components and accessories. Employment in the latter group actually
grew between 1978 and 1983. The only 3-digit electrical industry to suffer major job
losses was electric lighting and wiring, as a result of General Electric's relocation of
two wiring device operations to Mexico. The largest employer in communications
equipment was Raytheon.
Rubber and Plastics. In 1978, the rubber and plastics firms employed 7,100
people, primarily in making miscellaneous plastics products. Even so, most of the 900
lost jobs came from the rubber sector, many from the failure of a canvas shoe
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manufacturer. The largest plastics employer in the state is Tupperware, a division of
Dart Industries.
Other Industries and Employers. Rhode Island had manufacturing employment
in a number of other industries, many of which were dominated by one or several
employers. The largest employer in the food processing industry was Narragansett
Brewery, a unionized plant owned by Falstaff Beer, and shut down in 1981. While
General Dynamics provided a near majority of the jobs in transportation, Fram auto
filters also had a sizeable number. In the apparel industry, Health-Tex, a maker of
children's clothes, was the dominant employer. Most of the other establishments in the
industry were job shops. American Tourister Luggage provided nearly half the jobs in
the leather industry category (even though few suitcases are made out of leather these
days). While miscellaneous manufacturing had many small employers with product
lines sucn as Christmas ornaments and artificial flowers, a large percentage of the
employment was provided by two big employers--A.T. Cross (pens) and Hasbro (toys
and games).
1983-1986: Industrial Sta2nation and the Growth of the Se;vice-Producing Sector
After previous manufacturing recessions, the state's industrial sector typically hs
shown significant job growth. However, manufacturing employment has been fairly
flat since 1983. Today, the jobs level is at 119,000, only 3% above the nadir of 1983.
The U.S. manufacturing sector as a whole has experienced the same trend.
However, since 1983 and for the first time in recent history, the state's un-
employment rate has moved appreciably below that for the U.S. In 1986, the state's un-
employment rate was 4.1%, compared to 7.0% for the U.S. This achievement was made
possible by a 17% increase in non-manufacturing employment in three years (from
275,000 to 323,000) that outpaced the growth in the labor force. The largest gainers
were services and retail trade. The state now appears to be attracting a number of
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backoffice clerical operations in the finance and insurance industries.2 3 To the extent
this is so, these jobs may be simply a cleaner form of the low-wage jewelry jobs they
are replacing.
With the growth in service production, the state's reliance on manufacturing has
continued to fall. In 1986, manufacturing contributed 27% of the state employment,
compared to 34% in 1978. The traditional heart and soul of the state's industrial base--
textiles, jewelry and machinery--has fallen in size to such an extent that the state
manufacturing sector by default is more diversified than ever before. Textiles,
jewelry, and metals and machinery now comprise 46% of all manufacturing employ-
ment, compared to 76% in 1947.
In many areas of the country, the substitution of service-producing jobs for
goods-producing jobs has meant substantial losses of income for laid-off workers.
However, because of Rhode Island's low factory wages, and particularly because half
of the layoffs came in the very low-wage jewelry industry, the pay differential be-
tween many Rhode Island manufacturing and service jobs is much less, though still
negative. The average annual pay per RI manufacturing worker was 15% above the
annual average pay of other workers in the state, compared to 29% for the U S.
Moreover, the 1981 average hourly jewelry wage ($5.07 in current dollars) was 17%
below even Rhode Island's low all-manufacturing wage. Average service sector pay
was 25% below average manufacturing pay. Hence, if a laid-off jewelry worker could
find another job, it was likely that she would still suffer an income loss, but relatively
less than elsewhere.
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16Rhode Island Strategic Development Commission, o.cit., p. 199.
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2 3New York Times, "Providence Striving to Join the Boom by Luring Business
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CHAPTER 3
ANALYSIS OF GROSS JOB FLOWS
RHODE ISLAND, 1978-83
Introduction
The debates over the causes of economic dislocation and the public programs
needed to ameliorate dislocation are hampered by a fundamental lack of information
regarding the sources of employment change. Measuring the net change in aggregate
employment, even in 4-digit industries, does not allow us to see the roles of firm and
plant births, expansions, deaths and contractions in employment change. Little is
known about the percentage of jobs which are actually eliminated each year, the per-
centage of job loss due to plant closures, and the percentage of contraction job losses
which are not temporary. But without accuirate knowledge of the sources of employ-
ment change, it is difficult to fully understand the nature and extent of the economic
problems faced and to design programs that can meet those problems.
As one attempt to deal with this lack of information, in this chapter I disag-
gregate change in Rhode Island manufacturing employment for the 1978-83 period into
by the extent and scurce of job change at the olant level. I am calling this effort a
gross job flow:: analysis. Gross job gains are those jobs added by expanding and. new
plants; gross job losses are jobs eliminated as the result of plant contractions and
closures.1 Specifically, the chapter will look at:
o gross job losses and gains over the period as a whole and annually,
o the number of lost jobs attributable to plant closings and to plant contrac-
tions,
o the number of jobs lost in contracting plants in one year that are recovered
by those plants in the next, and
o patterns in annual job loss and gain as the recession deepened.
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In addition, I compare the methodology and findings of this chapter to those of
other studies which have attempted to measure gross job flows. In light of the Rhode
Island findings, I then offer a series of generalizations regarding gross flow trends that
might be tested through further study.
Methodoloey
-- Collection of Employment Data
I obtained the data for the gross flow and regression analyses from the ES-202
files of the Rhode Island Department of Employment Security (DES). 2 The ES-202
files are prepared from the quarterly unemployment insurance (UI) reports that must
be filed by nearly every employer in the state. DES made the employment data avail-
able to me in the form of computer printouts, which also included firm name, address
and plant SIC code. Our agreement was that I would handcopy the data- -DES was not
willing to let data tapes or the printouts leave the premises.
Given the necessity of copying the data, I had to design constraints on the data
collection process so that I had enough data for meaningful analysis, but not so much
that I would be overwhelmed in the data collection effort. Consequently, I decided I
would look at all establishments with 50 or more employees. This choice provided good
employment coverage, and kept the number of establishments at a manageable level for
data collection, yet high enough for statistical analysis. Plants witlh 50 or more em-
ployees provided 77% of the state's manufacturing employment, but comprised only
15% of all establishments.
A consequence for the gross flows analysis of choosing a minimum plant size is
that it is not meaningful to measure the contribution of plant births to job creation. I
track job change in a cohort of plants (those with 50 or more in a base year)--there is
exit from the cohort but no entry. The consequence for the logit regression analysis
(Chapter 4) is that I cannot ascertain relationships between organizational character-
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istics and plant closings for small plants and new firms. Most of the firms I examine
are fairly established. As I discuss my various research findings, I will point out the
implications of not having data on the smallest establishments.
I asked DES for a computer printout of employment data for establishments
with 50 or more employees for June and December of each year between 1977 and
1983. Nineteen seventy-seven was the base year simply because that was the first year
for which DES had put UI account data on computer. At the time of the request for
data, 1983 was the most recent full calendar year for which data were available. For
accounts which had more than fifty employees at some observation points but less than
50 in others, I obtained the missing data from DES microfiche files.
-- Decision Rules Regarding the Population
I refined the raw data base in a number of ways in order to prepare both for
the gross flows and the regression analyses. First, I decided that newspaper publishers,
though technically in manufacturing, would be excluded from thc population because
they were linked almost entirely to local markets, i.e. they were not in the traded sector
or closely linked to firms that were.
Second, I took steps to ensure that the data base was truly longitudinal. UI files
are structured by account, not by firm or plant. Accounts may be initiated or
terminated for reasons other than firm/establishment birth or death, e.g., change in
ownership or change in legal structure from a division to a subsidiary. The DES com-
puter data base provides no information on consecutive account numbers that represent
one plant. Consequently, I needed to link accounts by hand in order to remove
spurious births and deaths. Linkage was obvious in many cases in which two accounts
had the same firm name and one terminated at the observation point just previous to
the one in which the other began. Accounts that began after June 1977 or ended be-
fore December 1983 and that could not be so linked were considered as potential births
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and deaths. Confirmation of births and deaths was made through the telephone survey
undertaken to collect the organizational characteristics and, for non-respondents,
review of Rhode Island manufacturing directories and talks with persons knowledge-
able about corporate histories.
Third, I decided to exclude plants which only briefly provided 50 or more jobs.
In order for me to include a plant in the study population, it needed to have 50 or
more employees for three consecutive observations (e.g., June-December-June). I
thought that this approach offered the best available proxy for one year's steady
employment of 50 or more employees. As a result of all these various population deci-
sion rules, the data base population was comprised of 583 manufacturing estab-
lishments, representing 550 firms.
-- Measuring Plant Employment
Regarding the measurement of each plant's employment for the purposes of the
gross flows and regression analyses, I had to Pddress two issues. First, I needed to de-
cide whether to measure employment and employment changes in each year using only
one observation point (June or December), the average of June and December, or the
average of December-June-December. Second, I needed procedural rules for filling in
missing employment data.
I thought that a gross flows analysis should be point-to-point, not an annual
average-to-annual average, because the former is a better measure of actual change in
job levels. However, true point-to-point (e.g., June-to-June) might incorporate job levels
that were very transient in nature, for instance if a crew of temporary help was taken
on to deal with an temporary overflow of orders. Consequently, I decided that the
average of each plant's June and December figures for a given year would be the
measure of that year's employment. This approach would correct for problems of sea-
sonality, in that the same months would be used each year, and would smooth out
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transient rises and falls. A December-June-December average did not seem appealing
because, first, it essentially was a rolling average, as each December figure would be
used in determining the figures for two years, and as such would smooth out year-to-
year variation too much; and second, because one December figure would actually not
be in the actual year of concern.
For companies with more than one plant in Rhode Island, the UI account con-
tained estimated rather than actual employment figures for each plant. Every company
reporting to DES provides only a total employment figure of all workers covered by
the UI account, regardless of the number of plants involved. For multi-plant accounts,
DES prorates the total employment figure among the individual plants according to the
plants' actual share of employment as reported in a triennial survey to gather informa-
tion on types of products manufactured. Consequently, the employment figures for all
plants in an account rise and fall in unison, and so can be considered as only estimates
for actual plant figures. In seveial instances, DES contiaued to allocate employment to
a plant which I knew through the telephone survey to have closed; in these cases, I
reallocated the employment in the closed plant to the ones that remained open.
In a number of instances, the DES data base did not have an employment figure
for every observation point for which a plant was in operation. First, DES did not
estimate employment among plants ;n most multi-plant accounts until 1979. Prior to
that year, usually only an employment figure for the account as a whole was provided.
For the plants without 1977-78 employment estimates, I used the 1979 proration for-
mula to distribute the 1977-78 account employment total among the plants.
Second, a few firms did not report their employment figure for a particular
month. Normally, DES follows up with a phone call to get the data, but this is not al-
ways done. Third, DES microfiche records were not available for June and December,
1977 and June, 1981. Consequently, accurate employment counts could not be obtained
for plants which met the criteria for inclusion in the data base but did not have 50 or
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more people in one of those months. In these instances, the missing value was
determined by interpolation, extrapolation or other estimating methods. 4
Gross Job Flows for the Manufacturing Base, 1978-83
For the analysis of gross job flows, I decided that the appropriate time frame
for study was 1978 to 1983, covering one end of the decline in manufacturing employ-
ment to the other. I carried out the gross flow analyses for the period as a whole and
on a year-to-year basis. As mentioned earlier, I used a cohort approach, in which I
defined a population of plants in the base year and then measured the extent of job
change due to expansion, contraction and closure. The use of a cohort approach meant
that the entry (births) of new plants could not be included.5
For the analysis of gross flows for the period as a whole, I limited the popula-
tion to tho3e plants that had fifty or more employees in 1978. Including plants with
less than 50 employees in 1978 but which later grew, while excluding smaller plants
which did not grow, would have biased the analysis in favor of expansions. The 1978
cohort is comprised of 511 manufacturing establishments of 50 or more employees.
These plants had 103,970 employees in 1978, which was 77% of total covered employ-
ment in manufacturing (less newspaper publishing) and represented approximately 15%
of the manufacturing establishments reporting tc DES.6
A year-to-year analysis is first done for the 1978 cohort. Then, for purposes of
contrast, a year-to-year analysis is carried out in which employment change is
measured for all plants with 50 or more employees in the t-1 year (e.g., 1981 gross flows
are measured for all 1980 plants with 50 or more). This has the effect of removing
plants which fall below 50 and adding plants which were below 50 in 1978 but have
grown.
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-- Job Gain and Loss between 1978 and 1983
Cohort Net Job Loss in Relation to the Whole. In the aggregate, the subject
group of plants lost a net 20.7 thousand jobs by 1983, a decline of 19.9%. This figure
compares to a net drop of 18.4 thousand jobs in manufacturing overall (a 13.6% fall).
As Table 3.1 shows, the difference between the two figures is primarily a function of
employment gains in a handful of plants which in 1978 either had less then 50 employ-
ees or were nonexistent and which grew to have 50 or more employees in 1983. The
net change in the residual group (those plants which in 1978 either had less than 50
employees or were nonexistent and which in 1983 had less than 50 employees) was
slightly negative.7
The figures in the table indicate several interesting patterns. First, not sur-
prisingly, the aggregate net loss in manufacturing employment was almost entirely a
function of the job loss in the large planLs (those with 50 or more) existing in 1978.
This is consistent with the finding in the previous chapter that betwcen 1978 and 1983
the share of manufacturing employment in plants of under 50 rose from 21.3% to
23.1%. Second, whether through attraction or internal development, very few large
plants opened in Rhode Island during this period. Between 1979 and 1982, only IG new
plants were established which had 50 or more employees in 1983. Of these 10, seven
were branch plants. Only three were local startups and they provided but 227 of the
new plant jobs (13%). Two of the 10 plants, both in shipbuilding, provided 60% of the
new plant jobs.8
Third, contrary to the popular idea that small firms are the primary generators
of new jobs, less than 2% of the 1978 small plants (44 of 2819) had 50 employees by
1983. In contrast, 9% of the 1978 large plants (44 of 511) created 50 or more new jobs
by 1983 (Table 3.2). While these growing small plants created 1,537 jobs by 1983, large
plants which expanded by 50 or more as of 1983 created 6,988 jobs.
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TABLE 3.1
NET CHANGE IN RHODE ISLAND MANUFACTURING
EMPLOYMENT, 1978-83
BY PLANT STATUS IN 1978
All manufacturing*
Plants in data base:
Plants with 50+
employ. in 1978
Plants opened after
1978 and w/ 50+ employ.
in 1983
Plants w/ <50 in 1978
and w/ 50+ in 1983
# establishments
1978 1983
3330 3050
511 458
0
44
10
44
Employ
1978 1983
134,610 116,252
ment
Change
(18,358)
% Change
(13.6%)
103,970 83,250 (20,720) (19.9)
0 1,727 1,727 -
1,588 3,125 1,537 96.8
Residual plants:
1) plants w/ 2775
<5C in 1978 & <50 in
1983 and 2) plants opened
after 1978 & w/ <50 in 1983
2538 29,052 28,150
* excluding newspaper puilishing
Source: ES-202 data
Note: All mfg. establishment totals are annual averages.
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Gross Job Flows for Cohort Plants, 1978-83. The gross job flows for the plants
which had 50 or more workers in 1978 are presented in Table 3.2. The table indicates
the existence of a degree of employment change at the plant level that can not be seen
simply by looking at net change in aggregate employment figures. The key results are
as follows:
o Over 28% of all iobs that existed in plants with 50 or more employees in 1978
were gone by 1983. Thirty-seven percent of the lost jobs were the result of
plant closures.
o Seventy percent of all plants had either had closed or contracted between
1978 and 1983--14% were closures, 56% were contractions.
o Thirty percent of the plants had expanded between 1978 and 1983. These 153
plants created nearly 9000 jobs, or 9% of the 1978 base.
o For the most part, the gross job gains and losses were the result of substantial
additions and subtractions to plant workforccs. Eighty-one percent of the job
loss due to major layoffs in open plants was contributed by plants which lost
50 or more workers. Similarly, 78% of job growth in expanding plants was
contributed by plants which gained 50 or more workers.
-- Annual Gross Job Losses and Gains, 1978-83
1978 Cohort Plants. An even richer view of gross job flows can be obtained by
looking at them on an annual basis (Table 3.3). We can see the relationship between
shifts in annual job change and the movement of the business cycle and the amount of
"churning" that goes on at the plant level, e.g., job loss in one year made up by job gain
in the next. First I will look at patterns indicated by the table regarding job loss, then
job gain, then loss and gain together.
Major patterns regarding gross job losses include the following:
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Table 3.2
EMPLOYMENT CHANGE 1978-83
RHODE ISLAND PLANTS WITH 50+ EMPLOYEES IN 1978
N
511
1978 emp. 1983 emp. change
103,970 83,250 (20,720)
Plants with
job loss
Closed plants
Open plants
Losing 100+
50-99
15-49
1-14
Plants with
job gain
Gaining on+ 19
50-99 25
15-49 57
0-14 52
Source: ES-202 data
Plants
N %
358 70.1%
71 13.9
56.2
9.4
11 9
21.7
13.3
287
49
61
109
68
153 29.9
3.7
4.9
11.1
10.2
All Plants
Emp. change
1978-83
(29,675)
% 1978
emp.
28.5%
(10,851)
(18,824)
(11,082)
(4,130)
(3,114)
(499)
8,955
10.4
18.1
10.7
4.0
3.0
0.5
8.6
5.G
1.7
1.5
0.3
5,185
1,803
1,615
353
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TABLE 3.3
ANNUAL GROSS JOB GAIN AND LOSS, 1978-83
Plants with 50 or more employees in 1978
78-79 79-80 80-81 81-82 82-83
First Year Employment 103,970 102,482 97,314 92,975 83,872
net % change (1.4%) (5.0%) (4.5%) (9.8%) (0.7%)
First Year Establish. 511 505 499 487 474
Net % Change--All Mfg. (1.3%) (3.3%) (0.4%) (8.7%) (0.2%)
Gross Job Loss (7,307) (9,753) (8,745) (11,611) (6,833)
Contractions (6,167) (8,132) (6,687) (8,458) n.a.**
Closures* (1,140) (1,621) (2,058) (3,153) n.a.**
% gross loss 15.6% 16.6% 23.5% 27.2% n.a.**
% of First-Year Emp. 7.0% 9.5% 9.0% 12.5% 8.1%
contractions 5.9 7.9 6.9 9.1 n.a.
closures 1.1 1.6 2.1 3.4 n.a.
Largest Contraction (788) (229) (818) (269)
Largest Closure (194) (500) (250) (474)
Contraction Job Loss
Recovered in Next Year 964 1,766 802 2,171
% contracticn job loss 15.6% 21.7% 12.0% 25.7%
% gross job loss 13.2 18.1 9.2 18.7
% of contracting est. 30.4 43.2 25.7 47.2
which expand next yr.
Gross Job Gain 5,819 4,585 4,405 2,508 6,211
% of First-Year Emp. 5.6% 4.5% 4.5% 2.7% 7.4%
Largest Cain 198 1,029 133 171 833
Recovered Jcbs as % of -- 21.0 40.1 3?.n 35.0
Gain
Ratios
Losing/Expanding Plants .94 1.69 1.19 2.55 .97
Lost/Gained Jobs 1.26 2.13 1.99 4.63 1.10
Contracting/Exp. Plants .87 1.55 1.04 2.23 n.a.
Lost Jobs in Contracting 1.06 1.77 1.52 3.35 n.a.
Plants/Gained Jobs
* Plants considered closed are those which essentially stopped manufacturing operations in either
year of the two-year period or the subsequent year. For instance, the 1979-80 plant closing job
loss figures include plants that closed in 1978, 1979 or 1980. Since I did not have an accurate
list of 1984 closures, figures on closures and contractions for 1982-83 were not available.
** Minimum plant closing job loss figure for 1982-83 is 1,676; maximum contraction job loss figure
is 5,156. Plant closure job loss is at least 24.5% of gross job loss.
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o A significant number of jobs disappeared each year through plant closings
and contractions. At least 7% of the manufacturing jobs disappeared from
one year to the next; in four of the five years, the gross loss was over 8%.
The worst yearly loss was in 1982, when 12.5% of the jobs in 1981 (one in
eight) were eliminated.
o Even in the worst of years. contractions were a much more important source
of job loss than were plant closings. In 1979, 84.4% of gross job losses were
due to contractions. In the worst year of job loss, 1982, contractions ac-
counted for 72.3%.
o The number of jobs lost to vlant closings climbed, on a relative basis, much
more quickly than job loss due to contractions. The number of jobs lost to
plant closings in 1982 was three times the loss in 1979. Job lass due to con-
tractions did not zlimb each year (it fell in 1981) and was one-third bigher in
1982 than in 1979.
o Thus, the oercentagc of gross iob losses attributable to plant closings con-
sistently increased every year. In 1979, 15.6% of gross losses were due to
plant closings. In the n.ext three years, the figure successively climbed to
16.6%, 23.5% and 27.7%. (On the basis of partial information, it seems likely
that the 1983 percentage equals or surpasses that for 1982.)
o As the recession bottomed out, the level of gross job losses dropped
precipitously. The 1983 figure was the lowest of the five years.
o A significant number of the jobs lost through plant contractions were
recovered by those plants in the succeeding year.9 Even in 1982, 12% of the
jobs lost through contraction in 1981 were recovered. The best year for job
recovery was 1983 (25.7% of 1982 contraction job loss), as the slide in net job
loss essentially halted and gross job gains jumped. As a percentage of gross
job losses as a whole (i.e. including losses due to closures), jobs recovered in
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the succeeding year twice were above 18%. Hence, we see that a significant
amount of "churning" in employment goes on in individual plants.
In Table 3.2, we saw that by 1983, 37% of the cumulative job loss came from
plants that had closed. Yet on an annual basis the percentage of job loss due to closure
varied between 16% and 27%. This difference is the result of two factors. First, while
the cumulative table attributes to plant closure all job losses in a closed plant, the an-
nual table counts as plant closure losses only jobs lost in the year of and the prior year
to closure. Job losses in closed plants that occurred more than a year prior to closure
are counted as contractions in the annual table. Second, if a plant's employment in
1983 was higher than in 1978, the cumulative table just sees this as an expansion, while
the annual table picks up any contractions that may have occurred in the intervening
years. The inclusion of these contractions lowers the proportion of annual job loss due
to plant closures relative to that in the cumulative table.
In light of the finding that plant closures do not provide the majority of job
loss, I should point out that plant closures would seem to represent a higher level of
economic dislocation than do contractions. We saw that a significant number of jobs
lost through contractions in one year are recovered in the same plant in the next. Even
though we do not know the percentage of "recovered" jobs filled by the workers laid
off the previous year, we do know that there are no recovered jobs in the closed
plants. 10 Moreover, it is reasonable to expect that a higher percentage of contraction
job loss is the result of attrition (retirement, switching to a better job, voluntarily leav-
ing the labor force) than would be the case in plant closures.
Despite the recession, job gains continued to occur in a substantial number of
plants, though gains did decrease as the recession wore on. Moreover, a good part of
job gains in any year were the "recovery" of jobs lost in the same plant the prior year
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as the result of contraction. Specific patterns regarding gross job gains due to expan-
sions include the following:
o Visible gross job gains occurred each year but, given the economic downturn,
not at the level of the gross job losses. The number of new jobs in expanding
plants as a percentage of prior year employment was above 4% for every year
but 1982 (2.7%). The largest figure was in 1983 (7.4%), when the industrial
sector started its recovery.
o Despite the recession, at least one-third of the plants each year gained
employment or remained stable, again except for 1982, when only 27% of the
plants did so.
o The number of jobs gained from plant expansions droped each year as the
recession wore on. The 1982 gross job gains were less than half of that for
1979. However, as the recession lost steam, the gross job gains jumped 1.5
times between 1982 and 1983.
o Between one-fifth and two-fifths of the iobs gained were "recovered iobs," i.e.
offset jobs lost through contractions in the same lants the prior year. This
is another indication of the significant amount of "churning" in employment
that went on in many plants.
As might be expected, gross job losses and gross job gains moved in opposite
directions from year to year. So as the recession deepened, the extent to which expan-
sions could cover gross job loss was substantially reduced. An comparison of gross
losses to gross gains also indicates the existence of additional patterns. For instance, in
every year, the ratio of plants with job loss to plants with job gain was less than the
ratio of lost jobs to gained jobs. In fact, in the first and last years of the period, the
number of expanding plants was greater than the number of declining plants. In other
words, on average each losing plant lost more jobs than each expanding plant gained.
This pattern exists even if closed plants are removed and only contracting plants are
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compared to expanding plants. The ratios come the closest to each other in 1983, as the
industrial sector's decline slows down and the number of new jobs jumps. It is unclear
the extent to which this pattern represents the nature of firm behavior in response to
the business cycle and the extent to which there exists some underlying trend of labor-
saving technological change which adds to job losses and reduces job gains.
In terms of relative movement from year-to-year, gross job gains were almost as
sensitive to the length of the recession as are job losses due to plant closings. For in-
stance, the difference between 1982 and 1979 plant closing losses is 182%; that for 1979
and 1982 job gains is 132%. The difference between 1982 and 1979 contraction job
losses is 36%. Despite these differences in relative sensitivity, the absolute difference
between the high and low job figures in each category were much closer to one anoth-
er. The 1982 plant closing job loss figure is 2,076 above that for 1979; the 1982 con-
traction job loss figure is 2,228 over 1979's. Nominal difference in gross job loss was
4,304, compared to 3,311 for gross job gaias (which does not include entries, while
losses include exits).
Finally, and very importantly, it may be that gross flowF are a leading indicator
of manufacturing employment change. When the employment decline bottomed out in
1983, job losses fell and job gains jumped dranatically. While the actual net change in
employment in 1983 (-400) did not differ greatly from that in 1981 (-1,100), the change
in the annual gross loss and gain and gain figures between 1982 and 1983 is dramatic,
while the shift between 1980 and 1981 is not.
Job loss by tve of plant closure. In light of the apparent sensitivity of job loss
due to closures, I thought it would be interesting to explore patterns of annual job loss
by type of plant closure, i.e. job loss due to a liquidation of plant operations (firm
closure, liquidation of capacity in an open firm) and due to relocation to existing or
newly-built facilities. These data are presented in Table 3.4. A number of patterns
can be observed. First, as might be expected, the number of establishments in each
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TABLE 3.4
JOB LOSS RESULTING FROM PLANT CLOSURES
BY TYPE OF CLOSURE, 1978-82
Plants with 50+ employees in 1978
1979
Type of Closure Emp.
Operations Liquidated:
Firm closure 379
Firm open 139
Estab.
7
3
1980
Emp. Estab.
932 13
308 5
1981 1982
Emp. Estab. Emp. Estab.
988
358
18
6
1262 18
992 10
518 10 1240 18 1346 24 2254 28
Relocation of operations:
Relocate to 510
existing plant
Relocate to 112
rew plant
Subtotal
70TAL
5 185 4 301 6 586 9
2 196 3 411 4 304 5
622 7 381 7 712 10 890 14
1140 17 1621 25 2058 34 3216* 42*
Job Loss as Percentage of Prior Year Employment
Operations liquidated:
Firm closure 0.4%
Firm open 0.1
0.5
Relocation of Operations:
Relocate to 0.5
existing plant
Relocate to 0.1
new plant
0.6
TOTAL 1.1
0.9%
0.3
1.2
0.2
0.2
0.4
1.6
1.07
0.4
1.4
0.3
0.4
0.7
2.1
1.4%
1.1
2.4
0.6
0.3
1.0
3.5*
Source: DES/survey data base
* One 1982 closure involving 178
unknown.
jobs included only in total because type of closure
Note: Job loss due to jewelry firm closures as a percentage of all
closures-- 1979 30.8% 1980 82.3% (500-worker firm closed)
1981 19.4% 1982 56.0% (474-worker firm closed)
job loss due to firm
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Subtotal
category tended to rise over the recession. Second, the level of job losses resulting
from liquidations grew much more quickly than did losses due to relocations. As a per-
centage of the prior year's employment, job loss due to liquidations was almost five
times higher in 1982 than in 1979. This pattern seems logical--one would guess that liq-
uidations are in large part a function of aggregate demand, while relocations and con-
solidations of existing operations would seem to be moreso a function of relative costs
of operating elsewhere. While some respondents mentioned that their consolidations
were induced by declining demand, overall it seems that relocations and consolidations
may be somewhat less sensitive to the business cycle than are liquidations.
Third, within the liquidations category, losses due to firm closures rose much
more quickly than did losses in open firms. The latter did not rise significantly until
1982. The firm closures were almost all single-plant and small multi-plant firms, which
probably had less resources to ride out the recession than did larger multi-plant firms.
Fifty-eight percent of firm closure job losses were in jewelry, the hardest hit industr".
Although it does not show here, most of the liquidated operations of open firms came
about through the decision to terminate a particular product line. It seems most of
these firms, some large and some small, decided to cut less profitable lines only when
the situation had significantly worsened. These relationships between plant character-
istics and closings and many others will be explored in more detail in the next chapter.
Successive Cohorts. Table 3.5 presents annual gross flow data for plants over 50
in year t-1. The patterns that were evident in the first table basically are repeated
here, with slight differences due to the dropping of declining plants once they go
below 50 and the addition of small plants when they reach that mark. In general, the
gross job losses are less and the gross gains larger. The largest difference is in the 1982
job gains--the 1981 cohort has greater job gains because a new 800-person shipyard
reached full strength.
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TABLE 3.5
ANNUAL GROSS JOB GAIN AND LOSS, 1978-83
Plants with 50 or more employees in base year
78-79 79-80 80-81 81-82 82-83
Base Year Employment 103,970 102,900 98,063 94,367 85,213
First Year Establish. 511 499 486 474 439
Net % Change--All Mfg. (1.3%) (3.3%) (0.4%) (8.7%) (0.2%)
Gross Job Loss (7,307) (9,594) (8,681) (11,448) (6,753)
Contractions (6,167) (8,160) (6,789) (8,659) n.a.**
Closures* (1,140) (1,434) (1,892) (2,789) n.a.**
% gross loss 15.6% 14.9% 21.8% 24.4% n.a.**
% of First-Year Emp. 7.0% 9.3% 8.9% 12.1% 7.9%
contractions 5.9 7.9 6.9 9.2 n.a.
closures 1.1 1.4 1.9 3.0 n.a.
Contraction Job Loss
Recovered in Next Year 964 1.817 801 2,238
% contraction job loss 15.6% 22.3% 11.8% 25.8%
% gross job loss 13.2 18.9 9.2 19.5
% of contracting est. 30.4 43.5 26.6 48.3
which expand next yr.
Gross Job Gain 5,819 4,688 4,538 3,118 6,596
% of First-Ye3r Emp. 5.6% 4.6% 4.6% 3.3% 7,7%
Recovered Jobs as % ot -- 20.6 40.0 25.7 3,.9
Gain
Ratios
Losing/Expanding Plants .94 1.64 1.12 2.12 .87
Lost/Gained Jobs 1.26 2.05 1.91 3.67 1.02
Contracting/Exp. Plants .87 1.56 1.02 1.96 n.a.
Lost Jobs in Contracting 1.06 1.74 1.50 2.78 n.a.
Plants/Gained Jobs
* Plants considered closed are those which essentially stopped manufacturing operations in either
year of the two-year period or the subsequent year. For instance, the 1979-80 plant closing job
loss figures include plants that closed in 1978, 1979 or 1980. Since I did not have an accurate
List of 1984 closures, figures on closures and contractions for 1982-83 were not available.
** Minimum plant closing job loss figure for 1982-83 is 1,560; maximum contraction job loss figure
is 5,193. Plant closure job loss is at least 25.4% of gross job loss.
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Comparison of Findings to Other Gross Job Flow Studies
-- Establishment-Based Studies
Very few research studies have attempted to measure gross job flows through ei-
ther analyzing establishment data or through surveys of workers. Perhaps the most
well-known establishment-based study is David Birch's "The Job Generation Process," in
which he used the Dun's Market Identifier (DMI) file prepared by Dun and Bradstreet,
the credit rating firm, to look at gross job flows for the U.S. and each of the 50 states
for the 1969-76 period. 1 In another establishment-based study, Louis Jacobson of the
Upjohn Institute for Employment Research used ES-202 data to prepare gross job flow
figures for Pennsylvania for the years 1976-85.12
The Birch and Jacobson studies differ from this one in four ways. First, and
foremost, both Birch and Jacobson assumed that, for the purposes of analysis, all ac-
count terminations and commencements indicated plant deaths and births, respectively.
While they ;ecognized that some accounts are stopoed or started as the result of a
change in ownership or corporate reorganization, they thought that the number of
spurious births and deaths were not large enough to jeopardize the validity of the over-
all analysis. 13 In the Rhode Island study, I attempted to remove all spurious deaths and
births. A second difference between the studies is that the quality of ES-202 data is
far higher than that of the DMI file. Third, the studies differ in terms of time frame
and/or geographic area and/or economic sector. Finally, the Birch and Jacobson
studies look at all firms and plants, and includes births, while the Rhode Island study
is limited to plants of 50 or more and is a cohort study which excludes births.
With these differences in the studies in mind, I compared the annual average
rates of job loss due to closures, contractions and expansions in the three studies to
determine and attempt to explain any differences in rates. The findings of the three
studies are presented in Table 3.6. To help control for differences in economic condi-
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TABLE 3.6
ANNUAL AVERAGE PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN EMPLOYMENT BY PLANT STATUS
SELECTED STUDIES
Deaths Contractions Expansions Births Net Change
Birch--US
1969-72 -5.2% -2.9% 4.7% 5.7% 2.2%
1972-74 -4.6 -2.6 5.3 5.6 3.7
1974-76 -5.8 -3.4 4.4 6.8 2.0
Birch--RI Mfg.
1969-72 -5.2 -4.0 2.8 3.8 -2.6
1972-74 -4.0 -2.2 5.3 3.2 2.1
1974-76 -5.2 -4.0 5.2 2.2 -1.9
Jacobson--PA
1976 -5.9 -6.2 7.0 7.4 2.3
1977 -6.0 -6.1 7.2 6.1 1.2
1978 -4.7 -5.4 7.7 6.3 3.9
1979 -5.0 -5.8 7.4 5.6 2.2
1980 -5.1 -7.9 6.1 4.8 -2.1
1981 -4.8 -7.4 6.2 5.4 -0.6
1982 -5.9 -9.9 5.8 5.8 -4.2
1983 -6.2 -8. 6.8 5.0 -0.8
Jacubson--PA Mfg.
1975-85 Durables -4.6 -7.6 5.0 4.7 -2.7
1975-85 Nondur. -5.3 -6.0 5.1 4.8 -1.4
Reamer--RI Mfg. (Plants of 50+)
1978-79 -1.1* -5.9 5.6 n.a. -1.3**
1979-80 -1.4* -7.9 4.6 n.a. -3.3**
1980-81 -1.9* -6.9 4.6 n.a. -0.4**
1981-82 -3.0* -9.2 3.3 n.a. -8.7**
1932-83 ( -7.9*** ) 7.7 n.a. -0.2**
* Closures include jobs lost in plants which closed in the subsequent year, e.g.,
the 1978-79 figure includes job Losses for plants which closed in 1978, 1979 and
1980.
** Percentage net change for all manufacturing employment
* Cannot disaggregate between closures and contractions because do not have complete
information on 1984 closures. Minimum closure percent is 1.8%, maximum contrac-
tion percent is 6.1%.
68
tions, the annual net percentage change in each period is presented on the right of the
table.
Several observations can be made. First, as might be expected, the rates of job
loss and gain in each study seem to vary with the direction and extent of net change.
Second, the plant closing job loss rate is much lower in the Rhode Island study than the
rates in the other two, which in turn are quite similar to one another. It is striking
that in the worst year of net decline in Rhode Island manufacturing employment
(1982), with a percentage decline in net employment more than double that of any per-
iod of the other studies, the annual rate of job loss due to closures (3%) was below any
rate of closure job loss in the Birch or Jacobson studies, even for years of economic
boom. Moreover, when just manufacturing sectors are compared in periods of minor or
moderate decline, the Birch and Jacobson figures are up to five times the Rhode Island
ones. Finally, regarding contractions and expansions, the Rhode Island and Pennsyl-
v-ania appear similar to one another and, with one exception, 2-3 percentage points
above Birch findings for periods of similar net -:hange. I explore these differences and
their possible explanation in more detail bclow.
Differences in Job Loss Due to Closures. The much larger rates of job loss due
to plant closures in the Birch and Jacobson studies can be attributed to significant
numbers of spurious closures, plants for which a change in ownership or legal structure
brought about a new D&B or UI account. It seems that in the Birch and Jacobson
studies, spurious closures outnumber actual ones by a ratio in the neighborhood of 2:1
or 3:1, perhaps even 4:1 in years of economic growth. Evidence supporting this position
comes from two studies that attempted to assess the validity of using the DMI file to
count plant closures.
In 1986, the General Accounting Office of the U.S. Congress carried out a study
of the causes and consequences of plant closings. In order to generate a list of closed
plants, the GAO obtained from the U.S. Small Business Administration a printout of
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plants that according to the DMI file had closed (i.e. the account had been terminated)
or had a major layoff (over 20% of workers) during 1983 and 1984. To determine the
accuracy of the printout, the GAO selected a stratified random sample of 2,400 plants
with 100 or more workers and 200 plants with 50-99 workers. Through a telephone sur-
vey, GAO staff reached 90% of the sample plants. Only 600 had actually experienced a
closure or permanent layoff in the 1983-84 period. 14
In June 1984, a comparison of DMI "closures" and ES-202 closures was prepared
by myself and a colleague from data and information collected by the Massachusetts
Governor's Commission on Mature Industries.15 The Commission was appointed by Go-
vernor Dukakis the previous year to study the problems faced by owners and employees
in the state's traditional manufacturing industries. Originally, the Commission planned
to identify recent plant closures through a DMI list prepared by the SBA. However,
again through a telephone survey, the list was determined to be so filled with open
plants that the Commission turned to the state Division of Employment Security for an
accurate listing of closures. The DMI and DES lists did not completely overlap--the
former was for 1981-82 and the latter 1982-83. A comparison of the DMI and the DES
lists, supplemented from information gathered through phone calling, indicated that at
least 50% of the DMI deaths were spurious. Tiis was thought to be a conservative
estimate because attempts were not made to reach all firms on the DMI termination list.
The extent to which spurious closures outnumber actual ones also is supported
by the findings in Chapter 6 that the ratio of LED spurious closures to actual ones is
1.5:1. The Census Bureau has attempted to keep a permanent plant number (the LED
equivalent to an account) even when ownership changes. Consequently, the ratio for
the DMI and ES-202 files, in which no attempt is made to eliminate spurious closures,
must be higher.
The presence of substantial spurious closures in the Birch and Jacobson studies
is further indicated by the fact that, in several ways, my definition of plant closure
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job loss is more liberal than those in the Birch and Jacobson studies. First of all, I in-
clude "virtual closures," establishments in which employment has been reduced by over
90%, but there remain a few workers on site. These virtual closures retained a UI ac-
count. However, virtual closures were not counted as plant deaths in either the Birch
or the Jacobson studies as long as the establishment retained an account. Second, I
place in the plant deaths category all jobs losses in the year of and the year prior to
closing. Jacobson only counts loss in the year of closing. (Birch counts job loss from
the last known measurement, which can be anywhere from a few months to several
years prior to closure.) Third, while my unit of analysis is the plant, Jacobson's is the
UI account. Thus, Jacobson places job loss from a closed plant in a multi-plant UI ac-
count in the contractions, not the closures, category. In sum, I think that if the method
of counting job loss due to plant closurcs were made equivalent in each of the studies,
the gap between my finding and those of Birch and Jacobson would be even larger.
The extent of the differences among the studies and the presence of spurious
closures cannot be accurately determined because the Rhcde Island study does rot in-
clude plants of less than 50 cmployees. However, Rhode Island establishments of less
than 50 employees provided only approximately 22% of state manufacturing employ-
ment over the 1978-83 period.1 6 No'v many small establishments are likely to represent
new firms, and new firms are the ones most likely to fail. Firms between 0 and 5
years of age account for nearly half of all manufacturing firm failures in the U.S. 17
However, a sensitivity analysis indicates that a substantially higher rate of closings
among small plants could not adequately explain the gap in rates between the linked
and unlinked studies. For instance, if the rate of job loss due to closure for small
plants was three times that of larger plants, the overall rate of job loss would rise only
another 44%, e.g., from 1.4% to 2.0% in 1980.
One statement often quoted from the Birch study is that the rate of job loss due
to plant closures tends to be the same for all states, no matter what their economic con-
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dition. In light of the extent of spurious closures, this finding needs to be re-
examined. The relative difference between a state with a 1% rate of loss and one with
a 2% rate looks much larger than that between a state with a 5% rate and one with 6%.
This Rhode Island study could not look at job gains due to plant births. How-
ever, it should be pointed that out spurious births go hand-in-hand with spurious
deaths. Thus, the rates of job gains due to births in the Birch and Jacobson studies
probably are overstated to the same extent as are deaths. As I understand Birch's
study, spurious births were given an initial age of 0 and initial size of 0. Consequent-
ly, Birch's oft-quoted findings that small firms created 66% of new jobs and young
firms 80% is probably an exaggeration of reality.
Differences in Job Loss Due to Contractions and Job Gains Due to Expansions.
Birch's estimates for contractions and expansions tend to be lower than those for this
study for two reascns. First, the DMI data were collected in a rather haphazard, im-
precise and untimely manner. A comparison of Massachusetts plant employment fig-
ures provided by DMI with ES-202 data provided by the state's Division of Employ-
ment Security indicates many instances of wide variation between the two figures.
Jacobson poincs out the irregularity with which D&B data are collected. 18 Moieover,
firrus with DMI files have the incentive to underreport contractions so as not to look
bad to potential creditors. On the other hand, by law a firm's reports to the state
employment security agency must be accurate and UI files are not used by potential
creditors.19
The second reason for Birch's low contraction and expansion figures is a
secondary effect of the problem of spurious closures and births. If an establishment
changed ownership and contracted in the same period, that contraction will be missed.
Instead, the job loss will show up in a spurious birth smaller than the spurious death.
The reverse is true for an establishment which changed ownership and grew in size--
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the expansion will show up as a spurious birth and a smaller spurious death. This sec-
ond problem also must be true of the Jacobson study. 20
-- Survey-Based Studies
While a number of case studies of displaced workers has been carried out over
the years, there was not a large-scale survey specifically designed to identify workers
who lose jobs or are otherwise displaced until several years ago, when the U.S. Bureau
of the Census carried out such a survey for the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.2 1 This
survey was a special supplement to the March 1984 Current Population Survey of
60,000 households. The survey reached approximately 2830 displaced manufacturing
workers, 1650 (58%) of whom had 3 or more years job tenure.2 2 Of this latter group,
49% reported that they were no longer at their job because of a plant closure. This fig-
ure is significantly higher than the 37% figure reported in the this study for the 1978-
83 period. There are several possible factors that could explain this difference.
First, the BLS figure might be higher because it only reports on workers with 3
or more years on the job. As manufacturing employment peaked in 1979 in the U.S.,
there are large numbers of workers with less tenure who were likely the first to go
when contractions started. If 25% of the workers with less than 3 years tenure were
laid off as a result of plant closings, then the rate for the whole group falls to 39%.
A second possible reason for the difference between the BLS finding and that in
this study is BLS sampling error. Third, whatever family member answered the BLS
survey (which may not be the displaced worker) may not have known that a contrac-
tion, rather than a closure, took place. Finally, there may be structural differences be-
tween the Rhode Island economy and the U.S. economy that produce a lower rate of
job loss due to plant closures in Rhode Island. However, it should be pointed out that
even if the U.S. percentage for all manufacturing workers is a third higher than that
for Rhode Island, that would do little to explaining the variation between the Birch
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and Jacobson studies and this study on the extent of job loss due to plant closures. The
difference would still be due primarily to spurious closures.
Implications of Findings
The analysis of gross job flows in Rhode Island suggests that there exists sub-
stantial and complex patterns of employment change at the plant level that cannot be
seen simply by looking at shifts in aggregate figures. Moreover, it is clear that an ac-
curate picture of these patterns can be obtained only if the data base is truly longi-
tudinal. Patterns of gross manufacturing job flows in Rhode Island suggest a number
of generalizations that could be tested through analyses of linked ES-202 data in other
states and for periods of expansion and decline:
o Significant gross job losses and gains occur in both the best and the worst of
ecoromic conditions.
o The majority of annual gross job losses are due to plant contractionis.
o While a significant number of jobs are lost due to plant closings, the number
is not nearly as high as estimated in previous studies. However, it is probable
that a higher proportion, of jobs lost in plant closings result in economic dis-
placerment than is so for jobs lost in contractions, because the latter iricludes
retirements, voluntary quits, and temporary layoffs.
o Job loss through plant closures is relatively more sensitive to the length of a
recession than is job loss through contractions. Specifically, the percentage of
lost jobs due to closures, and the actual number of closure-caused job loss, in-
creases significantly with the depth and length of the recession.
o Increases in job losses due to plant closings as a recession deepens are
primarily due to increases in job losses due to the liquidation of plant opera-
tions (particularly firm closures). Job losses due to relocations seem less
sensitive to the business cycle.
74
o A large number of jobs lost in contracting plants are regained the next year.
The percentage changes in direct relation to economic conditions. Thus, a
significant amount of job "churning" goes on at the plant level.
o As manufacturing employment decline bottoms out, there is a dramatic drop
in gross job losses (from both contractions and closures) and a dramatic in-
crease in the gross job gains. Such shifts in gross flows might serve as lead-
ing indicators of economic recovery.
o In times of recession, contracting plants lose more jobs on average than do
growing plants. In times of growth, the reverse may be true. To the extent
that the reverse is not true, the introduction of labor-saving technology may
be the reason.
75
CHAPTER NOTES
1The gross flows analysis moves the point at which net measurements of employ-
ment change are made from the level of the economy or industrial sector to the level
of the plant. Consequently, I cannot capture gross flows within a plant. For example,
if a plant eliminates 10 production line jobs and the adds 5 equipment maintenance
jobs and 5 jobs in the front office, in this gross flows analysis employment in the plant
looks stable.
2 In the face of the large layoffs and high unemployment rates in Rhode Island
during the 1982 recession, Governor Garrahy appointed a Strategic Development Com-
mission to undertake an in-depth study of the state's economy and prepare a set of
public policy recommendations aimed at economic revitalization. Part of that study
was a detailed examination of the problem of manufacturing plant closings, of which I
had charge. For the purposes of identifying closed plants and the size of the employ-
ment loss, I was granted temporary access to the unemployment insurance records of
the state Department of Employment Security. To gain such access, I was required to
sign a statement that I would keep strictly confidential all firm-specific information,
consistent with the state's laws protecting the confidentiality of information filed by
participants of the UI system.
The work of the Commission ended in 1984 with the defeat of a public
referendum on the Commission's proposals. For the purpcses of completing this doc-
toral dissertation, I sought, and was granted, permission to use data that had been
available under Commission auspices, with the explicit understanding that I would con-
tinue to strictly respect the confidentiality agreement.
Originally, I was granLed access to two types of data and information. The first
was account mployment data from the DES data banks. Second was information of
firm and plant characteristics that were contained in the account paper files such as
year of firm founding and acquisition information. Soon after I had completed collec-
t'on of the employment data, a new executive director of DES was appointed by the
state's new governor. The new director decided not to honor the arrangement allowing
my access to UI data. Consequently, I decided to collect firm and plant organizational
characteristics through a telephone survey. The results of the survey formed the basis
was the analysis in Chapters 4 and 5.
3The results of this survey are intended to update each plant's SIC code. In
theory, the adjustment of the employment proration formula is to take place every
three years, but a perusal of the data base indicates adjustment was made less fre-
quently for a number of plants.
4In cases in which an employment figure did not appear in the printout because
employment was under 50 and was missing from the microfiche, the interpolation rule
was that the midpoint value would be inserted unless that value was 50 or more, in
which case a value of 49 would be used.
Rules for filling in missing values in 1977 or 1983 were somewhat more compli-
cated. Straight extrapolation was used if that did not produce a steep curve in one
direction of the other. The next best alternative was employment estimates in news-
paper articles or the RI Manufacturers Directory. The last alternative was an ex-
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trapolation which flattened the curve.
A random sample of data entries for 157 plants to see how many had missing
values yielded the following results:
109 (69) had values for all months in which the plant operated
36 (23%) had I or 2 missing values
9 (6%) had more than 2 missing values, but the interpolation/extrapolation
seemed reasonable
3 (2%) had no valid figures for a long period of time--news article/
directory estimates used
5This is a good place to point out that even if I were allowed to use the DES
tapes, the need to check all the new and terminated accounts for links probably would
have caused me to set a lower limit on establishment size anyway. I estimate that the
full population of manufacturing plants from 1977 to 1983 is represented by some-
where between 5000 and 6000 accounts. Checking for linkages in a data set of this size
was well beyond my available resources. I might have analyzed a sample of small
plants, e.g., in the textile industry or in a medium-sized town.
6There were a monthly average of 3,351 units reporting to DES in 1978. (Rhode
Island Department of Employment Security, "1979 Statistical and Fiscal Digest.")
7Note that the residual group is not a cohort, unlike the other three groups. It
includes births.
8The data on plant characteristics comes from survey data base.
90f course, there is no information as to (1) whether the lost jobs were actually
recovered or whether jobc of different scope and pay were developed instead, and (2)
if lost jobs were reinstituted, whether or not the laidoff workers were r'ehired.
101 did not count a plant as closed if more than 20% of the laidoff workers
transferred to a nearby sister plant. There were only five closed plants among 76 in
which any workers were transferred to a nearby sister plant, and in 2 of those, some
workers in the receiving plant lost their jobs in the process.
1 1David Birch, "The Job Generation Process," (Cambridge, MA: MIT Program on
Neighborhood and Regional Change, 1979).
1 2Louis Jacobson, "Job Creation and Destruction in Pennsylvania, 1975-85,"
(Kalamazoo, MI: The Upjohn Institute for Employment Reseaich, November 1986).
13 Birch asserted that spurious births and deaths were not a significant problem:
"Fortunately, the magnitude of such spurious changes is not great, averaging less than
one percent (emphasis added) of births and deaths in any year."(oD.cit., p. 13.) He did
not describe the method he used to arrive at this figure.
Jacobson did not provide a specific estimate for spurious births and deaths, but
he seemed to believe they were not a serious issue:
In this analysis a birth occurs when a unit begins reporting under a given
identification (ID) number and a death occurs when reporting is terminated
or falls permanently to zero. These definitions are deceptively simple.
Occasionally (emphasis added) a firm which 'dies' (stops reporting) will not
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actually cease operating but merge with another firm to form a new successor
firm, by acquired by another firm or simply change ID number because of
reorganization or movement of the headquarters to another county. (op.cit.,
p. 3.)
1 4 U.S. General Accounting Office, "Dislocated Workers: Extent of Business
Closures, Layoffs, and the Public and Private Response," July 1986. In a telephone
conversation, one of the study authors told me that another 191 plants had a closure or
layoff that occurred outside of the 1983-4 time frame.
1 5Andrew Reamer and Beth Siegel, Memorandum to David Hirschberg, Office
Of Advocacy, U.S. Small Business Administration, June 11, 1984.
161 noted earlier that my data base covers 77% of employment in 1978, which
should leave 23% for the small establishment group. However, as I looked for three
successive observations of 50 employees, I understate slightly the number of people who
worked in plants of 50+ at a given moment. County Business Patterns says that in
1978, establishments of less than 50 employees provided 21% of manufacturing employ-
ment.
17 U.S. Small Business Administration. The State of Small Business: A Report of
the President (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, March 1983), p.238.
18Jacobson, op.cit., p. 2.
19 A small businessman acquaintance told me that he regularly understated any
contractions to Dun and Bradstreet. Birch also mentions a corporate president who said
he never reported accurate employmenL figures to Dun and Bradstreet. Birch notes
that there is no practical way to measure the degree of misrepresentation. He does say
that if D&B discovers the misrepresentation, the firm's credit rating could be aitered.
(Birch, op.cit., p. 17-18.) However, it seems to me that misrepresentation would be dif-
ficult to prove unless there vas a large and obvious variance between actual and
reported figures.
20Information regarding the Pennsylvania economy lends support to the idea
that the rates of job change due to contraction could logically be higher. For instance,
net manufacturing employment in Pennsylvania fell 21% between 1979 and 1983.
Rhcde Island net manufacturing employment fell 14% over five years.
2 1U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Displaced Workers, 1979-1983, Bulletin 2240,
July 1985.
2 2These figures were drawn from Podgursky and Swaim, oo.cit.
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CHAPTER 4
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PLANT CLOSINGS
AND ORGANIZATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS
The gross flows analysis provided a picture of the components of manufacturing
employment change in Rhode Island. However, it could do little to explain why the
changes, particularly gross job losses, occurred as they did. In Chapter 1, I set out a
framework of suggested causes for manufacturing job loss. The purpose of this chapter
and the next is to examine the relationship between employment change and organiza-
tional characteristics, and to utilize the findings to help explain the role of institu-
tional, structural and macroeconomic factors in job loss. This chapter explores the re-
lationship betwcen plant closings and organizational characteristics, using logit regres-
sion models and a descriptive analysis of the closed plants. The next chapter utilizes
ordinary least squares regressions to examine the extent to which organizational char-
acte;istics can explain percentage employment change in all plants.
Hypotheses Regarding the Relationship between Plant Closures and Organizational
Characteristics
Several researchers have explored the causes of plant closures through an ex-
amination of a population of closed plants.1 A few others have looked at patterns of
closure in a particular industries. 2 A handful of studies have been published which
analyze the effect of the presence or absence of one characteristic, e.g. absentee
ownership, on the likelihood that a plant will close. 3 However, no study to date has at-
tempted to look at a large geographically-bounded population of plants across a number
of plant characteristics to determine the comparative influences of these characteristics
on the probability of closure.4
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Utilizing Chapter l's framework of suggested causes of plant closures, I develop-
ed a number of hypotheses concerning the effects of particular organizational charac-
teristics on the probability of a plant's closing.5 I chose these organizational character-
istics for their ability to represent particular suggested causes of closings and for the
feasibility of collecting information on them through a survey. The organizational
variables, the hypotheses relating each variable to the probability of closure, and the
rationale behind each hypothesis are described below:
o Plants belonging to multiple-plant companies are more likely to close than are
single-plant firms. First, a plant in a single-plant firm is a much more
"lumpy" commodity than is one in a multi-plant firm. For instance, in a
two-plant company, a 50% cutback in operations could result in a plant
closure, whereas in a single-plant firm, a 50% cutback would not reduce the
number of plants. Second, a multi-plant firm is likely to have a more diver-
sified product line than is a single-plant firm. As a consequence, a multi-
plant firm is more likely to make a decision to pull its assets out of one pro-
cuct line (and plant) and invest them in another, more profitable line, at a
different location.
o Plants belonging to firms headquartered outside of Rhode Island are more
likely to close than are firms headauartered inside the state. Owners of firms
headquartered loca!ly would be less likely to relocate operations out of the
area because primary manufacturing facilities tend to be near headquarters
and because, studies have suggested, owners of smaller, privately-held firms
are reluctant to uproot themselves and their families from long-term. com-
munity attachments. On the other hand, firms headquartered outside the
state would be more likely to close a Rhode Island plant. Outside companies
are likely to have plants in a number of sites. Decisions to relocate opera-
tions to a new or existing plant would be made for purely economic reasons.
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o Plants that are acquired by new owners are more likely to close than are
plants in firms operated by the founder or his family. Acquirers would have
less familiarity with how to profitably operate the plant.
o Moreover, if an acquired plant closes, it is more likely to do so sooner rather
than later after the acquisition. Acquirers would tend to find out very
quickly that they cannot operate the plant at the required level of profit.
Also, acquirers which are multi-plant firms may close a plant quickly because
they decide it is better consolidated with operations elsewhere.
o Plants belonging to newly founded companies are more likely to close than
are plants in more established firms. Younger firms would have troubles due
to inexperienced management. Firms between 0 and 5 years of age account
for nearly half of all manufacturing firm failures.6
o Plants belonging to nublicly-traded firms are more likely to close than are
plants belonging to privately-held firms because tne publicly-held firms, in
catering to pressures for short-run profits, would be less likely to hold on to
plants in the long-run.
o Plants of a smaller size will be more likelv to close than larger plants. First
of all, small single-plant firms would have a higher probability of failure
than larger firms because the former do not have the same depth of
resources, financial and managerial, to avoid and withstand periods of adver-
sity as do the latter. While companies with under 100 employees accounted
for 93.7% of all companies, they provided 99.2% of all bankruptcies in 1981.7
Second, in the face of declining demand, small plants in multi-plant firms
would be more likely to be closed than would larger plants in the same firms
because of small plants' lower economies of scale and/or an approach to cut-
backs in which smaller amounts of capacity are liquidated first so that the
company can retain the capacity to quickly respond to an upturn.
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o Plants whose primary product is not the primary product of the firm as whole
are more likely to be closed than are those plants whose primary product is
considered by the firm to be its primary product. This hypothesis concerns
plants in multi-plant companies--plant and firm primary product in single-
plant companies are the same by definition. The rationale for the hypothesis
is that if a product is not considered by the firm to be in the mainstream of
its economic activity, the firm would be more likely to close the plant due to
a lack of competence in a less familiar product line or a desire to redeploy
assets into a more profitable one.
o The probability of a plant's closure varies inversely with the percentage
change in U.S. industry employment in the 4-digit SIC code of the plant's pri-
mary product. I used percentage change in national employment as a catch-
all variable that captures macroeconomic and structural factors that impact
on the industry generally, e.g., shifts in aggregate demand, currency exchange
rates, changes in taste, technological change, and ncw foreign entrants in the
industry.
o Plants with a unionized workforce are more likely to close than are non-
unionized plants: moreover, the percentage of the workforce covered by col-
lective bargaining agreements directly influences the frequency of closure. A
plant with a high level of unionization would ne more likely Lo close than a
non-unionized plant because of high wage costs and union constraints on
management's ability to allocate technical resources and labor. Management
of unionized plants in larger firms would tend to respond to these costs and
constraints by either relocating or liquidating operations. Unionized plants
in small firms would tend to have a higher rate of closure because they could
not compete with non-unionized operations.
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Methodology for Preparing the Data Base
-- Population and Analytic Structure
I tested the above hypotheses through a series of logit regression analyses in
which "plant closed" is the categorical dependent variable. Table 4.1 sets out the de-
pendent and independent variables, the categories used for categorical variables, and
the source of information on each variable.
For the logit analysis, I used the entire data base population, i.e. all Rhode Is-
land manufacturing plants that had 50 or more employees for at least three successive
observations (e.g., June-December-June) between June 1977 and December 1983. This
population numbered 582 plants.8 The criterion of three successive observations of 50
or more employees meant that the earliest closures in the data base were those that
took place :n the second half of 1978.
If complete data had been available for plants of less than 50 employees, it is
likely that I would have built a second model, for smaller plants. The aadition of
smaller plants into a single model would have increased the number of plants in the
data base nearly 600%. As the very large majority of plants would have been single-
plant, RI-based firms, clarity regarding the dynamics of large multi-plant and non RI
employers would have been lost. Also, the introduction of a large number of smail and
new firms would have given firm age a very large role in plant closures. A study by
the Rhode Island Strategic Development Commission indicated that 80% of the
manufacturing firms incorporated in 1975 and 1976 no longer had DES accounts by
1983.9 Even with a generous allowance for spurious closures, it seems that a very large
number of new manufacturing firms did not last very long.
I am more interested in accounting for job loss through plant closings than
determining the incidence of plant closings per se. Using a sample that excludes smal-
ler plants and firms, but has significant variation among plants in terms of size and
firm age and provides coverage of 78% of manufacturing employment, allows for the
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Table 4.1
ORGANIZATIONAL VARIABLES AND SOURCES OF DATA
Variable
Multi-plant firm (Y,N)
Non-RI firm headquarters (Y,N)
Age of firm 1/1/84 or
year of closing
Acquisition of firm or plant (Y,N)
If acquired, years since most
recent acquisition
Firm publicly-traded (Y,N)
Plant size
% Change ;n U.S. employment in
4-digit SIC code of plant's
primary product, 1978-83
Union in plant (Y,N)
If unionized, % workers covered
by collective bargaining
Plant/firm industry difference (Y,N)
Multi-plant owner
Non-RI owner
Data Sources
Survey, DES, RI Directory of Mfg.
Survey, DES, mfg. directory, corpor-
ate registration
Year founded--survey, news articles,
corporate registration
Survey, DES, news articles, corp. reg.
Year acquired--survey, DES, news arti-
cles, corporate registration
Survey, library reference service
DES (highest June-December average,
1977-83)
Flant primary product--survey, DES,
mfg. directory
SIC classification--DES, mfg. direc-
tory, Standard Industrial Classifica-
tion Manual
4-digit employment change--U.S. Bureau
of Labor Statistics
Survey, union officials
Survey, union officials
Industry focus of firm--survey
Multi-plant firms--as above
Single-plant firms--survey, news arti-
cles
Multi-plant firms--as above
Single-plant firms--survey, news arti-
cles
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possibility of some clarity in seeing the dynamics of the major providers of jobs. This
is not to say that job loss through small plant closures is unimportant or that it would
not have been useful to build a second model for smaller plants. A two-model study
could have provided a very full picture of the dynamics of job loss through plant
closures.
I sought information on the characteristics of each plant and firm at one point
in time--as of December 1982 for open plants and as of the time of closure for closed
plants. I did not attempt to record the characteristics of prior owners nor to tally the
number of times a firm or plant changed hands in its history. Having this information
certainly would have made the data base richer. However, my budget could not sup-
port the extra effort required to obtain and analyze such information. Moreover, it
was not clear that respondents could accurately explain or even would desire to explain
a chronology of corporate ownership, with attendant owner characteristics and dates of
ownership change.
I chose December 1982 as the point in time for which to seek charazteiistics for
open plants because 1 thought that, overall, the firms in charge then were the ones most
likely to be responsible for the status of the firm in December 1983. For the plants
which changed hands in 1983, it did not seem appropriate to characterize the December
1983 status of the plant (and plant employment, for the OLS regressions) as a function
of the characteristics of an owner of several months. For each plant closure, I
gathered characteristics of the firm that made the decision to cease operations.
-- Data Sources
The primary source of data for most characteristics was a telephone survey,
which was carried out by three research assistants. 10 An attempt was made to reach
someone knowledgeable regarding every plant in the data base. Information was ob-
tained by telephone for 71% of the plants, with another 4% responding through a mail
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survey. (A mail survey was sent when requested by a respondent as an alternative to
the phone interview.) Regarding the 25% of the plants which were non-respondents,
8% was attributable to mail survey non-respondents, 6% to firms that were unreachable,
6% to outright refusals, and 5% to firms that were reachable but for which the person
designated to answer the survey repeatedly was not available and did not return phone
calls.
For non-respondents, information on non-RI headquarters, plant product, and
multi-plant firm was obtained from the DES printouts and from the Rhode Island
Directory of Manufacturers. Information on non-respondents regarding the extent of
union presence was provided by state and local union officials. Three data items were
more difficult to obtain for non-respondents--age of firm, acquisition, and date of ac-
quisition. Information on non-respondent closed plants and plants with major layoffs
also was obtained from Provicence Journal clipping files and corporate registration in-
formation filed with the Secretary of State."
-- Determination of a Plant Closure
Although I labelled the dependent categorical variable "plant closed," more ac-
curately the variable was not a function of site but of labor force. In other words, the
relocation of manufacturing operations to a new site was not considered a closure if
the majority of workers at the old site were employed at the new one.
The difference between a "closed" and an "open" plant was not always clear-cut.
There were a few instances in which a massive layoff took place but there were a few
people left working on the site. If manufacturing operations ceased entirely, I con-
sidered the plant closed. I also considered the plant closed if manufacturing operations
were still ongoing but the workforce level had declined more than 90% from the peak
level achieved earlier in the 1977-83 period. Only four plants fit this latter criterion.
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-- Determination of the "Firm"
One of the more complicated issues in the research process was defining "the
firm" operating a plant. For the majority of plants, the identity of the firm was clear.
However, in many multi-plant firms, the plant might be part of a subsidiary or a divi-
sion. In these instances, I needed to consider which characteristics I wanted regarding
the corporate parent and which regarding the subsidiary or division.
Given the rationales behind my hypotheses, I decided that for the non-RI head-
quarters, multi-plant firm, and publicly-traded variables I wanted the information for
the ultimate corporate parent. I assumed that the hypothesized influence of these char-
acteristics would emanate from corporate headquarters. On the other hand, I wanted
information on two characteristics of subsidiaries and divisions--year of founding and
acquisition. As subsidiaries and divisions tend to be functionally distinct from the
parent in terms of product line, I thought that the age of the subsidiary or division
(proxy for amount of experience in business) would be a more telling figure in relation
to probability of closure than would the age of the parent. In cases in which the sub-
sidiary or division was acquired, I attempted to obtain the founding date of the
original firm. 12
In a few instances, a firm was created by its management through a ouyout of a
subsidiary or division of a larger corporation. I considered the newly formed company
an acquisition and, for the purposes of a founding date, attempted to trace continuous
operations as far back in time as possible.
-- Discussion of Selected Variables
Many of the variables listed in Table 4.1 are self-explanatory. For each one that
is not, the concepts behind the variable and the decision rules created for coding arc
discussed below.
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Size. Each plant's size was defined by its peak annual employment figure.
There was no reason to pick a particular base year employment figure as having special
influence on whether a plant stayed open or closed.13
Multi-firm owner. For single-plant firms, the respondent was asked if the
owner had controlling interest in other businesses which together had 50 or more em-
ployees. I wanted to know if the firm was functionally a part of a multi-plant organi-
zation, in order to see how similar the probability of closure for such firms was to that
for plants in multi-plant firms. As a result, I had alternative variables for describing
the size of plant holdings, using alternative units of observation--firm and firm owner.
The difference between the two variables was simply a function of where I placed
multi-firm owners of single-plant firms (who owned approximately 12% of all plants).14
Non-RI owner. For RI-headquartered privately-held firms, the respondent was
asked if the controlling owner lived in Rhode Island or within a half-hour commute of
Rhode Island. The intent of this question was to see if the absence of the owner from
a RI-headquartered company raised the probability of closure.
Plant/firm industry difference. For multi-plant companizs, I needed a decision
rule for determining whether or not a plant and its parent firm were in the same in-
dustry. I considered a plhnt and a firm to be in the same industry if the plant's pri-
mary product and the firm's primary products were the same or were vertically or
horizontally linked. For instance, a baby food company acquired a RI plant which
made accessories for babies' bedrooms. Because I thought that both the firm as a whole
and the RI plant served the same market (parents of young children), and the sales op-
eration of the accessories plant seemed to fit with the marketing expertise of the
parent, I considered the firm and the plant to be in the same industry. Clearly, judg-
ments regarding this characteristic were subjective.
Percentage U.S. employment change in industry, 1978-83. I intended this vari-
able to measure the effect of a plant's product concentration. I originally used 1977-83
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percentage change, but found that the 1978-83 figure gave a more robust result. This
makes sense--1977-78 was a growth year for most industries, while the 1978-83 period
was a period of straight employment decline for many. Because the 1978-83 percentage
employment change gave sharper declines than did the 1977-83 figure, the former more
accurately reflected shifts in aggregate demand faced by the plants.
Profile of Manufacturing Plants in the Data Base
-- Plant Population by Organizational Characteristics
In terms of the organizational variables, Rhode Island's manufacturing plants of
50 or more employees were distributed as follows (Table 4.2):
o Nearly three-quarters of the plants had company headquarters inside the state.
However, roughly 1 in 15 RI-headquartered plants were controlled by an
owner who lived outside the area.
o Almost 60% of the plants were part of a single-plant company. However,
around I in 5 of the single-piant companies were held by owners who also op-
erated at least one other company with 50 or more employees.
o Approximately 40% of the plants were acquired. Of the acquired plants 72%
had been acquired between 1970 and 1982, and 48% between 1977 and 1982
o Seventy percent of the plants had no union representation.
o Plants operated by publicly-held companies accounted for only 17% of the
total.
o The average firm age was 47 years. The average peak plant employment in
the 1977-83 period was 218. Employment in the national industry correspond-
ing to each plant's primary product on average dropped nearly 15% between
1978 and 1983.
There were striking differences between the characteristics of plants in single-
plant firms and ones in multi-plant firms:
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Table 4.2
PROFILE OF PLANT CHARACTERISTICS
RHODE ISLAND PLANTS WITH 50+ EMPLOYEES DURING 1977-83 PERIOD
Characteristic
MuLti-pLant N
firm Y
MuLti-pLant N
owner Y
Non-RI Ho
Non-RI owner
Acquisition
Union
N
Y
N
Y
N
Y
N
Y
20%+ Workers N
unionized Y
Plant & firm N
diff. indus. Y
Publicly- N
traded Y
N* ALL Plants In SingLe-PLant In Multi-Plant
Firms Firms
579
488
580
499
494
575
575
501
562
58.2
41.8
40.2
59.8
73.3%
26.7
65.1
34.9
59.3
40.7
70.1
29.9
73.0
27.0
86.6
13.4
82.6
17.4
98.5%
1.5
95.6
4.4
78.8
21.2
80.7
19.3
82.8
17.2
100.0
0.0
100.0
0.0
38.0%
62.0
28.2
71.8
33.2
66.8
55.2
44.8
59.3
40.7
70.4
29.6
51.2
43.8
mean median mean median mean median
Plant size
Firm age
% U.S. emp. change
in plant's industry
218 116
47 38
(14.6%) (14.7%)
135 96 334 184
43 37 53 44
(16.9%) (15.7%) (12.0%) (12.6%)
% union 24.5% 0% 15.7% 0% 36.8% 0%
* Number of plants with no information for each characteristic = 582 - N.
Note: Percentages for plants with multi-plant owners and non-RI owners are Likely over-
stated because of a bias in the set of non-respondent plants, which are primarily small
RI-HQ companies. Minimum is 50.4% for the former, 30% for the latter.
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o While almost all single-plants firms were RI-headquartered, nearly two-thirds
of the plants in multi-plant companies were not.
o While 79% of the single-plant firms were being operated by their founder or
his family, two-thirds of the plants in multi-plant companies had been ac-
quired.
o While only 19% of the plants in single-plant firms had some union representa-
tion, 45% of plants in multi-plant companies did.
o As would be expected, no single-plant company was publicly-traded. On the
other hand, 44% of the plants in multi-plant companies were in publicly-
traded firms.
o Plants in single-plant firms tended to be younger than and half the size of
plants in larger companies. Also, plants in single-plant fIrms tended to be in
industries with large empioyment declines in the 1978-83 period than wcre
plants in multi-plant firms.
In terms of the distribution of plants by industry, jewelry and textiles
dominated, particularly among single-plant firms, 36% of which were in the jewelry in-
dustry. (See Table 4.3.) The distribution of plants in multi-plant firms was ml'ch more
diversified. A similar distribution by industry can be seen when plants are broken
down by location of headquarters, because almost all single-plant firms were locally
headquartered and nearly three-quarters of plants in large companies were head-
quartered out of state.
-- Frequency of Closure by Organizational Characteristics
Between 1977 and 1983, 13.1% of Rhode Island's plants of 50 or more employees
closed. The total job loss in these plants came to 12,565, as measured from peak annual
employment. Figure 4.1 is a stem-leaf diagram of the distribution of closed plants by
peak size. Note that the median peak size of closed plants was Ill employees.
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Table 4.3
Rhode Island Plants with 50 or More Workers, 1977-83
by Major Industry Group
All Plants
Food
Textiles
Apparel
Lumber, furniture,
paper
Printing, publishing
Chemicals
Plastics
Leather
Stone,clay,glass
Primary metals
Fabricated metals
Machinery
Electronics
Trans. equip.
Instruments
Jewelry
Misc.
Total
22
83
18
22
18
11
24
11
10
29
30
26
40
18
29
151
40
582
In Single-Plant In Multi-Plant
Firms Firms
11 11
47 35
12 6
12 10
12 6
4 7
14 10
3 8
4 6
12 17
19 11
8 17
15 25
11 7
9 20
120 30
24 16
337 242
Nnte: Firm characteristics could not be obtained for a small number of plants. Therefore, the addition of the figures
in cotumns 2 and 3 and in columns 4 and 5 may not add to the figure in .olumn 1.
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RI HO
15
65
10
14
16
5
17
6
4
15
25
14
23
13
11
138
33
424
Non-RI HO
7
17
8
8
2
6
7
5
6
14
5
11
17
5
18
13
7
156
Figure 4.1
STEM AND LEAF PLOT
PEAK SIZE OF CLOSED PLANTS, 1978-83
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MINIMUM IS:
LOWER HINGE IS:
MEDIAN IS:
UPPER HINGE IS:
MAXIMUM IS:
56.000
82.000
110.500
204.000
600.000
0 555
0 666666677777
0 H 8888888889999999
1 M 00000001
1 22233
1 44455
1 677
1 8899
2 H 001
2 3
2 4
2 7
2 8
3 1
3 22
3 5
3 7
3 8
***OUTSIDE VALUES***
4 01267
5 0
6 0
Notes: Peak size is the highest annual employment in the 1977-83
period.
Twenty-five percent of the plants are smaller than the lower
hinge and 25% of the plants are larger than the upper hinge.
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Table 4.4 provides the frequency of closure by plant characteristic. The
strength of the multiple-plant firm variable is worth noting. Five categorical variables
have a strong chi-squared when all plants are taken as a whole; among the continuous
variables, percentage union had a strong t statistic. However, when frequency of
closure is examined separately for single-plant firms and multi-plant firms, the
strength of the results is greatly diminished for these variables. One effect of the
higher frequency of closure for plants in multi-plant firms is that such plants ac-
counted for 58% of the closures, while they comprised only 42% of the plant population
as a whole. It is startling that nearly 20% of all plants in multi-plant firms closed in a
six-year period.
Moreover, notice that the frequency of closures by multi-firm owners of single-
plant firms (17.7%) is quite close to that of multi-plant firms (18.2%). On the other
hand, the frequcncy for single-plant owners is less than half of these, 7.1%.
The jewelry industry provided over one-quarter of the plant closures, with the
textile industry the second largest contributor at 16%. However, the frequency of
rlosure in these industries was very close to the overall average.
Closure rates by industry are provided in the appendix. For the continuous in-
dependent variables, tables indicating the frequency of closure by selected categories
are in the appendix as well.
Logit Regression Analysis
-- Whole Population
I employed a hierarchical modelling strategy in the regression analyses. Inde-
pendent variables were added to the regression equation one at a time. The variable
was retained in the model only if the partial chi-squared test was significant at the .05
level.15 If the results indicated that none or only one variable was significant at .05, I
relaxed the significance condition to .1. If a continuous variable did not pass the par-
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Table 4.4
FREQUENCY OF PLANT CLOSURE BY ORGANIZATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS
RHODE ISLAND PLANIS WITH 50+ EMPLOYEES DURING 1977-83
Categorical Variables
C/N
Multi-plant firm
Multi-plant owner
Non-RI HQ
Non-RI owner
Acquisition
Union
20%+ workers
unionized
Plant & firm
diff. industry
Publicly-traded
0
1
0
1
ALL Plants
% Prob.*
32/337 9.5%
44/242 18.2
14/196 7.1
52/292 17.8
48/424 14.3
28/156 18.0
43/325 13.2
31/175 17.7
33/293 11.3
40/201 19.9
49/403 12.2
27/172 15.7
50/420 11.9
26/155 16.8
54/434 12.4
17/67 25.4
55/464 11.9
20/98 20.4
0
1
0
1
.003
.001
.050
.225
.011
.311
.164
.008
.036
Single-Plant Firms
C/N % Prob.*
14/196 7.1%
9/5' 17.5
30/331 9.1
2/6 33.3
27/263 10.3
4/12 25.0
21/223 9.4
10/60 16.7
24/267 9.0
8/64 12.5
24/274 8.8
8/57 14.0
.032
.191
.158
.173
.536
.327
Plants in
Multi-Plant Firms
C/N % Prob.*
18/92 19.6%
26/150 17.3
16/62 25.8
27/158 17.1
12/70 17.1
30/141 21.3
25/133 18.8
19/108 17.6
26/143 18.2
18/98 18.4
29/159 16.4
17/67 25.4
23/126 18.3
20/98 20.4
.791
.201
.600
.942
1.000
.164
.814
* For Yates chi-squared test, the probability that the actual chi-squared is greater than the observed chi-squared, given that
the null hypothesis is true.
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Table 4.4 cont'd
Continuous variables
Peak plant size
Firm age
Pct. US industry change
Pct. unionized
Mean
Open
225
47
-14.4%
23.0%
All Plants
Mean
Closed Prob.**
170 .179
51 .283
-17.7% .115
33.8% .032
Single-Plant Firms
Mean Mean
Open Closed Prob.**
137 116 .347
43 44 .808
-16.5% -21.3% .106
14.1% 24.8% .107
Plants in
Multi-Plant Firms
Mean Mean
Open Closed Prob.**
362 209 .057
53 56 .564
-11.4% -15.0% .195
36.0 40.0 .527
** For difference of means t test, the probability that the null hypothesis is true.
'o
os'
tial chi-squared test, I tried alternatives in the form of the variable squared, its square
root, and its log.
The restricted model for the whole population of plants is presented in Table
4.5. (The global model is in the chapter appendix.) The influence of various plant
characteristics as suggested by the restricted model is described in more detail below:
o The expected probabilities of plant closure suggested by the restricted model
for single-plant firms and for multi-plant firms (8.6% v. 17.5%) are very close
to the actual frequencies (9.5% v. 18.2%).16 This seems to indicate that other
factors interfere little with the influence of the multi-plant firm variable.
o The firm age variable was significant in the model in the form "firm age +
1/firm age." Plants run by very young firms were the most likely to close.
Plants belonging to firms between 20 and 40 years old were the least likely to
close. The probability of a piant closure rose gradually for older firms. Fig-
ure 4.2 indicates the estimated probabilities of plant closure for firms of var-
ious ages. 17 (Remember, the "firm" here can be a subsidiary or divis'on.)
o Acquisition was significant in the model as an interaction variable:
FPACQ*(l/yeais since acquisition). The probability of closure was highest
soon after an acquisition took place. The longer a plant survived after an ac-
quisition, the more likely it continued to survive. (See Figure 4.3.)
o Smaller plants were more likely to close than larger plants (Figure 4.4). This
is a very interesting finding, given that the closure rate for multi-plant firms
was so much higher than that for single-plant firms, and plants in the former
tended to be much larger than plants in the latter. I will explore possible
reasons for this result later in the chapter.
o There was a direct relationship between employment trends in an industry na-
tionally and the probability of closure of a plant in that industry (Figure
4.5).
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REGRESSION PARAMETERS
Dummy Parameters
MULTI
MULT2
FPACQ
NONRI
PFDI
PUBLIC
Continuous parameters
FIRMAGE
AGEINV
ACQINV
PEAKSIZE
SIZESQ
ICH7883
PCTUNION
Multi-plant firm = 1
Multi-plant owner = 1
Firm or plant acquired = 1
Non-RI HQ = 1
Plant and firm in different industry = 1
Publicly traded = 1
Age of firm
1/FIRMAGE
FPACQ*(1/years since acquisition)
Peak annual emplyyment, 1977-83
PEAKSIZE*PEAKSIZE
Pct. change in US industry employment, 1978-83
Pct. plant workforce unionized
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Table 4.5
RESTRICTED LOGIT REGRESSION MODELS FOR PROBABILITY OF PLANT CLOSURE,
WHOLE POPULATION
w/ MULTI w/ MULT2
Cases
N 483 446
Closed 72 64
Parameter Coeff. t Coeff. t
CONSTANT -3.242 -7.70 -3.969 -7.94
MULTI .814 2.73 --- ---
MULT2 --- --- 1.147 3.30
FIRMAGE .010 2.23 .014 2.92
AGEINV 9.666 3.62 10.979 3.72
ACQINV 2.760 4.04 2.611 3.73
PEAKSIZE -.002 -2.22 -.C02 -2.14
ICH7883 -.018 -1.9A -.021 -2.11
Chi-squared 50.2 55.6
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Figures 4.2 and 4.3
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Figures 4.4 and 4.5
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Characteristics whose influence did not have statistical significance in the logit
regression analysis included non-RI headquarters, non-RI owner, union and percentage
unionization, publicly-traded, and plant/firm industry difference. However, while the
presence of one of these characteristics does not seem to increase the probability of
closure, we will see that in particular closure situations each of these variables does
play a role. Also, the act of acquisition ver se was not significant--the element of time
elapsed after the acquisition needed to be introduced.
The substitution of the multi-plant owner variable for the multi-plant firm vari-
able brought about a restricted model with the same variables, with the one substitu-
tion. (To reiterate, multi-plant owners include multi-plant firms plus single-plant firms
held by multi-firm owners.) Note that the coefficient for multi-plant owner is higher
than for multi-plant firm, suggesting a iarger difference in closure probability between
single-plant and multi-plant owners than between single-plant and muiti-plant firms.
-- Regressions for Single-Plant and Multi-Plant Categories
Because multi-plant firm and multi-plant owner loomed as large influences on
the probability of closure, I dezided to construct separate logit models for each
category within each of these variables, i.e. single-plant firms, multi-plant firms, single-
plant owners, and multi-plant owners. The final results from each of these analyses
are presented in Table 4.6. Each of the analyses yielded several significant variabies at
the .05 level, except for the single-plant owner analysis, which had one variable sig-
nificant at the .1 level. A comparison of these four models and the whole population
model yields a number of observations.
First, it seems that a major influence on the probability of a plant's closing is
whether or not a plant was part of a larger corporate family. The difference in
closure rates for single-plant firms and multi-plant firms was noted in the last section.
In the model for single-plant firms, the probability of closure under a multi-plant
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Table 4.6
REGRESSION MODELS FCR PROBABILITY OF PLANT CLOSURE
3Y TYPE OF FIRM AND OWNER
Restricted Models
PLANTS IN
SINGLE-PLAWT FIRMS MULTI-PLANT FIRMS SINGLE-PLANT OWNERS
245 201 196
22 42 14
t Coeff.
-4.48 -2.594
2. 9 0.0144
2.22 12.598
1.87 -0.0019
-1.70 --
-2.03 --
-- 2.910
-4.82
2.38
3.05
Cases
N
Closed
Parameter
CONSTANT
FIRMAGE
AGEINV
PEAKSIZE
SIZESO
ICH7883
ACQINV
MULT2
Coeff.
-5 009
.92 C.0367
-- -0.00011
PLANTS HELD BY
MULTI-PLANT OWNERS
250
50
t Coeff.
-3.30 -3.229
-- 0.0186
-- 14.178
1.67 -0.00210
-1.49 --
t
-5.95
3.21
3.69
-2.13
-- -0.0224 -1.97
-- 2.961 3.703.59
5.0 42.7
LO-
-1
Coeff.
-6.950
0.0184
9.695
0.0371
-0.00011
-0.0371
1.052 2.00
Chi-squared 23.2 28.3
owner was well above that for a single-plant owner. However, in the model for multi-
plant owners, multi-plant firm is not a significant variable. In other words, there is no
strong evidence that a single-plant firm of a multi-firm owner is less likely to close
than is a plant in a multi-plant firm.
Second, the percentage change in the U.S. employment in the plant's industry is
a significant variable for single-plant firms and for multi-plant owners, but, in-
terestingly, not for multi-plant firms. This finding suggests that multi-plants firms
might be more likely to close plants for reasons other than declining aggregate demand.
On the other hand, percentage employment change also is not a significant vari-
able for single-plant owners (t statistic = -1.10). It may be that these plants are less
sensitive to shifts in aggregate demand because it is their owners' only source of
livelihood. A person owning several firms in different industries might be more apt to
become overextended or to rcdeploy assets in bad times. These issues will be explored
later in the chapter.
Third, because the single-plant owner analysis only yields plant size as a sig-
nificant variable, and that at the .1 level, the significance of al ,h2 other variables in
the single-plant firm model seem to be due primarily to the presence of the multi-firm
owners in that category.18
Fourth, plant size is a factor in all the analyses. For plants belonging to multi-
plant owners (whether firms or individuals), probability of closure falls with size (as in
Figure 4.4). However, for single-plant firms, probability of closure rises with size be-
tween 50 and 175 employees (roughly) and then falls. (The variable is significant in
the form "size + size squared." See Figure 4.6.) A similar pattern exists for single-plant
owners.
Fifth, the acquisition interaction variable is significant in explaining closure
for multi-plant firms and owners, in the same pattern as for the population as a whole.
However, it is not significant for single-plant firms and owners.' While ACQINV had a
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positive coefficient for both categories in the global models, the low t statistics may in
part be a function of the relative infrequency of acquisitions for one plant firms--only
one-fifth of single-plant firms were acquired.
Sixth, the effect of firm age is similar in all the regressions, with the exception
of single-plant owners, following the parabolic pattern of Figure 4.1. The non-
significance of firm age for single-plant owners is probably a function of the con-
straint of requiring 50 or more workers in a plant. The reader should remember that
for age of firm, I may define "firm" as a subsidiary or division. Multi-plant firms and
multi-plant owners would find it easier to start enterprises that reach 50 employees
quickly than would single-plant owners. Single-plant operations started by owners
without other operations would likely take some time to reach 50; moreover, the
weeding-out process for thesz new firms primarily occurs at the below-50 level. There-
fore, the number of single-plant owners of young firms is very small given that single-
plant owners cperate over half the plants in the data base. (Table 4.7).
As we can see, the regression models indicate that there appears to exist strong
and complex relationships between organizational characteiistics and plant closures.
To recapitulate the findings so far:
o If plant belongs to a multi-plant firm or malti-plant owner, it is twice as like-
ly to close as is one belonging to a single-plant owner.
o The probability of closure for a single-plant firms held by multi-plant owners
is very sensitive to the percentage change in the industry's employment na-
tionally. Closures of plants held by single-plant owners seem less sensitive to
national changes. Industry employment change is not a significant variable
for plants in multi-plant firms, but probably because plants close for reasons
of decline in aggregated demand as well as for other reasons, such as
availability of lower factor costs elsewhere.
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Table 4.7
PLANTS IN FIRMS FIVE YEARS OLD OR LESS
by plant open/closed and type of firm
Closure
Closed Total Rate % All Plants
Single-Plant Owner
Single-Plant Firm/
Multi-Firm Owner
0
2
In Multi-Plant Firm 4
Total
2 0%
3 66.7%
6 66.7%
6 11 54.5%
* Estimated
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Type of Firm
53.7%*
11 .9*
41.8%
100.0%
o In multi-plant firms, probability of closure is inversely related to plant size.
For single-plant firms, probability of closure rises from 50 to 175 workers,
then falls.
o The probability of closure increases greatly after an acquisition, then declines
with time.
o The probability of closure is inversely related to firm age (for multi-plant
firms, "firm" may be defined as a subsidiary or division).
o Finally, unionization, publicly traded stock, non-RI headquarters, non-RI
owner, and plant/firm industry difference are not significant in any of the
models, nor was acquisition as a categorical (i.e. yes/no) variable.
-- Regression Models for Other Selected Categories
To further explore the nature of the relationships between organizaticnal char-
acteristics and the probability of closure, I aiso constructed logit models for particular
subgroups (or regroupirgs) of the data base. These models are presented below. First, I
examine patterns in the probability of firm closure. I was interested to see how the
findings for firm closures compared to those for plant closu:es. Then, I build regres-
sion models for Rhode Island's two major industry groups, jewelry and textiles, both to
determine the feasibility of industry-specific regression models and to better under-
stand the dynamics of these particular industries. To further explore the effcct of un-
ionization and publicly-traded stock, which have not been significant variables so far,
I construct a model for non-RI, multi-plant firms. Finally, I compare the effects of ac-
quisition and family succession in independent businesses on the probability of closure.
Firm closures. Thirty-eight firms in the data base closed between 1978 and
1983.19 In this instance, by "firm" I mean the ultimate corporate parent of the plant.
Interestingly, the two significant variables in the regression model for firm closures are
non-RI headquarters and the acquisition interaction variable (Table 4.8). On reflec-
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Table 4.8
RESTRICTED LOCIT REGRESSION MODELS FOR SELECTED CATEGORIES
Mutti-Plant, Independent
Firm Closures* Iewelry Non-Jewelry Textiles Non-RI Privately-held**
Cases
N 460 124 359 80 125 346
Closed 37 20 52 12 25 44
Parameters Coeff. t Coeff. t Coeff. t Coeff. t Coeff. t Coeff. t
CONSTANT -2.382 -11.92 -2.049 -4..2 -3.132 -6.95 -.727 -.87 -2.203 -5.81 -2.218 -8.42
NONRI -2.238 2.94 --- --- ----  --- ---
INVFACQ*** 3.198 3.17 --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
ACQINV --- --- 5.604 3.17 2.399 3.17 --- --- 2.724 2.77 --- ---
AGEINV --- --- 7.814 1.59 8.929 3.62 --- --- 6.533 1.70 
--- ---
PEAKSIZE --- --- .003 -1.32 .002 -1.81 .017 -2.14 --- --- 
--- ---
MULTI --- --- --- --- .932 2.66 1.506 2.03 --- --- 
--- ---
PUBLIC --- --- --- --- -- --- 2.578 1.63 --- --- --- 
---
FPACQ --- --- --- --- --- --- ~^~ ~~~ --- --- .901 2.30
INDRELATE*** --- --- --- --- --- --- -- --- --- --- .188 .47
Chi-squared 19.8 17.5 31.7 11.6 9.5 5.3
* In this model, the dependent variable if firm open/closed. In all other models, the dependent variable is plant open/closed.
** This is not a full model, just a comparisor of the effects oi two variables.
* INVFACQ is FACQ*1/years since firm acquisition, where FACQ is a dummy variable for firm acquisition.
INDRELATE is a dummy variable for inheritance of independent firn by relative
tion, the robustness of the headquarters variable is logical. Thirty-five of the 38 closed
firms were Rhode Island-headquartered. RI-headquartered firms tend to be 1-2 plant
operations, while a good number of the out-of-state firms are national or multinational
in scope. Standard wisdom and logic say that smaller firms are more likely to fail than
larger ones. In this regression model, it seems that location of headquarters is really a
proxy for firm size, a characteristic for which I could not get data. 20
Jewelry. The jewelry industry had 151 plants in the data base, 26% of the total.
Eighty percent of these plants were in single-plant firms. The only variable significant
at the .05 level in the jewelry regression model is the acquisition interaction variable.
Note, though, that its coefficient in this model is twice as large as any other. The size
of the coefficient is consistent with the dynamics of the jewelry boom and bust. When
the industry took off, both newcomers and experienced jewelry people sought to enter
the industry to cash in on the profits. The combination of falling demand and high in-
terest rates resulted in a last-in, first-out effect. Eight of the 20 jewelry plant closures
were post-1976 acquisitions. In fact, every jewelry plant of the five acquired in 1977
and 1978 closed by 1983.
After seeing the strength of the relationship between acquisition and closure in
the jewelry industry, I wanted to see if the relationship held for non-jewelry firms.
The logit regression model for non-jewelry firms indicates that acquisition remains an
important explanatory variable.
Textiles. The textile industry had 83 firms in the data base, 12 of which closed.
Significant variables in the regression model include multi-plant firm (direct relation
to probability of closure), peak size of plant (inverse), and publicly-held firm (direct).
The latter variable is significant because two of the seven textile plants in publicly-
traded firms were relocated to new sites outside of the state.
The two industry models show how the dynamics of closures can dramatically
differ from one industry to another and from the population as a whole.
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Non-RI firms. While unionization and publicly-traded stock do not seem to be
an important variables in explaining plant closure rates for multi-plant firms, I wanted
to see if they are significant when the model is restricted to non-RI headquartered,
multi-plant firms. Plants with workforces which are at least 20% unionized make up
48% of these plants (v. 19% for all other plants). Also, 65% of the plants in the non-RI
multi-plant group are in publicly-traded firms. Again, though, neither variable was
significant in the regression model. Acquisition age and firm age were the only two
significant variables. When I further limited the sample to out-of-state publicly-held
firms, the same results occurred.
Privately-held, independent firms. For privately-held, independent firms, the
survey interviewers asked if the current owner was the founder, of the founder's fam-
ily, or an acquirer. I was particulaily interested to see if the probability of closure
inider succeedirg generations tended more towards that for founders or that for ac-
quisition. The coefficient for succeeding generation ownership was slightly positi-e
and not significant. That for acquisition was robust.2 1
Descriptive Analysis: Patterns in the Characteristics of Closed Plants
The relationships between organizational characteristics and plant closures sug-
gested by the various logit models demand some explanation or hypotheses. The ex-
plication of these relationships requires a descriptive analysis of the closed plants, a
detailed examination of the nature of particular closings in terms of organizational
characteristics, reasons for closure, and disposition of plant operations after closure.
This type of analysis enables initial observations on the roles of institutional, struc-
tural and macroeconomic factors in plant closures.
For every closed plant but one, I was able to determine whether or not the firm
itself remained opened or had closed. For the closed plants in open firms, the tele-
phone interviewers asked a set of additional questions concerning the disposition of the
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plant's operations after its closure. These questions covered (1) whether or not the firm
continued to make the closed plant's primary product in another location, (2) whether
or not the plant's operations were liquidated or relocated, and (3) if relocated, the ad-
vantages of the new location.
For 22 of the 40 plants in closed firms, I obtained specific information on the
reason for the firm closure from persons who had long-term, first hand knowledge
about the firm operation. This information was obtained in face-to-face interviews as
part of my research for the Rhode Island Strategic Development Commission.2 2 For
these and a number of other failed firms, I also gathered information from the clip-
ping files of the Providence Journal.
Information on the disposition of plant operations and the reasons for firm and
plant closure was extremely useful in gaining a more detailed sense of why certain var-
iables are statistically significant and, very importantly, b,-inging to light trends not
apparent in the models. For instance, although the extent of union presence is never a
significant variable in aay model, the descriptive analysis allowed me to see certain
situations in which union presence seemed to stimulate the relocation of plant opera-
tions.
On reviewing the population of closed plants, I developed a typology of 4
categories of plant closures: firm closures (40 plants), nroduct termination closures, i.e.
the firm stops making the product (13 plants), capacity reduction closures, where the
firm continues to produce the product elsewhere (10 plants), and relocations of plant
operations for reasons related to factor costs (12 plants). I use this typology to struc-
ture the analysis.
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-- Firm Closures
The majority of plant closures (40) was due to firm closures (38). Firm closures
also accounted for about half of plant closing job loss (Table 4.9). As we saw in Chap-
ter 3, the job loss from firm closures rose very quickly between 1979 and 1983. The
regression models for all firm closures and for the closures of single-plant firms indi-
cate that five characteristics play important roles in the frequency of firm closures--
multi-firm owners of single-plant firms, years since acquisition, industry employment
change, plant size and location of headquarters (which I suspect to be a proxy for firm
size).
The role of multi-plant ownership and size. As Table 4.9 indicates, the majority
of job loss due to firm closures in the 1980-82 period came from closures of multi-plant
firms and single-plant firms held by multi-firm owners. There seem to be two reasons
for this pattern. First, as we saw, singie-plant firms iun by multi-plant owncrs were
morce likely to close than were other single-plant firms. Second, though multi-plant
firms were not more likely to fail than single-plant firms, the plants in the former
group tended to have larger employment. Only 2 of the 31 single-plant firm closures
resulted in a one-year loss of mor,. than 100 jobs. On the other hand, 5 of the 9
closures in multi-plant firms had this characteristic, with 2 plants with one-year losses
of 5GO employees each.
Of the 38 firm closures, all but three were headquartered in Rhode Island. As I
mentioned earlier, I think that the non-RI headquarters variable in the firm closure
regression model is really a proxy for firm size. Thirty-one of the firm closures were
single-plant firms. Of the seven multi-plant firms, five were two-plant operations and
one a three-plant operation. Only one closed firm was of any size, a publicly-traded,
New York-based fashion conglomerate.
Industry. Seventy percent of the closed plants were in the jewelry, textile or ap-
parel industries, with nearly half (19 of 40) in jewelry alone. This pattern is consistent
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TABLE 4.9
JOB LOSS IN CLOSURES OF RHODE ISLAND PLANTS
BY TYPE OF CLOSURE, 1979-82
for plants with 50+ workers in one year between 1977-81
Type of Closure
Firm Closures
Single-Plant Firms
Single-Firm Owners
Multi-Firm Owners
# Firms Unknown
Multi-Plant Firms
Product Terminations
Capacity Reductions
Factor Cost Reductions
TO)AL
Plants 1979
40 525
31
14
9
8
9
13
10
12
489
98
90
301
36
139
281
341
76* 1,286
Note: Job lass in each year counted for firms which closed in last
prior year, base year and subsequent year. Figures for 1983
cause identification of 1984 closures not available.
Counts in "Plants" column for plants which closed 1978-83.
six months of
not included be-
* Includes one plant which closed in 1983, with no job loss in prior years,
and for information is lacking to place in category. Therefore, "Plant"
column adds to 75.
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1980
987
416
140
125
151
571
292
42
339
1,66)
1981
1,007
498
175
68
255
509
343
120
592
2,062
1982
1,458
650
219
366
65
808
684
455
704
3,310
with the dominance of jewelry and textile plants among small RI-headquartered firms
and with the fact that both the jewelry and apparel industries underwent a nationwide
shakeout during the 1978-83 period.
I think the fact that firm closures provided over half of the state's plant
closures is very much a function of the large numbers of small jewelry firms. States
with an industry structure more oriented to larger firms would be less likely to have
such a high proportion of job loss resulting from firm closures.
Management and acquisition. From information I have for 24 of the 38 closed
firms, it seems that a large number of the closures were the result of management prob-
lems. Failures due to mismanagement can be broken into three groups--one in which
healthy companies were acquired and then poorly run by new owners, one in which rel-
atively young companies failed, and one in which long-term owners made management
errors.
For eleven of the firm failures, acquisition and mismanagement are clearly asso-
ciated. One of these is the above mentioned conglomerate, which acquired one of the
premier Rhode Island jewely companies in the early 1970's to be its flagship sub-
sidiary. A decade later, the entire company went down due to mismanagement at the
top and at the subsidiary. The ten remaining acquisition-failures all failed within 3
years of being acquired. In five of these, the firm failed after being sold by con-
glomerate ownership to the subsidiary's management. In four conglomerate-related
cases, a Rhode Island-based single-plant firm was acquired by an out-of-state con-
glomerate in the late 1960's or early 1970's; in the late 1970's, the conglomerate decided
to sell to the subsidiary's management because it was no longer profitable or profitable
enough.2 In the fifth case, soon after a Swiss venture capitalist started a watch case
firm, his mismanagement forced him to sell out to the local people.
For most of these conglomerate-related cases, I do not have enough information
to comment on the quality of the new management, though one might suspect their
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judgment in buying the companies in the first place. In one case, though, I was told
that after two brothers took over the company, one of them actually stole the firm's
cash and went to Mexico.
In the second group of acquisition-failures, apparently healthy companies were
taken over by inexperienced local management. One small jewelry company was ac-
quired by two marketing executives from a multimillion dollar corporation in a related
but different field. Their lack of operational experience doomed the firm. In a second
case, lack of management experience was compounded by the new owners' inability to
work with a union which had coexisted with the prior owners. Badly handled con-
frontations led first to a strike, then to violence, then to bankruptcy. In another
acquisition-failure, the new owner's drinking and gambling problem played a large part
in bringing about the result. A 2-plant jewelry company failed withir a year of being
acquired because the new and inexperienced owners highly leveraged their acquisition
at the time of 21% interest rates and the fall in jew'elry demand.
Of all the firm closures, only three were firms which started and failed under
the same owner within 10 years. Both firms for which I have good infoirmation failed
apparently because they ove-rexpanded, making investments in plant and equipment
that could not be supported. In one case, a jewelry company, the owner failed to un-
derstand his cost structure. For the other, a fish processing plant, management failed
to properly arrange for an adequate supply of fish, not understanding how the local
fisherman operate. The firm died in two years.
Twenty-four of the firm closures were operated by families which had owned
the firm for at least ten years. However, at least four of these instances look like some
of the acquisition-failures. In three cases, sons were unsuccessful in taking over from
fathers. In the fourth case, the long-term owner of a fabricated metals plant died
without a successor, and his estate was unable to find a buyer. Just before the owner
died, the workers voted to unionize. Facing tightening markets, the caretaker manage-
116
ment and the union were unable to come to contract agreement. A ten-month strike
ensued which ended only when the estate, unsuccessful in finding a buyer, decided to
liquidate.
In a number of instances, long-term owners did not seem to have the skills to
maintain profitable operations. One had made his fortune on a particular type of fad
jewelry, but did not diversify his product line once the firm faded. In a printing busi-
ness, management was too rigid and traditional to respond to new industry trends; it
closed after over 100 years of operation. In a third case, another jewelry maker over-
expanded, building a new plant just as the jewelry boom faded. Several of the single-
plant firms in this group belonged to multi-firm owners. Perhaps some of the owners
were too extended to manage their business properly; perhaps others were not suffi-
ciently motivated to save their business because it was not their only source of
livelihood.
Three of the firms in this group, and for which I have no information on man-
agement quality, were in women's apparel. Without excluding the possibility of man-
agement problems, there also seems to have been structural changes in that particular
industry that may have brought about their demise Persons knowledgeable about the
local apparel industry indicate that a number of small contract jobbers, such as these
single-plant firms, closed when the buyer decided to shift the contract to off-shore
sources. As we saw in Chapter 2, apparel was the only major industry group in Rhode
island that paid wages above the national industry average.
Only for one firm could I find information that the closure was purely
voluntary--the owner wanted to retire, could not find a local buyer, and so shut the
firm and sold the assets outside the state.
The role of institutional and structural factors in firm closures. It appears that
most of the Rhode Island firm closures occurred for institutional reasons, particularly
mismanagement. External macroeconomic and structural events, such as the decline of
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jewelry demand and the appearance of low-wage foreign entrants, may have exacer-
bated difficulties to the point of failure, but for the most part the problem seems to
have been within.2 4 In clear and rich detail, we can see the role of inexperienced new
management and poor judgment by old management. Moreover, given the high failure
rate of single-plant firm held by multi-plant owners, it may be that a single person
running a number of separate firms results in overextension and poor management.
Conglomerate ownership seemed to have played a key role in a number of firm
failures, at one remove from the final owner in all but one case. It is difficult at a
distance to tell whether and how much the conglomerates' contribution to these firm
failures was through willful "milking," lack of experience, or the bureaucratic transac-
tion costs that conglomerates can impose on their subsidiaries. The repeated pattern of
acquisition, divestiture and failure is both striking and quite similar to conglomerate-
generated job losses de scribed elsewhere.2 5  t is important to aote that in each case, the
conglomerate's own on-site management took over the firm. It may be that in one or
two cases significant management problems existed within the subsidiary instcad of or
in addition to problems from above.
Pointing the finger at management for Rhode Island firm failures does not
mean that structural and macroeconomic issues had little to do with the ultimate result.
The regression models do indicate a robust correlation between change in industry
employment and single-plant firm closures.2 6 Basically, I think there is a tension be-
tween the macroeconomic, structural and institutional factors that varies from industry
to industry, firm to firm, region to region, the top to the bottom of the business cycle,
and one fad in corporate conglomeration to another. For instance, the high proportion
of closed Rhode Island firms with clear institutional problems was in large part a com-
bined function of the boom/bust in jewelry demand and the structure of the jewelry
industry, which is primarily comprised of small firms. The boom encouraged many in-
experienced people to enter the business and those in the business to expand; when the
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decline in demand occurred, those that could not adjust closed up. Changing industry
structure or technology, or the massive inflow of imports did not appear to play a
major role in most of the jewelry failures. Bad timing and inexperience did.
In other industries, times and places, structural problems may more directly dic-
tate firm closure, regardless of institutional ability. For instance, in the Rhode Island-
Massachusetts textile industry of the 1950's, changing tastes, new products, and the
availability of lower-waged labor in the South meant that many small manufacturers
had little choice but to liquidate, unless they wanted to move South also. That was a
institutional choice many did not want to make. Today, apparel contract shops find
their opportunities significantly narrowed as buyers switch to foreign sources.
Ultimately, I think, all firm failures have institutional roots--owners and managers fail
or decide to stop trying. Trends in aggregate demand, currency rates, and industry
structure and technology set the environment. However, in many instances the room to
move is very narrow.
To put it another way, firm failures appcar to be the results of institutional
reactions to structural and miiacroeconomic opportunities and constraints. I believe this
perception holds for other types of plant closures as well.
-- Product Termination Closures
Thirteen plants were shut down as a result of a firm decision to get out of the
business of making the plant's product. Unlike the firm failures, 6 of the 13 closed
plants in this group were operated by non-Rhode Island firms. Only 3 plants were un-
ionized. The mean peak size of these plants was slightly larger than that for the firm
failures (176 v. 146). Six plants had under 100 workers, 4 were over 235.
In 11 of the 13 product termination closures, the liquidated product was
tangential to the company's primary product line. For 8 of these firms, the parent
made a decision to enter a new market, either vertically or horizontally related to its
119
primary business, but after a few years determined that the venture was not working
and closed the plant. In all cases, the company ran the plant for 8 years or less; in six
cases, it ran the plant 5 or less years. Four of the 8 were startup plants and four were
acquisitions. In only 1 of the 4 acquisitions did the new owner acquire a troubled com-
pany, one that had been in Chapter 11 for 5 years. In at least three acquisitions, the
parent decided the acquisition did not fit with the rest of the firm. In several others,
firms misjudged the nature of the new market they were entering; one of these firms
also decided it did not like or understand the jewelry industry culture. And a few
were simply mismanaged. Again we see that new acquisitions and newly created "firms"
(in the form of subsidiaries) in businesses in which management lacks experience or
adequate knowledge are more likely to close than are other plants.
In two other cases of tangential product termination, the company decided to
eliminate a traditional product line during a period of company turmoil in which man-
agement problems played a part. Both companies had produced their respective pro-
duct lines for quite some time. For one of these plants, a Brown and Sharpe cutting
tool operation, a long-term conflict with the unioi compounded the company's prob-
le ins.
There were two product termination cases in which the plant product was not
considered tangential by the parent. One company closed its Rhode Island plant when
that plant's product, dry felt for asphalt shingles, became obsolete. The firm, which
had run the unionized RI plant for 75 years, closed several such plants around the
country. The company replaced these plants by expanding production of the replace-
ment product, fiber-glass shingles, in a new South Carolina plant and a converted Mas-
sachusetts one.
The last case of product termination was more akin to a firm failure. A 76-year
old manufacturing firm whose primary product was handbag ornaments shut down the
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handbag plant after failing to change its styles with the times. It did retain a small
plant that made medallions.
According to personal interviews, news articles and the survey respondents, in-
stitutional issues played a large role in product termination closures. That nearly two-
thirds of these closures were in-and-out operations in new product lines again indicates
the role of inexperience or misjudgment in bringing about plant closures. Management
problems also seemed to be present in the three product termination closures under
long-term management, including the handbag and cutting tool plants.
However, there also appear to be a few product termination closures in which a
measured decision was made to redeploy assets in response to structural industry trends.
In one, vertical integration no longer made economic sense, so the plant was dismem-
bered and the assets sold. In another, it was decided to redeploy assets in another part
of the industry. The product obsolcscence closure was brcught on by technological
change. Finally, for a microwave components plant, the appearance of low-cost Japan-
ese products meant that it was no longer economically viable.
I did not expect to find such a high proportion of closures which were product
terminations--17% of the total. It would be iiteresting to see if this proportion is repli-
eated in other areas.
-- Capacity Reduction Closures
Ten plants closed when companies decided to reduce (but not eliminate) produc-
tion capacity in an existing product line in the face of falling demand. In all cases but
one, operations were consolidated into other existing plants. The consolidations had a
regional flavor--five were with sister Rhode Island plants, and 2 with Massachusetts
plants, and only 2 with plants outside the New England region. Six of the 7 intra-
regional consolidations had less than 110 workers.
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Five plants in three firms were closed as the result of a decision to consolidate
operations with another Rhode Island plant.2 7 Two RI-headquartered firms (jewelry-
related, publishing) closed three plants and one out-of-state firm (luggage) closed two.
All five plants were acquired 7 or less years prior to closure. One of the firms, which
made jewelry-related items, acquired two subsidiaries from two different con-
glomerates. One source suggests that the acquirer had management problems and be-
came overextended in the recession of the early 1980's. A third plant closure took
place in the aftermath of a merger between two printing companies.
In two cases, an Indiana conglomerate that focussed on making hospital beds
took over a Rhode Island-based manufacturer of luggage which had 5 local plants.
Soon after the acquisition, demand for the product declined an estimated 20%, requir-
ing liquidation of some capacity. Imports' share of the U.S. luggage market rose from
20% in 1977 to 38% in 1983.28
Two plants lost to consolidation were operated by small Massachusetts-based
companies (apparel, jewelry) which moved the Rhode Tsland operations into the head-
quarters plant when product demand fell. Both plants had less than 70 people. rhey
were the only 2 plants in the capacity reduction group which were startups by the
parent.
Finally, three plants were closed by non-regional firms as the result of decisions
to reduce excess capacity. Two were cross-country plant consolidations (to Minnesota,
New Jersey). Both plants were quite larger than the others, averaging 300 workers
each. One survey respondent, now in a middle management position with another com-
pany, told us that the parent of the closed plant, which had acquired the Rhode Island
subsidiary 20 years earlier, did not invest much in plant and equipment and essentially
had "milked" the plant. (The parent had diversified holdings in the same major indus-
try group, food processing, as the plant.) The stated reason for the other capacity
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reduction/relocation was a drop in aggregate industry demand for computer termi-
nals.2 9
The last case in this category is more akin to a firm failure. The largest pro-
ducer of kitchen cabinets in Spain set up a subsidiary in Rhode Island to produce for
the U.S. market. However, the product was never test-marketed, there were communi-
cation problems between Spanish managers and local workers, and the plant site was
too far from markets. The plant only lasted 2 years. Unlike the other capacity reduc-
tion closures, operations were not consolidated with an existing plant. The company
defaulted on the mortgage and the mortgagor took title to the plant and equipment.
Consistent with patterns in prior categories, at least a few of these consolida-
tions can be attributed to management problems. One jewelry firm made an acquisi-
tion in 1980, not the best time to do so--the plant closed in two years. It also was un-
able to sustain production in an .earlier acquired plant that made a tangential product.
The possibility of management issues at the food processing plant has been mentioned.
For a number of capacity reduction closures, I have no assessment of management per-
formance. However, it is clear that, for at least a few plants, structural factors did
play a role, in jewelry, apparel, luggage and office equipment.
It is unclear what conclusions can be drawn from the predominance of capacity-
reducing consolidations to local plants. Perhaps such local consolidations are more like-
ly to take place than cross-country ones for logistical reasons. Perhaps their
predominance is a combination of the structure of the Rhode Island economy and coin-
cidence.
Finally, it appears that in almost every case of capacity reduction, some portion
of plant operations were consolidated into an existing plant in the same product line.
For companies that retain a closed plant's product line and geographic market, perhaps
partial rather than complete liquidation is the norm. After all, reduction in demand
does not necessarily coincide neatly with a plant's capacity; moreover, a company prob-
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ably would want to keep some capacity if an upturn occurs. Only studies of other
areas can indicate whether this pattern is replicated.
-- Relocations and Consolidations to Reduce Factor Costs
Profile of closures. The remaining 12 plants all seem to have had their opera-
tions relocated to new plants (6) or consolidated with existing plants (6) for the pur-
poses of reducing factors costs. Significant reductions in capacity were not involved.
Four closures appear to have been made primarily for labor-related reasons, 4 for
physical site reasons, 2 primarily to reduce energy costs, and 2 to reduce transportation
costs. All but one we:e non-RI headquartered and acquired. Most of the plants were
fairly large. Average peak plant size was 270 workers, with the largest being 600 and
the smallest 56.
Four plants moved to escape unions and to lower labor costs. Each of these
plants were larger than average (the smallest being 190 workers) and were moved to
low-wage, locations--South Carolina, Alabama and Mexico. Three had production work-
forces which were 100% unionized. The one non-unionized plant belonged to General
Electric--however, with a sister Rhode Island unionized plant, its workers were paid
union scale. General Electric publicly admitted that its reasons for moving both plants
(wiring devices) to Mexico was to lower labor costs in light of industry trends. One GE
plant was the largest closure in the 1978-83 period.
A plant closure by Davol, a maker of latex products for health care, illustrates a
pattern of acquisition and relocation that is repeated by several other plants. Founded
in Rhode Island in 1874, Davol was acquired in 1968 by the International Paper Co.,
organized by the United Rubber Workers in 1970, and experienced an eight-week strike
in 1970 and an 18-week strike in 1973-74.30 In the aftermath of the strike, the compa-
ny announced that it would no longer expand in Rhode Island because of the state's
unemployment compensation costs and a law which provided unemployment insurance
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benefits to strikers after 7 weeks of strike. The company acquired its South Carolina
plant in 1977 and closed one Rhode Island plant the next year. (It continues to operate
another Rhode Island plant.)
Parenthetically, one telephone respondent from the group of plants that relo-
cated for labor-related reasons said that he regretted the move because the firm was
unable to maintain the same product quality as in Rhode Island.
Four respondents said that plant operations were moved for reasons of physical
plant--to gain larger plant capacity, better plant layout, or lower rent. All moved to
Northeast locations. Two plants were consolidated into existing plants within three
years of being acquired. One was moved into a new plant built near corporate head-
quarters seven years after the Rhode Island-based firm was acquired. Finally, one
plant, a textile subsidiary of large nationwide conglomerate, moved to Pennsylvania
after a dispute with the Rhode Island government over plant rental costs. Three of
these plants were non-union; the four was 60% unionized.
Two plants were primarily shut down for energy reasons. The Narragansett
Brewery was consolidated with a Falstaff Beer operation (its parent) in Indiana be-
cause the brewery could not get a guaranteed supply of ratural gas and refuse d to op
erate with more costly oil.3 1 In the second case, a bottling plant's Pennsylvania-based
parent went bankrupt and was taken over by a Canadian conglomerate. 32 However,
soon after the acquisition, the Canadian firm decided to close the plant for reasons, it
told the press, of high energy and transportation costs. Operations were consolidated
with a West Virginia plant where energy costs were one-third as much.
Finally, two plants were moved for reasons of distance to markets. One was the
only RI-headquartered company to move a plant out of state. The single-plant compa-
ny went into Chapter 7 bankruptcy within 6 months of moving to New Jersey. A
source draws a familiar picture--a son took over the business from his father but had
trouble maintaining operations. The business was said to be highly undercapitalized.
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The Davol plant closure is a case of an established Rhode Island company being
acquired and then having operations moved. The final case shows that the same pat-
tern can occur for a new local company as well. Technical Fluorocarbons Engineering,
Inc. (TFE) was founded in 1965 by two Rhode Islanders and acquired two years later
by Dayco Corp. as part of its Cadillac Plastics division. In 1976, TFE headquarters
were moved to Kalamazoo, Michigan, site of a second TFE plant. In 1980, TFE de-
cided it wanted a consolidated operation at a centrally located site, so it built a new
plant in North Carolina and closed both older plants.
A Teamster representative said to the survey interviewer that while labor issues
were not the primary reason for closure, they were at least secondary. Soon after TFE
moved its headquarters to Michigan, TFE workers in Rhode Island voted to join the
Teamsters. In 1977, a National Labor Relations Board judge ruled that TFE had
engagcd in unfair labor practices by coercively interrogating employees about union
sentiment and offering them raises in exchange for not supporting the union. 33 When
the closure announcement was made in 1980, TFE's president said that while Rhode Is-
land was not chosen as the consolidation site because of its peripheral location, North
Carolina was chosen both for reasons of location and its "total pro-business climate."3 4
All eleven non-RI headquartered plants which were relocated for factor cost
reasons were acquired. In prior categories a large number of plants were closed within
5 years of acquisition because the new owners could not adequately adjust to their new
responsibilities. However, for this group, 7 of the plants were held for 5 or more years,
and 6 for 10 or more. For these relatively long-held plants, the decisions to close seem
more measured, a proactive attempt to adjust to changing market conditions by lower-
ing the costs of the factors of production. Four plants were acquired and moved in 3
years, one for labor reasons, two for physical site and one for energy. In these cases,
the relocations seemed to be made as the companies began operating the plants, better
understood their cost structures, and made locational adjustments.
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There is clear evidence that the dynamics of the geographic dispersion of pro-
duction capacity for labor-related reasons was at work in several cases. At the same
time, for the majority of these relocations, it seems that non-labor factors were the
motivating force. 35
Roughly one-quarter of plant closing jobs loss was due to relocations and con-
solidations for reasons of factor costs. For the 1978-83 period, 4%-6% of annual gross
job loss (i.e. closures and contractions) can be attributed to this type of closures. As we
saw, all but one were non-RI headquartered plants. In fact, while only 0.23% of RI-
headquartered plants (I of 425) had plant operations fully transferred to another loca-
tion, this occurred for 7.1% (11 of 156) of all non-RI headquartered plants, a dif-
ference in frequency of a factor of 33.
Comparison of relocation findings to those of David Birch. One of David
Birch's key findings in "The Job Generation Process" is that Job loss due to plant
relocation is almost negligible:
Virtually no firms migrate from one area to another in the sense of hiring a
moving van and relocating their operations. The oft-cited move of textiles
and shoes from New England to the South represented a rare fluke in the
1950's, uot an example of a significant process today. 36
Birch supported his assertion by data that show that in the years 1969-76, the annual
rate of job loss due to relocation was between .03% and .1%. His figures were for all
types of businesses--he did not publish natioral figures for migration of manufacturing
plants. This was not a trivial omission, for the migration of traded sector firms is the
important figure. Birch's published migration data for manufacturing at the state level
show substantially higher migration rates. For Rhode Island manufacturing, the an-
nual job loss rate for the 1969-76 period was between .1% and .3%. However, he went
on to say that even the higher levels of migration in particular areas overstate the
problem:
A careful look at the firm migration figures reveals a great deal of cluster-
ing. . . . Most of these (migration) moves . . . are relatively short-distance
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moves. If we draw the boundaries around greater metropolitan areas rather
than around states, most of the migration vanishes. 3 7
In light of findings that factor cost relocations and consolidations provided one-
fourth of plant closing job loss and 4-6% of annual gross job loss, I believe that Birch
underestimated the importance of the relocation phenomenon. Translating the reloca-
tion job loss figures to a form comparable to Birch's, I estimate that in the 1979-83 per-
iod between .3% and .8% of RI manufacturing jobs were annually lost to the movement
of operations outside of the state. Though these figures are not very large, and are for
a different time period, they do suggest that relocation is more widespread than Birch
indicated. Three methodological reasons and an observation about Rhode Island's eco-
nomic structure support this notion. First, as Birch notes, the DMI file undercounts
relocations. In response to the relocation of operations to a new plant, Dun and Brad-
street frequently does not bother to transfer the old DUNS number, in which case the
relocation is not counted as such. Rather it is treated as a death in one place and a
birth in another. 38 Second, ana very importantly, the DMI file only picks ip reloca-
tions to new plants. It does not count the consolidation of plant operations into exist-
ing plants. However, half of the RI plant operations moved to reduce factor cos%.s were
of this latter type. 3 9 Third, whereas Birch's figures irclude intra-metropolitan area
moves, mine do not. Perhaps one reason why intra-city moves are so well represented
in Birch's migration data is that in such cases only one D&B office is handling the
relocation of the account. For inter-regional moves which require the coordination of
two D&B offices, the old DUNS number is more likely to fall through the cracks and
the relocation missed. In sum, it does not seem that the DMI file provided a very ac-
curate count of job loss due to relocation and consolidation.
The Rhode Island data probably understate the extent to which the movement
of plant operations occurs in other states. Nearly 75% of the plants with 50+ workers
were RI-headquartered. However, we saw that non-local firms were far more likely to
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move operations than were local firms. In states which are more dependent on branch
plants than Rhode Island, job loss due to relocation of operations likely would be high-
er.
Review of Hypotheses in Light of Findings
The series of logit regression models has indicated that certain variables are sig-
nificant in explaining the probability of Rhode Island plant closures. The descriptive
analysis of the closures has provided a deeper understanding of the relationships be-
tween a number of organizational characteristics and plant closings. Using the results
from both the logit and descriptive analyses, I can now review the hypotheses set out
in the beginning of the chapter regarding these relationships.
Multi-plant firm and multi-plant owner. Contrary to popular wisdom, the logit
analysis indicates that plants held by multi-plant companies were twice as likely to
close as were single-plant firms. The primary reason for this result is that a single-
plant firm is more "lumpy" than plant in a multi-plant firm. As was apparent in -
number of closures, when capacicy is significantly reduced in a multi-plant firm,
whether to cut down oa excess capacity or to stop making a tangential product, a plant
might close. On the other hand, capacity reduction in a single-plant firm means a
layoff, not closure.
The frequency of closure for single-plant firms held by multi-firm owners
looked like that for plants in multi-plant firms. For every firm closure under a multi-
firm owner for which I have evidence (all but 2), it is clear that management problems
are at fault. As said earlier, perhaps multi-firm owners get overextended or have less
personal investment in an individual business because their income comes from a num-
ber of sources.
Non-Rhode Island headquarters. I think it is plausible that the non-RI head-
quarters variable was not significant because it had two very strong, but opposite,
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tendencies that cancelled each other out. On the one hand, out-of-state firms were far
more likely than locally-based firms to move operations out of state. On the other,
local firms were far more likely to fail.
When all movements of plant operations to out-of-state locations are counted, in-
cluding those involving capacity reductions, only 0.23% of RI-headquartered plants
were moved versus 9.6% of non-RI headquartered plants (15 of 156). A plant with out-
of-state headquarters was over 40 times more likely to relocate or consolidate out of
state than was a plant with in-state headquarters.
These startling results probably can be explained in part by two facts. First, the
plant operations of almost every Rhode Island-headquartered firm were solely or
predominately based in the state. Second, almost every Rhode Island firm was in the
1-3 plant range in size. It seems plausible that local owners would be very reluctant to
move a faciiity out of state since they either would have to move too or create a new
management style that did not involve on-site oversight. A number of the sources in-
terviewed for the Greenhouse study noted that many of the small firm owners were It-
tached to their businesses for social reasons, e.g., standing in the community, mem-
bership in the country club. Out-of-state firms with RI plants would be much less like-
ly to let the social attachments of their Rhode Island managers rule out a relocation.
Th2 results make a strong statement about the geographic stability of and the
role of non-business factors in the siting decisions of small, locally-owned manufactur-
ing businesses. However, it is unclear the extent to which relocations by in-state firms
did not take place because the firms were local and the extent to which the result oc-
curred because the firms were small.
While only 1.5% of non-RI headquartered firms failed, 8.8% of RI-headquartered
ones did. As I mentioned earlier, I believe that these results are more a function of
firm size than of location. Rhode Island is a state of small local firms. In a state with
larger local-headquartered plants and firms, there may be a lower rate of in-state firm
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failure. It would be interesting to see if there were an off-setting higher rate of out-
of-state relocation by in-state firms.
Years since acquisition. Years since acquisition had a very powerful influence
on the probability of plant closure. There seem to be two types of reasons for this--
management error and quick adjustment. A large number of plants closed soon after
acquisition because the new owners wither were unable to maintain profitability or,
for tangential plant acquisitions, soon realized they had made a mistake. In addition,
several plants closed soon after acquisition when their managements chose relocation as
the method to absorb the new operations into the firm.
Interestingly, the act of acquisition itself (i.e. as a categorical variable) was not
significant in any model. This result further indicates that the impact of acquisition
on closure is very much related to time.
Firm and plant size. When I designed this study, I did not have a variable for
firm size because the information was difficult to obtain for frms with out-of-state
operations. However, the regression model for firm closures indicates that, if one ac-
cepts location of headquarters as a proxy for firm size, that small firms indeed are
more likely to close than large ones.
The regression models indicate that the relationship between the probability of
plant closure and plant size depends on the number of plants in the firm. The prob-
ability curve for multi-plant firms is negative-sloping--smaller plants are more likely to
close. The curve for single-plant firms is bell-shaped, rising between 50 and 175
workers and then falling.
I think that three factors can explain the negative sloping curve for multi-plant
firms. First, when a firm chooses to reduce capacity, smaller plants logically would
close before larger ones making the same product. If there is a consolidation, a smaller
operation has to fit into a larger one. Drops in sales may be only severe enough to call
for the liquidation of a small plant rather than a large one. Also, closure of a smaller
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plant allows a company more flexibility to respond if sales rise again. (Of the 9 plants
closed to reduce capacity, 6 had less than 110 workers.) On the other hand, if cutbacks
need to take place within very large plants, it is less likely that the whole plant would
close. While the largest closed plant had 600 workers, there were 38 plants that were
larger. We see that "lumpiness" has a role in lowering the probability of closure not
only for single-plant firms (which tend to be small, but also for plants at the far end
of spectrum.
This dynamic might not be replicated in states, like Ohio and Pennsylvania in
the late 1970's and early 1980's, hard hit by restructuring in durable goods. However,
the frequency of large plant closures in such limited time and bounded space has been
a rare occurrence in U.S. industrial history.
Perhaps a second reason for the downward sloping curve is that the quality of
management in small firms might not be as good as that in large ones. Of the plant
ciosures in multi-plant firms involving less than 110 workers, the majority were in
small re gioral companies. Third, small plants might be more likely to close for reasons
of economies of scale. For certain industries, small plants are less efficient thani larger
plants. If cost differentials become more important, smaller plants would be more like-
ly to close.
A bell-shaped curve relating probability of closure to plant size occurs both for
single-plant firms and for single-firm owners--the coefficients for plant size are almost
identical. So for this variable the influence of multi-firm owners is not profound.
Perhaps firms in the 100-225 range of employment are more susceptible to being closed
because they are at the outer edge of the range in which non-professionally trained,
family-type management can be successful without a broad and deep skill base. A
number of the firms in this range appeared to close after outsiders or sons took over,
or as smaller jewelry companies expanded during the boom.
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Firm age. Except for single-plant owners, very young firms were more likely to
close a plant. Remember that for this variable, the "firm" may be the subsidiary or
division of a larger company. Of the 7 plant closures with firm age less than 10, 4
were parent firm startups of a single-plant corporate subsidiary and 2 were startups of
single-plant firms by multi-plant owners. Only 1 single-plant owner (of 11) failed with
less than 10 years firm age. Thus, for plants with 50 or more employees, it was not
newness and inexperience per se, but corporate expansions coupled with management
problems that seemed to lead to a quick closure. However, I am missing the rela-
tionship between firm age and closure for the smallest firms.
Percentage change in industry employment. In the regression models, percentage
change in industry employment is a significant variable only when multi-plant owners
of single-plant firms are included in the sample. As mentioned earlier, it is likely that
the variable is not significant for multi-plant firms bccause they close plants for rea-
sons other than declining demand, e g., relocating to lower factor costs or getting out of
a product line entirely to make a better rate of return in a different investment.
Multi-plant owners of single-plant firms may be more sensitive to aggregate
dcinand changes than single-plant operators perhaps because the former seem to be
more frequently plagued by maiagement problems and these are exacerbated by
demand decline. In addition, it may be that single-plant operators are less sensitive to
aggregate demand changes because the plant is their only means of livelihood and so
they are more dedicated to keeping it open.
Extent of unionization. In every configuration of regression model, the
presence or extent of unionization was not a significant variable in explaining the
probability of closure, even for out-of-state, publicly-held firms. However, as we have
seen, union presence does seem to be a factor for certain firms--those with a disposition
to be geographically mobile and facing structural trends that stimulate movement to
lower-wage, non-union sites, and those with a history of union conflict.
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Six unionized plants (counting the asphalt shingle plant) had their operations
moved to the South or to Mexico for reasons associated with labor issues. Two firm
closures and two plant closures came about during or soon after long and bitter strug-
gles with unions (2 Machinists, 1 Steelworkers at a textile plant, 1 United Rubber
Workers). In at least three cases, there were clear management problems. 40 Unneces-
sary confrontation on the part of a union may have occurred, but such a determination
is beyond the research scope of this study.
Plant/firm industry difference. The difference between plant and firm indus-
try focus was not a significant variable in the regression models. Yet clearly, dif-
ferences in product played a large role among closures. This contradiction might be
explained at least in part by my decision rule to code as "same industry" plants with
primary products related to, but not the same as, firm primary products. The fact is
that a number of firms that I had coded "same industry" were closed because their pro-
duct lines were not close enough to the parent firms' main concern. However, without
much more detailed information on each firm product structure and the nature of their
markets, information difficult or expensive to obtain, I think it would have been dif-
ficult to develop a coding scheme significantly more accurate.
Publicly traded. The publicly-traded variable was not significant in any model
except that for the textile industry, in which two plant closures were relocations by
publicly-held firms for reasons of factor costs (labor, lease). As with unionization or
headquarters, this result does not mean that the factor had no influence. It only means
that, all other factors held constant, publicly-held firms did not close plants more fre-
quently than privately-held ones. While it is fairly easy to gather evidence indicating
that a plant was closed because it was unionized, it is more difficult to obtain evidence
that a corporation's concern for short-term profits to please the stock market resulted
in a closure.
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Synthesizing the Results of the Logit and Descriptive Analyses by Type of Firm
The results of the regressions and descriptive analyses are both rich and com-
plex. At the risk of simplification, it seems to me that the influence of various organi-
zational characteristics on the probability of closure is most clearly perceived when
plants are disaggregated into four categories of firms: single-plant owners; single-plant
firms of multi-firm owners; small, RI-headquartered multi-plant firms; and large, non-
RI headquartered, multi-plant firms. I have prepared a chart that describes, by type of
firm, the influence of various characteristics on the probability of plant closure (Table
4.10). The chart includes dynamics that were visible in the analyses, as well as a few
speculations previously mentioned, e.g., that owners of several small plants might get
overextended.
This disaggregation by type of firm seems to work because a large number of
the influences on the probability of closure appear directly related to the headquarters
location, firm size, and the complexity of the plant's corporate family. Within each
category, variation in certain organizational characteristics can also strongly affect the
probability of plant closure, e.g., the size of a plant in a multi-plant firm or the experi-
ence of management.
For simplicity's sake, the chart does not directly cover large in-state firms and
small, multi-plant, out-of-state ones. Tne former appear to act in the same way as
small in-state firms, except they are much less apt to fail. Conversely, small out-of-
state firms (primarily Massachusetts-based) appear to act in the same way as large ones.
In theory, one would think that the small non-local firms would be more apt to fail
than the large ones. However, none did in the time period of study. It may be that
there were only a handful of small out-of-state firms with plants in Rhode Island to
begin with.
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Table 4.10
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN TYPE OF FIRM AND PROBABILITY OF PLANT CLOSURE
RI-HQ NonRI-HQ
Single-Plant Owner Multi-Firm Owner
Single-Plant Firm
Multi-Plant Firm
(sma Ll)
Multi-Plant Firm
(large)
General Probability
of Closure
Types of Closure
Characteristics
which inherently
lower probability
of closure
Lower
firm failure
dedicated mgt.
geographically
stable
higher
firm failure
geographically
stable
higher
firm failure
product term.
capacity reduc.
more professional
management
geographically
stable
higher
product term.
capacity reduc.
relocation
more professional
management
open in partial
capacity reductions
open in partial
capacity reductions
firm economies of
scale in production,
finance, mgt.
Characteristicn
which inherently
increase probability
of closure
low economies of
scale in firm & plant
Low economies of
scale in firm & plant
sensitive to reduction
in aggregate demano
lower economies of
scale in f-rm & plant
close in capacity
reduction
Potential
Characteristics
which will increase
probability of
closure
inexperienced
in mgt., industry,
product
overextended mgt. (?)
inexperienced
in mgt., industry,
product
inexperience
in mgt., industry,
product
small plants
close in capacity
reduction
relocate capacity to
Lower factor costs
inexperience with
product
small plants
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The Influences of State, Time Period and Population on Results
It seems to me that the typology of plant closures and the basic patterns of in-
fluence of the organizational variables on the probability of closure are generalizable
to other areas and to the upward side of the business cycle. The dynamics seem so fun-
damental that they would likely appear in these other situations. However, the specific
findings of similar studies carried out for other places and times probably would dif-
fer from the ones generated here in a number of ways.
First of all, the overall frequency of plant closures would differ with other in-
dustrial structures and points in time. Second, the distribution of closures and job loss
within the plant closing typology would differ. The dominance of firm failure as a
reason for plant closures seems very much a function of the small-firm structure of the
Rhode Island jewelry industry and the occurrence of recessions.
Third, differences in industrial structure and business cycle would affect the
size of estimated variable coefficients in the logit analysis. For ir.stance, tne :trength
of the relationship between acquisition and closure was in part due to the instability
and small-firm structure of the jewelry industry. Differences in industry structure
also could affect the shape of a probability curve. I noted earlier that a sinilar study
of Ohio in the same period might have a positive relationship between plant size and
probability of closure. However, I think that such a finding would reflect a mo-
mentary linear relationship between plant size and negative industry trends, and would
not indicate an influence on the probability of closure that was a function of size per
se.
Fourth, in other places and times, certain variables that were statistically sig-
nificant in this analysis may not appear to be so. During the up side of a business
cycle, logit regression analysis might provide less robust results simply because there
would be a smaller percentage of closures in the data base. Again, though, I think that
the basic patterns and reasons for plant closures identified here would still exist, their
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presence would just more difficult to prove statistically. There also could be instances
in which a variable not statistically significant in this study would become so. In the
hypothetical Ohio study, the presence of unions might become statistically significant.
The unique dynamics of multi-firm owners of single-plant firms were not some-
thing I had expected to find. I wonder about the extent to which my findings for this
group are a function of the unique nature of the Rhode Island economy, based as it is
on small firms. In some states, particularly those with a branch plant orientation, there
may be too few of this type of owner for the category to have influence in the regres-
sion model. For other states with numerous small firms, it would be interesting to see
if the basic thrust of the Rhode Island results are replicated.
Regarding plants with less than 50 workers in multi-plant firms, I see no ob-
vious reason why the basic findings here would not be applicable, particularly the one
that suggests that smaller plants are more vulnerable. Extrapolation of the findings on
single-plant firms to such firms under 50 is less clear. The probability curve for plant
size suggested that smaller firms were less vulnerable to closure- as size fell below 175.
However, as I mentioned earlier, I believe that most single-plant firm failures occur to
young firms before they ever reach 50 employees. Only a direct study could ascertain
the piobability of small single-firm plant closures and the factors that contribute to the
phenomenon.
Plant Closings and the Interplay of Macroeconomic, Structural and Institutional Effects
In Chapter 1, I suggested that the magnitude of U.S. manufacturing job loss in
recent years seems to reflect a large-scale restructuring of the nation's industrial base.
I then described a number of macroeconomic, structural and institutional factors that
have been put forth by observers as reasons for this job loss. The results of the gross
flows analysis in Chapter 3 indicated that plant closings were an important, but not the
primary, source of gross job loss in Rhode Island in the 1978-83 period. In this chap-
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ter, as a means of gaining a better understanding of the role of various factors in plant
closing job loss, I examined the relationships between plant closings and organizational
characteristics.
Earlier in the chapter, I. asserted that firm failures were the result of institu-
tional responses to structural and macroeconomic opportunities and constraints, or, to
put it another way, the result of internal responses to the environment. I suggested
that a tension existed between institutional, structural and macroeconomic factors and
that the tension varied from firm to firm, industry to industry, and one part of the
business cycle to another. As I argue below, this perspective is relevant for all four
types of plant closings--product terminations, capacity reductions and factor cost
relocations, as well as firm failures.
Firms respond to structural and macroeconomic opportunities and constraints
through making decisions regarding the flo'v of investment dollars into product, site,
the various factors of production, and various overhead functions. As environmental
conditions always change, firms mus, continually reassess and redirect tne flow of
funds. Investment decisions for manufacturing firms are of two types--categorical and
incremental. Categorical decisions are those with a "lumpy," either/or quality and con-
cern what products to manufacture and whe-re to manufacture them. These decisions
determine the production framework within incremental investment decisions are made:
how much to invest in the production of a particular product and how to distribute
that investment among the factors of production (production workers, management,
overhead staff, plant and equipment, materials, etc.) and operating sites. 4 1
Once made, categorical investment decisions, given that they take much time
and money to implement and determine the production framework for the firm, usual-
ly are neither easily nor quickly reversed. A plant closing is a reversal of a categorical
investment decision that results in ending investment at a particular site, and perhaps
in a particular product. I suggest that each plant closing can be attributed primarily to
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one of two types of institutional response to structural and macroeconomic conditions.
Some plant closures are primarily the unintended results of management error, i.e. im-
proper responses in light of environmental conditions. Errors may have been made in
any of the variety of categorical and incremental investment decisions described in the
previous paragraph, or in the implementation of investment decisions (e.g. a poorly de-
signed marketing program). The types of investment errors visible in this chapter's
descriptive analysis include overexpansion, making an ill-fitting product acquisition,
and acquiring a firm without the proper skills to run it. In terms of plant closure
categories, the effects of management error resulted in firm closures, product termina-
tions and capacity reduction categories.
The second type of institutional response that results in plant closings is the
intentional decision to close in light of macroeconomic and structural conditions. Of
course, the decision to closc may have been a wrong one. The key point is that the
closure was perceived by decision-makers as the proper response in light of environ-
mental conditions. Some closures in the second group are the result of a decision to
reduce capacity in the face of large drops in aggregate demand. Others reflect an in-
stitutioral determination to redeploy plant investment to other places and products,
e.g., the termination of long-held products for replacement by more profitable ones, and
the relocation of plant operations to ,educe factor cost. In Rhode Island, it seems that
most closures in the "intentional" group were in response to a change in the environ-
ment. However, in a few cases, a closure was in response to an internal change--e.g., an
acquisition of a new subsidiary and consolidation of plant operations with head-
quarters.
Of course not every closure can be attributed to solely to internal error or to ap-
propriate internal response to external conditions. Probably, a number of closures were
the result of a combination of management error (e.g., entering a new market without
fully understanding it) and change in environmental conditions (e.g., unexpectedly
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rising dollar makes the new product vulnerable to imports). But the distinction is use-
ful for the purposes of discussion.
This chapter's analyses indicate that not only can a plant closing be primarily
attributed to one of two types of institutional responses to environmental conditions,
but that the institutional response that results in a plant closing is very often a func-
tion of firm and plant organizational characteristics. Every organizational character-
istic with explanatory power regarding plant closings appears to have a connection
with either one or both of the institutional response types. Some organizational charac-
teristics reflect a firm's ability to appropriately perceive and respond to environmental
conditions, i.e. to avoid management error. These characteristics include firm age,
years since acquisition and firm size.
Other orgarlizational characteristics guide a firm in its perceptions of viable
options as it determines whether or not to continae operating a particu!ar plant. It
seems that location of firm headquarters and firm size are important determinants
regarding whether or not a firm will seriously consider relocating a plant's operations.
Firm size also can be al, ndication of whether or not a firm has the internal resources
to respond to new environmental ccnditions. For instance, in an industry ;n which
large-scale investment in new mass production equipment is necessary to keep up, a
small firm may decide to liquidate because it does not have the resources (or will) to
make such an investment. The relationship of a plant's product to the primary focus
of the firm can guide the decision to close in a number of instances. The presence of a
union can encourage relocation. The fact that a firm is multi-plant will guide
decision-makers to see any individual plant as less "lumpy" and so more subject to
closure than would the owner of a single-plant firm. And I conjectured that in multi-
plant firms, smaller plants are more likely to close than larger plants for logistical rea-
sons.
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In sum, organizational characteristics represent the "lens" through which man-
agement looks at its environment. Certain characteristics reflect management's ability
to perceive environmental trends and make the right investment choices. Others guide
management in its perception of alternatives to investment in a particular plant it is
willing and able to consider. The nature of these influences need to be taken into ac-
count in the design of policies intended to counter plant closings, a topic that will be
discussed in Chapter 7. In the next chapter, I look at the extent to which organiza-
tional variables appear related to percentage employment change at the plant level.
Having explored dynamics on the institutional side of the lens up to this point, I
want summarize patterns on the environmental side that affect plant closings. Struc-
tural and macroeconomic opportunities and constraints strongly influence the range of
investment choices which a firm perceives before it and the margin for management
error before a plant closing occurs. Environmental conditions can be split into a
demand side and a supply side. Trends that affect product demand, i.e. GNP growth,
saving habits, exchange rates, changes in taste, and the introduction of substitute pro-
ducts, influence the frequency of firm failures, product teiminations and capacity
reductions. When demand is declining, the margin for management error 'n avoiding
unintended plant closings narrows. Trends in demand also determine the frequency
with which firms make intentional closures as the result of aecisions to leave or reduce
capacity in an industry.
Supply-side trends include those concerning industry concentration, the key ele-
ment of competition (e.g., price, quality), production process technology, and the cost,
location, and availability of labor and materials. Such trends influence both the
determination about whether or not to continue investment at a particular site and the
margin for management error before an unintended plant closure occurs.
In Chapter 1, I described the structuralist approach to explaining manufacturing
job loss as one which emphasized the role of periodic spatial, technological and corpo-
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rate reorganizations. For three reasons, such supply-side structural dynamics were not
particularly visible in this analysis. First, given that I was examining a population of
plants in which nearly two hundred 4-digit industries were represented, a structural
analysis of each plant's industry was not feasible. Second, in the logit analysis, all
structural and macroeconomic effects were represented by one variable, percentage U.S.
employment change in plant's industry. That this variable was statistically significant
for the population indicates that the environment indeed has an effect. However, the
nature of the variable does not allow us to see the extent to which a plant's industry
was being reorganized in spatial, technological and corporate terms.
Third, and very importantly, the state's largest industries simply were not un-
dergoing highly visible restructuring. In-depth analyses of each of Rhode Island's
major manufacturing industries by the Rhode Island Strategic Development Commis-
sion turned up only one 4-digit industry in which major spatial restructuring was
occurring--wiring devices (the General Electric plants). Though the Commission did
not analyze the apparel industry for reasons of confidentiality (because Health-Tex is
so dominant), I also turned up anecdotal evidence of a movement in off-shore sites for
women's apparel job shops. We also saw two plant operations, in surgical gloves and
narrow fabrics, move South for labor-related reasons that fit in well vith "profit cycle'
theory. But overall, we saw only a handful of plaat closures which could be rea-
sonably explained by this thecry.
The ability of "profit cycle" theory to explain plant closing dynamics varies
with time and place, for two reasons. First, major restructurings are episodic--they do
not go on all the time. Second, structuralist theory emphasizes the dynamics of in-
dustries with oligopolistic tendencies, those with product demand large, stable and
certain enough to make large-scale investment and the corporate concentration of capi-
tal worthwhile. The dynamics of the jewelry industry, with its unstandardized produc-
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ts and ever-changing fashions, is not neatly explained by an oligopoly-oriented
paradigm.
In summation, my argument regarding the dynamics that bring about plant clos-
ings has four parts:
o Plant closings are the results of institutional responses to macroeconomic and
structural opportunities and constraints.
o The institutional responses that result in plant closings are of two types: (1)
management error which results in an unintended closure and (2) an inten-
tional act of closing a plant which is perceived to be appropriate in light of
external conditions.
o Institutional responses that result in plant closings appear to be very much a
function of organizational characteristics. Certain characteristics reflect
firms' abilities to appropriately perceive and respond to en-iron'mental condi-
tions, and so appear related to the extent to which management error results
in closings. Other organizational characteristics guide firms' in their percep-
tions of viable investment options, and so seem related to the extent to which
closings occur out of intent.
o Structural and macroeconomic opportunities and constraints strongly in-
fluence the range of investment choices which a firm perceives before it and
the margin for management error before an unintended plant closing occurs.
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CHAPTER NOTES
'See Roger Schmenner, o.cit.; Phillip Shapira, "Industry and Jobs in Transition:
A Study of Industrial Restructuring and Worker Displacement," Ph.D. dissertation, Uni-
versity of California at Berkeley, November 1986; U.S. General Accounting Office,
o.cit.
2For example, Doreen Massey and Richard Meegan, The Anatomy of Job Loss,
New York: Methuen Press.
3For example, P.N. O'Farrell and R. Crouchley, "Industrial Closures in Ireland
1973-81: Analysis and Implication," Regional Studies, 17, 6; and Richard McGranahan,
"Absentee and Local Ownership in Northwestern Wisconsin," Growth and Change, v.13,
n. 2.
4Marie Howland has just published a study of the effect of local economic con-
ditions on rates of plant closures. She sought to determine if inter-SMSA differences
in the price of inputs, rates of unionization, changes if factor prices, and shifts in
market demand affected the rates of plants closure. She found that, overall, local eco-
nomic conditions have little to do with plant closure rates. However, she relies on the
DMI file to provide these rates. As she gets plant closure rate of 28% over 7 years, it
appears she did not correct for spurious closures. "Plant Closures and Local Economic
Conditions," Institute for Urban Studies, University of Maryland, February 20, 1987.
5As mentioned in Chapter 1, I had hoped to carry out a separate analysis of the
effect of operating characteristics on employment change, using the Census Bureau's
Longitudinal Establishment Data file, but this analysis was not feasible because of
spurious closures in the LED.
6U.3. Small Business Administration, The State cf Srall Business: A Revort of
the President (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, March 1983), p. 238.
7Ibid., p. 157.
8The data base covers 583 establishments. However, one establishment operated
solely as a corporate headquarters during the period. As the analysis was aimed at un-
derstanding the characteristics involved in the closure of production facilities, this es-
tablishment was excluded from the logit analysis.
9Rhode Island Strategic Development Commission, oo.cit., p. 120.
10The particular wording of the survey depended on whether or not the firm
being called was a subsidiary or an independent, was in business or out of business as
of December 1983, and whether or not any of its plants had closed. To avoid having to
use an enormously complex survey form, five variations were created. The interviewer
used the one that fit the profile of the firm being called. For companies with more
than one plant in Rhode Island, the portion of the survey that concerned plant-specific
information (union, product) was repeated for each RI plant.
"Almost all of the firms which agreed to answer the survey supplied answers to
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all relevant questions, though completing the survey sometimes involved talking to
more than one person. The question to which respondents were most sensitive con-
cerned whether or not a plant was unionized. Regarding the latter question, several
respondents inquired if the interviewer was scouting for a union. I anticipated this
sensitivity and placed the union question last in the survey. In the handful of cases in
which a respondent did not want to answer the union question, the state AFL-CIO of-
fice was able to supply an answer. In the end, 97% of the surveys with respondents had
answers for every question.
One initial fear I had was that it would be difficult to get information on the
closed plants. However, using respondents and the files I created for the Greenhouse
plant closing study, we fully completed surveys for 93% of the closed plants. Firms
that operated about half the closed plants were still in existence and were not reluctant
to give information. For single-plant firms that had gone bankrupt, many former
owners were quite open to answering questions. In cases in which the owner of a
closed firm could not be contacted, interviewers attempted to reach former workers,
union officials, or owners of competing firms.
For reasons both inside and outside of my control, several issues arose concern-
ing data accuracy and consistency. First, I had no means to check the accuracy of
respondents' knowledge. However, follow-up telephone calls were made to eliminate
any inconsistencies in respondents' answers.
Second, the survey question regarding the percentage of the workforce covered
by collective bargaining did not specify if the denominator was to be the total estab-
lishment workforce or the production workforce. Consequently, the answers received
are not entirely consistent with each other. As the single most common answer for
unionized plants was 100%. my sense is that most respondents used the production
workforce as the denuminator. It also should be kept in mind that all percentages were
spontaneous estimates by the respondents.
For 81% of the unionized plants, covered workers comprised either over 79% or
under 21% of the workforce. This bimodal tendency seems to indicate that the word-
ing probably did not have much effect. The same bimodal tendency probably would
have appeared in any case.
The third data issue concerns acquisitions. Respondents were asked two acquisi-
tion questions: (1) whether or not, and when, the firm had beern acquired and (2)
whether or not the lant itself had been acquired by another firm since 1970, and
when. The first question was aimed at firms that changed ownership but remained in-
tact as an independent, viable entities. Only one firm is involved--it just changes
hands. However, there is another type of acquisition, in which one firm acquires only
a part of another. Suppose ABC Corporation sells its RI plant to XYZ Corporation.
ABC itself remains intact as a firm. The survey would first ask if XYZ Corporation
had ever been acquired. However, the answer would not indicate if the old ABC plant
was acquired by XYZ Corporation. The plant acquisition question was intended to
capture this type of information.
The plant acquisition question had two design problems. First, I decided to ask
if the plant had been acquired only since 1970. Thus the question about plant acquisi-
tion was not parallel to firm acquisition question, which put no time constraints on
when the acquisition took place. I do not believe this problem had much of an impact.
If a pre-1970 plant acquisition was the last acquisition made of the respondent's plant,
the respondent usually told the interviewer anyway. When I made my final coding
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scheme, I made sure that every plant acquisitions, regardless of date, was incorporated
into the data base if it was the last acquisition of the plant to take place.
Second, the original wording of the plant acquisition question was vague, with
the result that one-fourth of the way through the survey no respondent answered "yes"
to the question. At that point, the wording was corrected. As a consequence, however,
plant acquisitions since 1970 (which only amounted to 6 for the 75% of the completed
surveys which had proper wording) may be underreported to a slight degree.
12In some cases, the acquired plant or firm was not transformed into a formal
division or subsidiary. However, if the acquired entity operated independently within
the acquiring firm because it had a distinctly different product or market, I treated it
as if it were a subsidiary.
13To be sure, I tried substituting 1978 employment for peak employment in the
logit regressions. Peak employment always came out the stronger explanatory variable.
141 was not able to obtain information of ownership of other companies for the
owners of 94 single-plant firms. On the other hand, information is missing for only 3
plants for the multi-plant firm variable. As cases with missing data for particular var-
iables cannot be used to build regression models using those variables, the models using
the multi-plant firm variable tend to utilize data from a larger number of plants than
do models using the multi-plant owner variable.
1 5 A partial chi-squarea was obtained by subtracting the chi-squared for the
more restricted model (x variables) from that for the less restricted model (x+y vari-
ables). The probability of a partial chi-squared being greater that the observed partial
cni-squared if the null hypothesis were true was then determined for y degrees of free-
dom.
Because not every plant had a complete data set, the more variables I had in a
model the smaller N (number of cases) became. However, to correctly perform the par-
tial chi-squared test I needed the same plant sample in both models. Therefore, for the
purposes of the partial chi-squared test, I removed plants from the more restricted
model that were not included in the less restricted model.
1 6The formula to convert the logit regression results to a probability equation is:
1/(l + exp(-constant - betal*parameterl - beta2*parameter2 - . . . ))
17The regression curves were determined by inserting the mean value for each
of the independent variables to be held constant. They are not meant to be exact, but
to show general tendencies.
18The means and standard deviations of the two samples are quite similar, so
lack of variance in the smaller sample should not be a problem.
191 have definite firm closure information for 75 of the 76 plants. The one
plant with missing information closed down in 1983. The out-of-state parent is no
longer in existence, but I could not discover if it and the plant shut down simulta-
neously.
2 0The U.S. Bureau of the Census' Longitudinal Establishment Data file (LED)
can provide total manufacturing employment data by ultimate parent. One of the
losses in being unable to use the LED for logit analysis was being unable to directly see
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the effects of firm size on the probability of closure.
211 did not use the acquisition interaction variable in this model because I did
not have "years since succession" data for firms taken over by relatives.
22For reasons of confidentiality, I cannot reveal the names of the sources.
2 3Two cases were in the classic conglomerate mold. Colgate-Palmolive was the
parent for Bancroft Sporting Goods. Colgate management was unable to keep up with
innovations in the industry. When the tennis boom ended, they sold Bancroft. Liggett
and Meyers, of cigarette fame, bought and sold a watch band company. A third con-
glomerate was privately-held, with a scientific orientation--my interviewee told me that
the conglomerate drained profits from the Rhode Island plant to invest in its other
holdings.
2 4One of the revealing aspects of this study was the contradictions between the
reasons some owners gave reporters for closure, and the reasons provided by my inter-
viewees. In no news article did an owner ever blame himself, which is
understandable--imports, regulation, and energy costs were issues often mentioned.
2 5cf. Bluestone and Harrison, ov.cit.
261 could not include percentage national employment change in the firm closure
regression because I had SIC code by plant not firm.
27For the local consolidations, at least 80% of the workers in the closed plants
lost their jobs.
28 U.S. Department ot Commerce, 1987 U.S. Industrial Outlook. The Providence
Journal reported that after Hillenbrand's acquisition there were some morale problems
and several managers left the company, in spite of the parent's attempts to be sensitive
to local management needs. (Leonard Edgerly, "Hillenbrand is investing for the fu-
ture," Providence Journal, December 28, 1980.) However, a union representative sug-
gests that the better managers stayed on end that Iillenbrand's significant infusion of
investment has been very important.
29Hamilton Allen, "Northern Telecom to close in April; 290 employees affected,"
Providence Journal, January 15, 1983.
3oDavid Edgerly, "Strikers' pay may scare off 2 large firms," Providence Journal,
December 21, 1976.
31"Is enigmatic owner of 'Gansett brewery testing Ocean State in push for
breaks?" Providence Journal, August 16, 1981.
3 2 The bankruptcy occurred after the owner of the company stopped taking in-
terest in the business and let his lawyer run it. Apparently, the plant was in bad
repair and relations with the union local not entirely smooth.
33
"NLRB judge upholds firm on TFE firings," Providence Journal, May 13, 1977.
3 4The company president added, "If you interpret that as meaning we will have
lower wages, you're dead wrong." Leonard S. Edgerly, "TFE to phase out Warwick fa-
cility," Providence Journal, June 24, 1980.
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3 5 As the reason for relocation usually came from the company respondent
and/or a company official quoted in an article, there is the possibility that labor was
in fact an issue but was not mentioned. However, I attempted to structure the survey
question in a way that encouraged truth telling. The respondent was asked what the
advantages of the new location were over the old, and provided a checklist of eight
possibilities. The respondent could choose more than one. The respondent was then
asked which was the most important. Each respondent that did not have labor costs as
the main issue did not mention it in the checklist either.
3 6Birch, oo.cit. (summary version), p. 4.
37Iid. (full report), p. 25.
38Ibid., p.15.
3 9Even this study's figures underestimate the nature of the relocation problem.
In the previous section, we saw that four plants closed for capacity reduction reasons
and operations were consolidated outside of Rhode Island. Whatever jobs were added
to the receiving plants after the capacity reduction also represents relocated jobs.
4 0The fourth is the Davol latex plant, which unionized soon after the company
was acquired by International Paper Co. It is possible that the union-management
problems stemmed from actions by new management. I had no information on this
case.
411 am using the term "investment" here in the broad sense, any commitment of
corporate funds. The tvpology oversimplifies matters somewhat. For instance, a deci-
sion to undertake a major overhaul of production processes, as auto companies have
recently done, has the look of a categorical decision. My thinking about a tvpology of
investment decisions was stimulated by Richard Walker and John Storper, op. cit.
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Table 4A.1
PLANT CLOSURES BY INDUSTRY GROUP
Rhode Island Plants with 50+ Employees during 1977-83
Industry Group
All Plants
C/N
Plants in Single-
Plant Firms
C/N %
Plants in Multi-
Plant Firms
C/N %
Food
Textiles
Apparel
Lumber,furniture,
paper
Printing,publishing
Chemicals
Plastics
Leather
Stone,clay,glass
Primary metals
Fabricated metals
Machinery
Electronics
Trans. equip.
Instruments
Jewelry
Misc.
Total
3/22
12/83
5/18
2/22
2/18
1/11
2/24
4/11
3/10
5/29
1/30
4/26
3/40
1/1&
2/29
20/151
6/40
13.6%
14.5
27.8
9.1
11.1
9.1
8.3
36.6
30.0
17.2
3.3
15.4
7.5
5.6
6.9
13.3
15.0
76/582 13.1%
1/11
4/47
4/12
0/12
1/12
0/4
1/14
0/3
0/4
2/12
0/19
0/8
0/15
1/11
1/9
13/120
4/2L
32/331
9.1%
8.5
33.3
0.0
8.3
0.0
7.1
0.0
0.0
16.7
0.0
0.0
0.0
9.1
11.1
10.8
16.7
9.5%
Note: Firm characteristics could not be obtained for a small number
addition of figures in columns 2 and 3 may not add to the figu
2/11
8/35
1/6
2/10
1/6
1/7
1/10
4/8
3/6
3/17
1/11
4/17
3/25
0/7
1/20
7/30
2/16
18.2%
22.9
16.7
20.0
16.7
14.3
10.0
50.0
50.0
17.7
9.1
23.5
12.0
0.0
5.0
23.3
12.5
44/242 18.2%
of plancs. Thercfore, the
re in column 1.
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Table 4A.2
FREQUENCY OF PLANT CLOSURE BY PEAK PLANT SIZE
Peak plant size
50-99
100-249
250-499
500-999
1000+
Total
Closed
31
30
13
2
0
76
Total
236
211
83
38
14
582
Closure
Rate
13.1%
14.2
15.7
5.3
0.0
13.1%
Table 4A.3
FREQUENCY OF PLANT CLOSURE BY AGE OF FIRM
ClosedFirm age
0-5
6-10
11-20
21-40
41+
6
3
7
21
36
73
Total
11
27
70
159
228
495
Closure
Rate
54.5%
11.1
10.0
13.2
15.8
14.8%
Table 4A.4
FREQUENCY OF PLANT CLOSURE BY PERCENTAGE 1978-83 CHANGE
IN U.S. EMPLOYMENT IN PLANT'S INDUSTRY
Pct. Change
<=-30%
-30% to -15%
-15% to 0%
>=0%
Total
Total
Closed
16
26
26
8
Total
102
185
203
92
58276
Closure
Rate
15.7%
14.1
12.8
8.7
13.1%
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Table 4A.5
FREQUENCY OF PLANT CLOSURE BY PERCENTAGE OF WORKFORCE
COVERED BY COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
Pct. Covered
0-19%
20-79%
80-100%
Unknown
Total
Closed
50
1
25
0
76
Total
415
34
123
3
575
Closure
Rate
12.1%
2.9
20.3
13.2%
Table 4A.6
FREQUENCY OF PLANT CLOSURE BY ACQUISITION AND YEARS
SINCE ACQUISITION
Acquisition C
No
Yes
Total
Years Since Acquisition
1-5
6-10
11-20
20-40
41+
Unknown
losed Total
34
39
73
Closure
Rate
294
200
49A
11.7%
19.5
14.8
23
6
5
1
4
0
81
41
50
17
9
2
28.4%
14.6
10.0
5.9
44.4
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lable 4A.7
REGRESSION MODELS FOR PROBASILITY OF PLANT CLOSURE
Glibal Models
PLANTS IN PLANTS IN
ALL PLANTS SINGL!-PLANT FIRMS MULTI-PLANT FIRMS
471
70
245
22
199
42
PLANTS HELD BY
SINGLE-PLANT OWNERS MUJLTI-PLANT OWNERS
196
14
249
50
Coeff. t Coeff.
-3.387 -7.77 -7.464
0.920 2.50 ---
--- 1.052
0.010 2.09 0.017
9.952 3.69 10.214
2.671 3.70 1.845
-0.021 -2.18 -0.041
-0.002 -2.17 0.040
-.- --- -0.0001
0.004 1.14 0.009
0.098 0.18 ---
-0.414 -0.87 ---
0.288 0.56 ---
Parameter
CONSTANT
MULTI
MULT2
FIRMAGE
AGEINV
ACOINV
ICH7883
PEAKSIZE
SIZESO
PCTUNION
PUBLIC
NONRI
PFDI
Chi-squared
global
restricted
t Coeff.
-4.60 -2.561
1.98
1.95 0.014
2.30 12.801
1.17 2.789
-2.13 -0.010
1.91 -0.002
-1.71 ---
1.38 0.002
--- 0.080
--- 
-0.555
--- 0.405
26.0
23.2
t Coeff. t Coeff.
-4.23 -5.582 -2.89 -3.468
--- --- --- 0.524
--- --- --- ---
2.24 -0.001 -0.09 0.018
2.99 -1.673 -0.15 14.150
3.20 1.181 0.59 2.894
-0.86 -0.022 -1.10 -0.023
-1.89 0.037 1.62 -0.002
--- -0.0001 
-1.43 ---
0.35 0.010 1.44 0.0002
0.15 --- --- 0.319
-1.08 --- --- -0.502
0.76 --- --- ---
30.7
27.7
8.4
5.0
Cases
N
Closed
L-A
Lii
54.4
52.6
-5.21
0.98
3.06
3.68
3.42
-1.96
-2.10
0.06
0.62
-1.01
44.0
42.7
CHAPTER 5
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PLANT EMPLOYMENT CHANGE
AND PLANT CHARACTERISTICS
Introduction
The gross flows analysis resulted in a description of the components of
manufacturing employment change in terms of job loss due to plant closings and con-
tractions, and job gains due to plant expansions. The last chapter allowed us to devel-
op a deeper understanding of the reasons for one component of employment change,
plant closings, by examining the strong and complex influences of organizational char-
acteristics on the frequency of closure. In this chapter, I look at the influence of or-
ganizational characteristics on expensions and contractions, i.e. the plants that did not
close by 1983.
I undertake this analysis through building ordinary least squares (OLS) regres-
sion medels, using percentage change in plant employment between 1978 and 1983 as
the dependent variable The plant population is all plants which had 50 or more em-
ployees in 1978 and were open in 1983. As in Chapter 3, I choose the 1978-83 perioc
because the end points bracket a period of manufacturing employment decline. The
subjecL group excludes plants under 50 in 1978 because the data base contains only
growing plants from that group--their inclusion would have biased the analysis in
favor of expanding plants. I use percentage, rather than actual, employment change as
the dependent variable because the former controls for initial plant size while the lat-
ter does not.
Percentage employment change for the population of plants with 50+ employees
in 1978 is represented by the stem-and-leaf plot in Figure 5.1. To give a sense of the
relationship between plant closures, contractions and expansions, I plotted percentage
change for all plants. The plot is a visual representation of the plant investment typol-
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Figure 5.1
STEM AND LEAF PLOT
PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN PLANT EMPLOYMENT, 1978-83
ALL PLANTS OPEN PLANTS
N- 511 439
MINIMUM IS: -100.0 -84.8
LOWER HINGE IS: -45.1 -32.7
MEDIAN IS: -20.3 -13.0
UPPER HINGE IS: 5.8 10.3
MAXIMUM IS: 679.7 679.7
Plot is of all plants
-10 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
-9 98876655431110
-8 854431
-7 9954411000
-6 855554322100
-5 998877655433322211000
-4 H 9998776666555554432221111110000
-3 999887777766666665555544433333322222111100
-2 M 98888887777777666666666665555444444433333332222111111111100*
-1 99999887777766655555444444333333332222222222211111111000
-0 99999988888877766553555544443333321111111100
U H 00000111111233333444555555666666777788899
1 00000001233334455556777899
2 01122223445556788899999
3 0012233455666888
4 023444569
5 011223445566
6 012345777
7 03334
8 0
***OUTSIDE VALUES***
8 9
9 15
10 125
14 7
16 6
21 1
29 0
67 9
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ogy discussed in the last chapter. Plant closings, as reversals of categorical investment
decisions, are phenomena quite distinct from employment change in open plants. For
the open plants, the plot is bell-shaped, as one might expect. The plot is extended on
the expansion side simply because employment can rise more than 100%, but cannot fall
below -100%.
I utilized the same type of hierarchical modelling process as in the last chapter,
using partial F-tests at a .05 level of significance to determine whether or not to in-
clude new variables to the model. In the process of building the models, I removed a
number of plants that were outliers in terms of percentage growth or size. 1
Regression Analyses
The restricted and global models for open plants are presented in Table 5.1. The
restricted model r-squared is minuscule--2.8%. Only two variables are significant--
percentage change in industry employment and base year plant employment. The first
variable one wculd expect to see, and the relationship with plant employment change
appears very direct--each 1% change at the national level is likely to produce a .32%
change in plant employment. The coefficient for initial plant size is negative and very
small. All other factors being held constant, a 300-person plant is likely to have
employment change 3 percentage points lower than a 100-person plant.
For the purposes of comparison, I also developed an OLS regression model for
all plants. The results indicate that the presence of plant closings, with their extreme
(100%) percentage decline in employment, heavily influences the model. Because the
percentage plot is bimodal, representing both categorical and incremental results, this
model is not particularly meaningful.
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Table 5.1
REGRESSION MODELS FOR PERCENTAGE CHANGE
IN PLANT EMPLOYMENT, 1978-83
GLOBAL
OPEN PLANTS
RESTRICTED
Cases
Adjusted R-sq.
Parameter
CONSTANT
ICH7883
ACQINV
FIRMAGE
AGEINV
A78*
MULT'
NCNRI
PCTUNIO.'!I
PUBLIC
PFDI
406
.086
Coeff.
5.9
0.42
-65.4
-0.2
-235.6
0.84
3.14
-4.77
-2.11
-2.88
399
.081
Coeff.
9.7
0.41
-58.6
-0.2
-235.6
-0.005
-3.1
-3.1
-0.03
7 5
-8.1
418
1.29
2.96
-3.89
-2.06
-2.78
-0.43
-0.49
-0.39
-0.48
0.82
-0.90
333
.028 .025
Coeff. t Coeff.
-0.9 -0.36 -9.1
0.32 3.18 0.20
--- --- 
-2.4
--- --- 0.05
--- --- 192.1
-0.015 -2.16 -0.022
--- --- 8.5
--- --- 
-9.0
--- --- 0.002
--- --- 7.3
--- --- 
-8.7
t
-1.14
1.69
-0.12
0.56
1.66
-2.18
1.54
-1.28
0.03
0.93
-1.08
* 1978 plant employment
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RESTRICTED
ALL PLANTS
GLOBAL
Analytic Conclusions
While organizational characteristics appear to have a strong relationship to the
reversal of plant investment decisions, they can help little in explaining expansions and
contractions in open plants. Moreover, the only significant variable with a sizable
coefficient, percent industry employment change, reflects external conditions and tells
us nothing about institutional factors that might influence the nature of decision-
making.
For several reasons, I am doubtful that the slightly negative coefficient for
plant size in the open plant model should be interpreted as meaning that small plants
are more competitive than large ones. Regarding expanding plants, it logically is more
likely that a 50-person plant will grow 40% than it is for a 500-person plant. For the
latter, there is a higher risk due to the large size of the new investment and, if the de-
cision is made tc go ahead, the greater likelihood that such an investment would result
in the building of a new plant rather than the expansion of an existing one.
Regarding plants with declining employment, we saw in the logit regression that
in the face of a drop in aemand, small plants belorging to multi-piant companies are
more likely to close tnan are large plants. I had hypothesized that large plants would
be more likely to cut back on employment than to cJose. Small plants in the open
plants model would tend to look healthier because the ones that closed due to cutbacks
are no longer in the sample.
In conclusion, expansions and contractions seem to be a function of factors
other than fundamental organizational characteristics. There are many examples of
such factors. For instance, in the face of declining demand, firms have different ap-
proaches to staffing changes. Companies with skilled workers might be more reluctant
to resort to layoffs than would firms reliant on semi-skilled or unskilled workers. Pro-
ductivity changes, whether through the introduction of new technology or line speedup,
significantly vary, even among firms in the same industry. In addition, while national
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industry employment change captures basic trends in industry employment, it does not
accurately cover trends in a plant's basic product, which usually is but one small slice
of the group of products that make up a 4-digit industry. Plants coded in the same in-
dustry have different product mixes (including many outside the coded industry), and
so will grow or shrank differently in response to the same market conditions. And of
course there are very basic differences in management and in the organization of work
that will also result in different responses to similar conditions. In sum, percentage
employment change in open plants is apparently a function of a number of subtle, com-
plex and idiosyncratic factors that cannot be captured by simple organizational
categories.
Given these dynamics, I would not expect the overall explanatory power of the
regression model for contracLions and expansions to be much different in any other
economy. However, I would be surprised if national industry employment change did
not have some explanatory power, however small, in any situation. I would think that,
despite the fact that employment at the national level is measured for - 4-digit indus-
try, the relationship to expansions and contractions always would be significant and
positively correlated.
The absence of plants of less than 50 probably is irrelevant to the results. Theie
is no reason to think that the power of organizational characteristics t o explain expan-
sions and contractions would De substantially higher for smaller plants.
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CHAPTER NOTES
'Specifically, I took out the five plants that had expanded more than 110% (the
bottom skew to the bell curve) and the General Dynamics submarine plant. Each of
the former started with less than 100 workers. The latter had an enormous influence
in the model because it was twice as large as any other and grew 50%, while most other
large plants declined.
I also removed 15 open plants for which (1) the owner in 1982 was different
than the owner in 1978, (2) there was a significant 1978-83 employment shift (over
10%), and (3) the majority of 1978-83 employment shift occurred under the 1978 owner.
As plant characteristics were collected only for the 1982 owner, if these plants were
left in the sample, the employment change would have been attributed to character-
istics of the wrong owner.
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CHAPTER 6
AN ASSESSMENT OF THE USEFULNESS OF
THE U.S. CENSUS BUREAU'S
LONGITUDINAL ESTABLISHMENT DATA FILE
FOR ANALYSIS OF PLANT CLOSURES
Introduction
To complement the analysis of the relationship between organizational charac-
teristics and employment change, I attempted to use the Longitudinal Establishment
Data (LED) file to identify what effects, if any, relative differences in plant operating
characteristics, particularly differences in wage levels, cost of materials, and labor pro-
ductivity, had on employment change. The LED file brings together establishment data
contained in the Censuses of Manufactures and the Annual Sur-veys of Manufactures
conducted by the U.S. Bureau of the Census. For every year which ends in a "2" or a
"7" (e.g., 1977, 1982), the Bureau of the Census undertakes a Census of Manufactures,
which attempts to obtain and analyze operating information on every manufacturing
establishment in the U.S. (about 225,000). Information collected includes employment,
production hours, cost of materials, capital expenditures, value added and value of
shipments by seven-digit product code. In the years between Censuses, the Census
Bureau carries out an Annual Survey of Manufactures (ASM), which collects somewhat
more detailed information from a sample of 56,000 manufacturing establishments.1
The LED is maintained and operated by the Center for Economic Studies (CES), an
arm of the Census Bureau which takes on contract work on confidential data for non-
Census clients. The data in the LED are considered confidential and may not be
released to the public in any form in which characteristics of individual establishments
can be identified.
The thrust of the planned approach was straightforward, build regression
models in which the dependent variables measure employment change and the inde-
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pendent variables represent establishment characteristics. My intent was to perform a
series of industry-specific analyses. It seemed inappropriate to throw jewelry plant
characteristics and textile plant characteristics into the same model and expect any
meaningful patterns regarding the effect of wage rates on employment change. The
study was viewed by both myself and CES as an experiment--it had not been tried be-
fore. 2
Unfortunately, the experiment was not able to produce meaningful statistical
results. The major reason was that the LED is unable to connect the successive census
records of a significant number of plants. Consequently, the number of plant "deaths"
reported by the LED is nearly double the actual number (as determined by the
DES/survey analysis). This fact makes meaningful statistical analysis impossible.
The purpose of this chapte-. is to describe the intended structure of the analysis
ard of the nature of the LED problems uncovered. Whiie I could not obtain a useful
analysis of the data, ooth I and the CES staff learned a significant amount about the
nature of the LED data set.
The Design of the Analysis
I needed to make Three sets of choiccs with regard to the model--the scop:: of
the population, the dependent variables and the independent variables.
-- Population
The choice of the populations to study evolved from the following principles:
o Because actual operating data was to be used, it was clear that each sample
group would need to be industry-specific at the 4-digit level. A comparison
of average wages for 4-digit industries classified within the same 3-digit in-
dustry group indicated that the 4-digit industry wages differed enough to
make analysis at even the 3-digit level inappropriate.
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o The size of a sample group had to meet two criteria. First, I determined that
there should be at least 40 establishments in the group, i.e. 10 cases for every
independent variable, assuming no interaction terms. This choice allowed for
a large enough sample so that standard errors could be minimized, yet also al-
lowed for the possibility that several industries could be analyzed. Second, I
wanted the industry to be of some economic importance in the economy--
otherwise there was no rationale for studying it. I chose a minimum industry
size of 1000 employees.
o The nature of the LED indicated that only data for the Census years could be
used, at least for a small area like Rhode Island. The Census years have
100% coverage of all establishments. The ASM only includes a sample of the
establishments. For an area as small as Rhode Island, or even for New Eng-
land, that samplc wouid have been too small for meaningful analysis. So it
was decided to analyze employment change over two intercen:al periods--
1972-77 and 1977-82.
o For logit analysis, for which the dependent variable is categorical (plant
open/plant closed), I wanted a closure rate of at least 10%, out of concern
that otherwise there would be too little variation in the dependent variable
for meaningful analysis.
On the basis of these criteria and using published Census data, I identified
eleven industry groups as potential choices for analysis. It was clear that in order to
reach 40 establishments per industry group it would be necessary for many industries
to have a minimum plant size of 25, rather than 50 as in the DES/survey study, and
expand the geographic boundaries of analysis from Rhode Island to the six New Eng-
land states. I thought that for the purposes of understanding the effect of operating
characteristics on employment change, rigid political boundaries did not need to be ad-
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hered to. As long as establishments faced the same general locational factors, the geog-
raphic boundaries of the analysis could be expanded.
CES produced tables which provided establishments counts by size, area, births
and deaths for both the 1972-77 and 1977-82 periods. On the basis of these tables, I
selected ten establishment groups, covering five industries, for analysis. In all cases,
the establishment group was to cover all plants with 25 or more employees in the base
year. The establishment groups selected were:
For 1972-77--2241 (NE), 3471 (NE), 3911 (NE), and 3961 (RI)
For 1977-82--2241 (NE), 3471 (NE), 3911 (NE & RI), 3915 (NE), 3961 (RI)
SIC code: 2241--Narrow Fabric Mills, 3471--Metal Plating and Polishing, 3911--
Precious Metal Jewelry, 3915--Jewelers' Materials and Lapidary Work, and 3961--
Costume Jewelry.
Because membership in each group was a function of employee size in the base
year, the 1972 base year groups were chosen entirely independently of the 1977 base
year groups.
-- Variables
Conceptual framework. As with the analysis of the influence of organizational
characteristics, there was to be one logit model in the LED analysis, using "plant open"
as the dependent categorical variable, and one OLS model, using change in estab-
lishment employment as the dependent continuous variable.
On the basis of the data collected through the Census, I deemed four operating
characteristics both important and feasible to analyze--wage costs, material costs, labor
productivity, and total value of shipments. There are a number of important data
items which are collected by the ASM but not for the Census as a whole, e.g., capital
expenditures, fringe benefits and energy costs. Because data for these characteristics
are collected only for a handful of plants in each industry, it was not feasible to use
them in this analysis.
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Establishments in four-digit industries do not all produce the same type of pro-
duct. The Census Bureau recognizes this by assigning a fifth-digit to each plant that
symbolizes its "primary product." Because I thought that differences between primary
products within an industry could be a factor in explaining changes in employment, I
included one or more dummy variables to represent primary product codes (PPCs) in
industries that had more than one PPC. In this study, two of the five industries had
more than one PPC:
2241: 1--woven narrow fabrics, 4--braided narrow fabrics, and 5--covered rub-
ber thread.
3915: 1--jewelers' findings and materials and 2--lapidary work and diamond
cutting and polishing.
Two sets of independent variables were designed. The first was comprised of
the base year characteristics of each establishment, e.g., wage level in the base year.
These independent variables were to be evaluated as predictors of employment change.
In the second set, the independent variables measured the change in each characteristic
frcm the base year to the next census year. I wanted to see the extent to which
employment change is associated with change in establishment characteristics. This
second variable set could be employed only for plants that stayed open and in the same
industry over the period. Consequently, only an OLS model could be built using it.
Base-year characte-istics. For the base year model, CES was asked to produce a
correlation matrix that included the following variables: 3
Operating characteristics:
production worker wages/production hour
value added/production hour
production worker wages/value added
cost of materials/value added
total value of shipments
Organizational characteristics:
number of establishment employees
number of full-time equivalent establishment production workers (production
hours/2000)
single-unit/multi-unit firm
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number of employees in the firm's manufacturing establishments
number of FTE firm production workers
if the industry has more than one primary product code (PPC), a series of
dummy variables to reflect this.
The choice of wages/hr. and value added/hr. was straightforward--these
represent measures of labor costs and labor productivity. For cases in which the
sample size was low, these two variables were combined into one, wages/value added.
The optimal measure of materials cost would be cost of materials per unit of produc-
tion. However, while the Census Bureau does collect production quantity data in some
cases, product units are not standardized across establishments so cost per unit
measures would be meaningless. The second-best choice was cost of materials per dol-
lar of value added. Total value of shipments was included to cover cases in which the
plant basically performed assembly rather than manufacturing work, i.e. with low em-
ployee levels and high value of shipments.
The number of employees and fulltime-equivalent production workers in the es-
tablishment and the firm were meant to be substitutes for one another. I thoaght that
one might have a better fiL than the other in certain instances.
Change in operating characteristics. I wantcd to build two different models
using variables that measured change in operating characteristics over the period. The
first model was to examine establishment employment change as a function of the
change in certain other establishment characteristics. In the second model, the inde-
pendent variables measured changes in each e:;tablishment relative to changes in the in-
dustry for the U.S. as a whole. The dependent and independent variables for both
models are defined in the appendix.
The Problem of Spurious Plant Closures
The planned LED-based analyses were not feasible because the LED significant-
ly overcounts the number of plant closures. Theoretically, all plant closures should be
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able to be identified by what is known as a census coverage code. Census coverage
codes are supposed to describe major changes in plant status, e.g., changes in ownership
or company structure, acquisitions, plant closures and plant relocations. However, CES
staff's experience with this code has told them that many plant closures are missed.
Consequently, for the purposes of this study, CES identified plant closures through the
disappearance of a plant from the LED between one census period and the next. A
plant is identified by a permanent plant number (PPN). The disappearance of a PPN
was considered a plant closure.
When a plant changes ownership, the plant is supposed to retain its PPN. CES
staff had some worry that, because Census Bureau procedures for smaller plants are not
as thorough as those for larger plants, a small plant ownership change might result in
the termination of one PPN and the generation of a new one, and so look like a closure
and a birth on the same site. As the:se worries could not be quantified, the decision
was made to go ahead with the analysis.
However, once the DES/survey data base was completed, a comparison was made
of the plant closure rates in the two data bases (LED and DES/survey) for the plants in
the five industries that had 50 or more employees in 1977. The results indicate that
the LED rate was more than twice as high as the DES/survey rate. According to the
LED, 26% of the Rhode Island plants in the five industries that had 50 or more em-
ployees in 1977 were closed by 1982. In the DES/survey data base, the figure was 10%
for 1977 plants with 50 or more employees. When the comparison is made for all 11 in-
dustries for which CES provided counts, the results are the same (Table 6.1).
Three factors support the accuracy of the comparison and indicate the presence
of a large number of spurious closures in the LED. First, the establishment counts in
both data bases are remarkably similar. The counts for jewelry and plastics are exactly
the same. Those for textiles may differ because of differences in SIC classification.
(There are a number of textile-related industries not covered in the comparison. On
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TabLe 6.1
SIC
Textiles:
2221
2231
2241
226
228
2292
Total
Plastics:
3079
Jewelry-related
3471
3911
3915
3961
Total
TCTAL
COMPARISON OF PLANT CLOSURE RATES
FOR SELECTED INDUSTRIES, 1978-81
DES/SURVEY DATA BASE AND CENSUS LED
Plants with 50 or more employees in 1977
DES/Survey Census LED
# estab. # closed % closed # estab. # closed
5
7
25
15
8
4
64
21
12
28
18
65
123
208
4
1
0
0
20.0%
14.3
16.0
6.6
0.0
0.0
9 14.1%
2
2
3
0
6
9.50/
16.7%
10.7
0.0
9.2
1ll 10.2%
20 9.5%
6
3
22
11
7
4
3
1
6
2
3
0
53 15
21
9
35
18
61
4
1
8
4
19
123 32
197 51
% closed
50.0%
33.3
27.2
18.2
42.9
0.0
28.3%
19.0%
11.1%
22.9
22.2
31.1
26.0
25.9%
Note: DES/survey data base figures adjusted to incLude closures occuring in
late 1977 and early 1978. DES/survey closure rate if end date extended
to December 1982 is 13.0%.
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the other hand, all jewelry industries are represented, so even though there are dif-
ferences in the counts at the 4-digit level, the total jewelry counts are the same.)
Hence, it can be assumed that each data base is dealing with the same plant population,
more or less. Second, as the DES/survey data base was painstakingly prepared, plant
by plant, and over 80% of the plants had completed surveys, I had great confidence in
the overall accuracy of the count of plant closures. One obvious method of dealing
with the problem of spurious closures was to compare the names and addresses of the
plant closures from one data base with that of the other. Unfortunately, the LED does
not carry names and addresses in its file, so such a comparison could not be made.
Third, a review of methodological differences between the two approaches to
counting plant closures could not provide reasons for the much higher closure rate in-
dic'ited by the LED. For instance, it is possible that the Census Buieau accurately
determined that certain singlu-site firms had shifted from manufacturing to wholesale,
but that the DES/survey data base did not pick up this shift. However, for several
reasons, I do not think this can account foi the differencc in clorure rates. One hun-
dred twenty-one of the 147 plants (82%) in the five original industries answered the
survey, so I kno'v directly from the respondents whether or not they remained in
manufacturing. In addition, I believe I have accuiate information flom other sources
for the 26 non-respondents. When the DES data printouts were prepared, I asked that
the SIC code be given for each plant for each observation month. DES updates its SIC
code for every employer every three years (one-third each year) through the use of a
survey which asks questions about the type of business and products. Assuming the
surveys were accurately filled out, we were able to pick up most of the SIC code
changes. Moreover, 24 of the 26 are in the 1986 Rhode Island Directory of Manufac-
tures. The two that closed after 1983 have employment figures up to 1983 that are at a
level which do not decline steeply in a way that suggests a shift from a manufacturing
to a wholesale operation.
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As a matter of fact, it seems that the DES/survey data base has a few plant
closures not considered as such by the LED. According to the SIC system of industrial
classification, firms that shift from production to jobbing (whereby they have actual
production done on contract) are still classified as being manufacturers. Both the LED
and DES adhere to this approach. However, for the DES/survey data base, I took a
more constrained definition of manufacturing--if a firm eliminated its production
process and became a jobber, the plant was considered closed. Two of the DES/survey
plant closures in SIC 3961 fit this profile, but would not be considered closures by the
LED.
Another potential reason for the difference in closure rates is that the LED
might be counting as closures the relocation of plants to areas nearby enough that the
same workforce could commute to the new site. For the DES/survey data base. closed
establishments were not considered closed plant operations when they were relocated
near enough to the old site that the same workforce could retain their jobs. However,
the LED treats some local relocations somewhat differently. If a plant relocates across
a county line, the Census Bureau gives it a new PPN, which makes such relocations
look like closures and births. However, both a review of DES information (I received
all address changes) and a comparison between each plant's 1977 address according to
DES and its 1985 address in the manufacturers' directory indicated that there were no
local relocations across county lines. So it seems that the overcount of plant deaths by
the LED occurred for other reasons.
One factor that could explain some small difference between the two closure
rates may be that the LED may actually pick up some 1982 closures in their count,
even though any firm which operated during any portion of that year is supposed to
provide operating information. Census forms are sent out in early 1983. Perhaps some
1982 closures did not receive the forms or decided not to fill them out. Even so, when
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the DES/survey data base closure rate is calculated for the period from 1978 through
1982, the closure rate only moves up to 13%.
As a result of the lack of any other explanation, I have come to believe that the
LED overcounts plant closures because it contains a significant number of permanent
plant numbers which were inappropriately terminated, probably when there was a
change in ownership. As a CES staff person noted, the Census and the ASM were not
designed to be sources for longitudinal files. Consequently, the information needed to
make the LED truly longitudinal was not collected on a systematic basis. For plants
with stable ownership, longitudinal analysis using the LED seems to be an attractive
and feasible prospect. However, as presently set up, the LED is not suitable for longi-
tudinal analysis on issues involving closed (or new) plants. 4 With some labor-intensive
effort, such difficulties could be overcome if names and addresses were added to the
file from the mainframe- Census tapes. Then, on a project by project basis, identi-
fication of closed plants could be done manually if the CES client were able to develop
an independent list of closures, as was done here.
The LED's levei of spurious plant closings is of the same magnitude as those
which we previously saw for DMI and ES-202 files, and the reason for this high level
seems to be the same--unlinked accounts for the same plant operation. It seems rea-
sonable to conclude that large inaccuracies can result from using longitudinal data
bases with unlinked accounts, whether DMI, ES-202 or LED, for determining gross
flows of jobs and counting establishment births and deaths.5
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CHAPTER NOTES
'A sample group is selected for five-year periods, with the first year beginning
two years after the last census year (e.g., 1979-84). The sample is based on employment
and industry figures determined in the census year. All establishments with 250 or
more employees in the census year are included in the sample, plus a random sampling
of smaller establishments, with care taken to ensure that all industries and areas of the
country are adequately represented.
2The LED has been available for use by the general research community for a
little over two years as of this writing.
3To provide myself with the opportunity of "playing" with the data despite the
constraint that only CES staff could actually view the plant-specific data, I asked CES
staff to produce a correlation matrix for each establishment group from which I could
produce regression equations.
4This statement may or may not be true for plants of less than 50 employees,
though I believe it is. We saw that the probability of a single-plant firm closing, at
least in Rhode Jsland, is half that for multi-plant firms, and that, within single-plant
firms, the probability of closure tends to rise from 50 to 175 employees. Moreover,
while the Census Bureau does attempt to track ownership changes for large plants, it
spends much less time doing so for very small plants. For the smallest plants in each
industry (upper limit bet veen 5 and 20 employees, depending on the industry), surveys
are not even sent--IRS records are used. On the other hand, there is probably a higher
real failure rate for new firms. Further, the evidence on acquisitions of single-plant
firms in Chapter 4 suggests that such firms are less likely to change ownership (and
stimulate spurious closures) than are large firms. Overall, given that the number of
spurious closures seems to exceed that of the actual for plants above 50, I do not think
the share of spurious closures for the below 50 group is low enough to permit satisfac-
tory analysis foi that group either.
5 Recently, Mark Roberts prepared a paper for the Office of Strategic Planning
and Policy Development in the U.S. Department of Labor in which he used the LED in
.an attempt to count the number of plant closings and related job loss from 1963 to
1982. He used PPN terminations as the proxy for closures, and as a result, I believe,
his findings are too high. For instance, he estimated that 27.6% of all U.S. manufactur-
ing plants with 20+ workers open in 1977 were closed in 1982. In three out of four in-
tercensal periods, job loss due to plant closings exceeded that for contractions. (He did
not publish closure job loss as a percentage of base year employment.) Roberts' find-
ings were presented as an attachment to the recently published report of the U.S. Secre-
tary of Labor's Task Force on Economic Adjustment and Worker Dislocation ("Sectoral
Changes in Employment Due to Plant Openings and Closings, 1963-1982," July 1986, in
Economic Adiustment and Worker Dislocation in a Competitive Society, December
1986)
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Table 6.Al
VARIABLES IN REGRESSION MODEL
INTENDED TO EXPLORE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CHANGE IN
OPERATING CHARACTERISTICS AND EMPLOYMENT CHANGE
Dependent Variables
1) change in establishment employment: TE7 +5 - TE7 X (7X is the base year,
i.e. 1972 or 1977; 7X+5 is the next census year)
2) percentage change in establishment employment: (TE7 X+ - TE7 X)/TE 7 X
3) percentage change in establishment employment relative to percentage change
in industry employment:
([TE*7X+S - TE* 7 /TE" 7x)/([TI 7 X+5 - TI 7 X]/TI7 x) where "e" is for estab-
lishment and "i' is for industry
Independent Variables
1) Establishment variables
a) inflation-adjusted change ;n production wage/hcur:
([WW/PH] 7 X+5 - [WW/PH] 7 )/inflation factor.
Inflation adjustment factor: 1972-77: 1.447
1977-82: 1.486
b) inflation-adjusted change in value added/production hor:
([VA/PH 7X+5 - [VA/PHI 7 )/inflaticn factor
c) inflation adjusted change in production wage/value added:
([WW/VA] 7X+5 - [WW/VA] 7x)/inflation factor
d) inflation-adjusted change in cost of materials/value added:
([CM/VA] 7x+5 - [CM/VA] 7 )/inflation facto -
e) inflation-adjusted change in total value of shipments:
(TVS 7X+5 - TVS7x)/inflation factor
f) ratio of change in establishment average wage to change in industry aver-
age wage
([WW/PH]*7x+ 5 - [WW/PH]*7 )/([WW/PH] 7X+ 5 - [WW/PH]' 7x)
g) ratio of change in establishment labor productivity to change in industry
labor productivity
([VA/PH]*7x+5 - [VA/PH].e7 )/([VA/PH]I' 7X+ 5 - [VA/PH]'.7X)
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h) ratio of change in establishment wages/value added to change in industry
wages/value added
([WW/VA]*7X+ 5 - [WW/VA]. 7 )/([WW/VA]i 7 X+ 5 - [WW/VAly7x)
i) ratio of change in establishment cost of materials/value added to change in
industry cost of materials/value added
([CM/VA]*7X+ 5 - [CM/VA]*7 x)/([CM/VAl 7 X+ 5 - [CM/VA]yx)
j) ratio of percentage change in establishment total value of shipments to per-
centage change in industry total value of shipments
([TVS 7X+5 - TVSe X]/TVSe7X)/([TVS7X+ 5 - TVS' 7x]/TVSi7x)
2) Firm variables
a) change in total firm employment: TEfyXs - TEfy7
b) change in FTE production workers: [PH/40] 7X+5 - [PH/40]'yx
c) percentage change in total firm employment relative to percentage change
in industry employment:
([TE 7X+S - TEf7X]/TE7X ])/([TEi7xs - TE17x]/TE 7x)
d) percentage change in firm FTE production workers relative to percentage
change in industry FTE production workers:
(([PH/40]f17+ 5 - [PH /40]fTx)/[PH/40]flx)/
([PH/40] 7X+5 - [PH/40] 7x)/[PH/401 7X)
3) Dummy variables for SIC 2241 and 3911
2241 PPC I DVI=1 and DV2=0
2 0 1
5 0 0
3911 PPC 1 DV=1
2 0
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CHAPTER 7
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH AND POLICY
Summary of Findings
At the beginning of this thesis, I pointed out that effective policy responses at
the Federal, state and local levels are hindered by the lack of understanding regarding
the magnitude of and reasons for manufacturing employment change. I suggested that,
in particular, two types of information are needed. First, researchers and policymakers
need a more thorough understanding of the dynamics of gross job loss and gain, i.e. the
magnitude of the contribution of the various components of economic change at the
plant-level (births, deaths, contractions, expansions); the magnitude of the "churning"
that goes on in plants, as people are laid off and brought back; and patterns of change
in gross flows that occur with shifts in the business cycle. While a number of gross
flows analyses have been carried out, their accuracy has been compromised by the use
of data bases which are not truly longitudinal. The second type of knowledge needed
by researchers and policymakers concerns the macroeconomic, structural and institu-
tional factors associated with job loss and gain. Only through understanding the mag-
nitude of and the reasons for employment change can effective economic development
policies and programs be designed and implemented.
In an effort to help fill this informational vacuum, I carried out several types
of analyses of the manufacturing sector of Rhode Island for the 1978-83, years which
bracketed a substantial decline in the state's manufacturing employment. First, I per-
formed a gross jobs flows analysis, which indicated that the state experienced substan-
tial and complex patterns of employment change at the plant level that cannot be seen
simply by looking at shifts in aggregate figures. Second, in order to better understand
the roles of institutional, structural and macroeconomic factors in plant closures, I ana-
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lyzed the relationships between the frequency of plant closures and plant organiza-
tional characteristics. Third, I examined the relationships between the magnitude of
employment change in open plants and plant organizational characteristics. Fourth, I
attempted to utilize the U.S. Census Bureau's Longitudinal Establishment Data file to
examine the relationship between plant employment change and plant operating charac-
teristics. However, this effort was not successful because of the presence of a large
number of spurious closures in the LED.
Below I summarize the findings from these analyses. Afterwards, I discuss the
implications of the findings for economic development research and policy and then
make a few concluding comments.
--Gross Flows Analysis
Key finding of the gross job flows analysis include the following:
o Significant gross job losses and gains occurred throughout the period of
study. The majority of annual gross job losses were due to plant contractions.
Plants which closed provided between 16% and 27% of annual job loss and
37% of the five-year job loss.
o It is probable that a higher proportion of jobs lost in plant closings resulted
in economic displacement than was so for jobs lost in contractions, because
the latter included retirements, voluntary quits, and temporary layoffs.
o A large number of jobs lost in contracting plants were regained the next year,
with the percentage in direct relation to economic conditions. Thus, a sig-
nificant amount of job "churning" went on at the plant level.
o Job loss through plant closures appeared relatively more sensitive to the
length of the recession than did job loss through contractions. Specifically,
the percentage of lost jobs due to closures, and the actual number of closure-
caused job loss, increased significantly with the depth and length of the
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recession. Increases in job losses due to plant closings as the recession
deepened were primarily due to increases in job losses due to the liquidation
of plant operations (particularly firm closures). Job losses due to relocations
seemed less sensitive to the business cycle.
o As the manufacturing employment decline bottomed out, there was a
dramatic drop in gross job losses (from both contractions and closures) and a
dramatic increase in the gross job gains.
o Contracting plants lost more jobs on average than did growing plants. In
times of growth, the reverse may be true. To the extent that the reverse is
not true, the introduction of labor-saving technology may be the reason.
The analysis made clear that not only was it feasible to construct a truly longi-
tudinal data base but that an accurate picture of gross flows patterns cannot be ob-
tained unless spurious births and deaths are accounted for. A comparison of the find-
ings of this study with gross flows analyses using unlinked data bases indicated that
the latter substantially overcounted job change due to establishment births and deaths
and undercounted that due to expansions and contractions.
-- Analyses of Plant Closures and Employment Change
Through building a series of logit regression models, I examined the rela-
tionships between one component of employment change, plant closures, and plant or-
ganizational characteristics. I followed this with a descriptive analysis of the closed
plants which looked in detail at the reasons for closures and the disposition of plant
operations after closure. On the basis of these analyses, I developed the following
argument regarding the dynamics that bring about plant closings:
o Plant closings are the results of institutional responses to macroeconomic and
structural opportunities and constraints.
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o The institutional responses that result in plant closings are of two types: (1)
management error which results in an unintended closure and (2) an inten-
tional act of closing a plant which is perceived to be appropriate in light of
external conditions.
o Institutional responses that result in plant closings appear to be very much a
function of organizational characteristics. Certain characteristics reflect
firms' abilities to appropriately perceive and respond to environmental condi-
tions, and so appear related to the extent to which management error results
in closings. Other organizational characteristics guide firms' in their percep-
tions of viable investment options, and so seem related to the extent to which
closings occur out of intent.
o Structural and macroeconomic opportunities and constraints strongly in-
fluence the range of investment choices which a firm perceives before it and
the margin for management error before an unintended plant closing occurs.
Four types of plant closures took place--firm failures, product terminations, ex-
cess capacity reductions, and factor cost relocations and consolidations. The logit and
descriptive analyses led me to a number of conclusions and speculations regarding the
role played by particular organizational characteristics in influencing the frequency of
plant closures:
o Plants in multi-plant companies were twice as likely to close as were single-
plant firms, in large part because the latter are more "lumpy" than the for-
mer.
o The probability of closure for single-plant firms held by multi-plant owners
was similar to that for plants in multi-plant firms. This occurred perhaps be-
cause multi-firm owners were overextended or had less personal investment
in an individual business because their income came from a number of
sources.
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o Small firms were more likely to fail than are large firms.
o Non-RI firms were far more likely to relocate operations than were RI firms.
However, it is unclear the extent to which this dynamic was a function of
headquarters location and the extent to which it was a function of firm size.
o The probability of a plant closing was very high immediately after acquisi-
tion, both because any problems of the new management tended to appear
quickly and because acquiring firms absorbed the new operations by con-
solidating them into other sites.
o In multi-plant firms, small plants were more likely to close than large ones. I
suggested that this might be so because in capacity reductions firms would
tend to eliminate small amounts of capacity, larger plants are more "lumpy,"
smaller plants might have lower economies of scale, and they may belong to
small firms, whose management may not be as skilled as that in larger firms.
o In single-plant firms, the probability curve relating plant size to probability
of closure was bell-shaped. This may be because firms in the 100-225 range
are at the outer edge of the range in which a non-professionally trained, fam-
ily management style can be successful.
o Very young "firms" (which may be divisions or subsidiaries) were more likely
to close a plant than were older firms.
o In general, percentage change in industry employment appeared to inversely
influence the probability of a plant's closure. However, this was not so for
single-plant owners, who may have been less sensitive to industry change as
the plant was their only means of livelihood.
o Union presence, plant/firm in same industry, and publicly traded were not
significant variables in explaining the probability of plant closure. Union
presence was a factor for a few firms with a predisposition to be geog-
raphically mobile or with a history of union conflict. Some plants were
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closed because their products were not their firms' primary concern, even
though the plant and the firm were in the same industry.
The OLS regression models relating plant expansions and contractions to organi-
zational characteristics indicated that the latter could do little to explain the former,
with the exception of the plant's product. It appeared that other, more subtle factors
were at work. However, these findings reiterate the fact that plant closures, as rever-
sals of categorical investment decisions, are indeed phenomena distinct from other
types of employment change.
The Goal of Economic Development and the Roles of Government
How one perceives the implications of this study's findings for economic devel-
opment research and policies depends in large part upon what one thinks are the goals
of economic development and the proper division of roles in economic development
among various levels of government. Before describing what I think are the implica-
tions of the findings, I lay out the context within which I draw these implications.
The goal of economic development should be the achievement of shared and
sustainable economic well-being for a region's residents. The fruits of the economy
should not accrue to just a select few, but to as many as possible. Moreover, develop-
ment should occur in a way that does not detract from an economy's ability to continue
to provide for the economic well-being of its residents in the future. Thus, develop-
ment officials should not only be concerned with the number of jobs created and
retained, but with their quality (e.g., wages and fringe benefits, room for advancement,
protection from harassment), stability, and harmony with the preservation of public
goods on which people depend, such as open space and clean water and air.
For a number of reasons, state and local governments should have primary
responsibility for designing and carrying out regional development strategies. To be
economically effective, regional development policies must be custom-fit to the specific
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regional economic circumstances. Local development authorities have the at-hand
knowledge and political investment to design and implement strategies that are custom-
fit. Further, development policy is not a technocratic exercise but a cooperative one
involving government, business, labor and universities which is best directed from
within an economy. In addition, a plethora of regional development policies en-
courages experimentation, innovation and the rapid diffusion of information about ex-
periences with various types of programs. 1
The performance of Federal responsibilities with regard to national economic
development--in the realms of monetary, fiscal, trade, and industry-specific policies--of
course have large effects on the health of regional economies. The direct Federal role
in regional economic development should be to support state and local efforts. The
Federal government has a number of unique supportive roles to play because of its
powers to collect and redistribute tax revenues, to broker interactions between states,
and to determine nationwide standards of behavior for both firms and subfederal go-
vernments.
Implications of the Findings for Economic Development Research
While Rhode Island is a state yet, it is small both in terms of area and popula-
tion (under 1 million), it has the characteristics of a metropolitan area. Consequently,
one of the implications of this study for further research is that the analytic meth-
odologies employed are feasible both at the level of the state and substate area.
--Longitudinal Establishment Data Analysis
The gross flows analysis indicates the feasibility and usefulness of gaining un-
derstanding of local economic conditions through ascertaining the components of local
employment change. Accurate gross flows data can enhance understanding about the
patterns of employment change at different points in the business cycle (which could
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help in predicting the bottom of recessions and the top of booms); the importance of
plant closings as a source of job loss; the extent to which contractions and expansions
represent "churning" (in which lost jobs are regained in the next year and vice versa)
and the extent to which they represent permanent job gains and losses; and the rela-
tionship between firm size and job generation. Moreover, the completion of gross job
flow analyses in areas with industrial structures different than Rhode Island and for
periods of economic expansion would add substantially to the body of knowledge about
the dynamics and components of economic change.
As I have shown, major accuracy problems develop when unlinked data bases
are used for gross flows analysis, which has been the methodological norm to date.
Linked analyses are not feasible using the DMI or LED files as presently constructed.
The extent to which linked ES-202 files exist is not clear--the situation varies from
state to state. However, it does seem certain that to the extent linked ES-202 files do
exist, linked gross flows analyses are rarely undertaken. 2
This situation could be remedied if Federal and state governments took the in-
itiative to increase the availability and utilization of linked data bases. The U.S. De-
partment of Labor, which specifies ES-202 data methodology, could require state ESAs
to submit linked ES-202 data when they submit their quarterly figures to the Bureau of
Labor Statistics. Then both the states and BLS would be able to run linked gross flows
analyses. BLS also could offer demonstration grants to ESAs to encourage them to un-
dertake linked gross flows analyses. Even without BLS edicts or encouragement, indi-
vidual states could undertake a linkage effort and gross flows analysis on their own.
The U.S. Small Business Administration has built its U.S. Establishment and
Enterprise Microdata File (USEEM) around unlinked DMI data. The USEEM was con-
structed in accordance with a Congressional directive and is the source of most SBA
analyses of small business dynamics. Accounts in the USEEM are not linked. If they
were, and if Dun & Bradstreet increased the frequency and accuracy of its data collec-
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tion effort, the USEEM would be useable for longitudinal studies involving plant and
firm births and deaths. The SBA is aware of the problem and is the process of negotia-
ting with Dun & Bradstreet regarding the latter's providing linked accounts in the fu-
ture. 3
If correctly linked, the U.S. Census Bureau's LED file could serve not only for
gross flows analyses in manufacturing but also for analyses of the relationships be-
tween operating characteristics and employment change. However, the cost of linking
all establishments in the Census of Manufactures would be prohibitively expensive. As
mentioned in Chapter 6, the usefulness of the LED would be enhanced if establishment
names and addresses were added to the file because linkage would be possible in cases
such as this study, in which the client has an independent list of closures. The Annual
Survey of Manufactures provides an almost ready-made longitudinal file, as the Census
Bureau takes great care, it says, in tracking ownership changes. To make a 5-year ASM
sample fully longitudinal, the Bureau would need to link accounts of plants that leave
the sample early or come into it late because they are bought by or sold by firms not in
the ASM sample. However, because the ASM is a sample and because the analysis of
operating characteristics can be done only on an industry-specific basis, regression
models enabled by a linked ASM sample would need to cover areas large enough to pro-
vide sufficient cases for statistical analysis. For instance, the ASM sample for New
England was too small for those industries I wanted to examine.
-- Plant Closure Analyses
This study also has demonstrated the feasibility and fruitfulness of carrying out
regression and descriptive analyses of a population of manufacturing plants for the
purpose of understanding the relationships between plant and firm organizational char-
acteristics and plant closures. I think that states and localities would find such a study
useful in gaining an understanding of the dynamics of their economy on which intel-
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ligent development policy can be built. Moreover, the data base of organizational char-
acteristics provides an excellent profile of an industrial sector. Once established, its
updating could be routinized. In instances in which a development authority wishes to
interact with particular types of firms, e.g., new ones, out-of-state ones, recently ac-
quired ones, the data base could provide the contact list. The data base also could be
expanded to firms outside of manufacturing, e.g., traded firms in the service sector.
While access to Rhode Island ES-202 data certainly was useful for the plant
closure analysis, that analysis was the only part of the thesis for which such access was
unnecessary. The biannual series of state manufacturers directories would have suf-
ficed in providing a population of the plants for which data could be collected through
the telephone survey. As outside access to ES-202 data is often restricted, even to other
state agencies, the availability of an alternative and fairly complete list of larger
plants is crucial to the feasibility of a plant closing study.
-- Analyses of Expansions and Contractions
The OLS regression models demonstrated that organizational characteristics are
not particularly powerful explainers of expansions and contractions in open plants.
The implication is that in order to better understand these dynamics, researchers need
to explore both the possibility of introducing other quantifiable plant characteristics
into statistical models as well as the use of a more qualitative, case study type of ap-
proach.
Implications for Economic Development Policies and Programs
The findings have a large number of implications for state and local economic
development policies. Where the results seem generalizable, I will describe the implica-
tions broadly; otherwise, I will discuss them in terms of Rhode Island specifically.
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The magnitude of job loss identified here indicates the need for a well research-
ed and thought out economic development strategy which identifies priorities and pos-
sibilities for job retention and job replacement. The analysis provided little informa-
tion on levers that planners might use to minimize job loss due to plant contractions.
However, the study did demonstrate that plant closures are phenomena clearly distinct
from contractions, that closures are an important contributor to job dislocation, and
that there exists a strong and complex series of relationships between plant closures
and organizational characteristics. These relationships have implications for policies
which aim at preventing plant closures.
Very importantly, the plant closing analysis demonstrated that plant closures are
the result of institutional responses to the economic environment. That the environ-
ment does not "dictate" that a plant must close implies that there is room for program-
matic intervention at the institutional level. This finding is important for state and
local governments, which are not positioned to have great influence over structural and
macroeconomic conditions.
As we saw, certain types of plant closures are the unintended results of manage-
ment error and others are perceived by management as proper responses in light of en-
vironmental conditions. Moreover, we saw that certain organizational characteristics
reflect management's ability to avoid unintended closure and others reflect how man-
agement is likely to perceive its viable options for plant siting. Consequently, a major
implication of this study is that development officials should use an understanding of
the relationships between organizational characteristics and plant closings as an aid to
designing programs aimed at minimizing job loss due to plant closures.
Almost all firm closures, many product termination closures, and a few capacity
reduction closures in Rhode Island were the result of management error. We saw that
closures were much more likely to occur soon after firm ownership changed hands or a
large firm started a new subsidiary. In addition, we saw that small firms held by
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owners with other major business interests also were much more likely to close, with
the possible reason, I suggested, that the owner could not or did not give the business
his full attention. And we saw that some unintended closures occurred soon after a son
inherited a business from his father or when long-term owner either overreacted (by
overexpanding) or failed to react to changing market conditions. These dynamics indi-
cate the need for a good system of management support, one which includes adequate
and affordable counselling, training and consulting services. The role of a state is to
see that such services exist and that business owners are aware of their availability.
Moreover, a state may want to develop an outreach program which targets new owners
and owners of several companies.
For the majority of unintended plant closures, at least in Rhode Island, the
firms seemed to be small and locally-based. The logical clients for a management sup-
port system are these types of firms because the top decision-maker is close by, and the
management skills of these types of firms are the weakest. However, a management
support system could be marketed to larger and non-local firms who are commencing
operations in a new market or product, e.g., the Spanish cabinet company.
Even with a good management support system, many firm failures of local com-
panies will occur. It is likely that in a number of these cases, the assets of the firm--its
product, equipment and workforce--allow the possibility that it could be resurrected
under new and competent management. It is in a state's interest to attempt to broker
transfers of ownership than can result in firm turnarounds. Traditional lending
sources are loathe to provide financing in such situations because of the high risk. A
state should consider targeting development finance monies to provide capital in such
high-risk, high-payoff situations.
The study indicates that local companies were far more stable geographically
than were out-of-state companies. Consequently, it appears to be in the Rhode Island's
interest, if not other states as well, to encourage not only strengthening th management
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of weak local companies, but the development of strong, indigenous companies gener-
ally. States are developing a wide body of experience in this area. Means of aiding
local manufacturing firms include development finance programs, assistance in obtain-
ing government procurement contracts, technology transfer programs, technology devel-
opment programs, buyer-supplier matching programs, incubator programs, programs en-
couraging employee ownership, and export promotion programs.
Within economic development circles, David Birch's findings in "The Job Gener-
ation Process" that small and new firms create most new jobs are taken as gospel, and
have been used to justify a large number of the state and local programs aimed at en-
couraging indigenous development. In this study, I believe that I have conclusively
demonstrated that Birch substantially undercounted the number of spurious births and
deaths, and so overcounted the contribution of small and new firms to job creation.
Moreover, the gross flows analysis showed that very few plants under 50 employees in
1978 grew to a level above that figure by 1983. However, given my lack of data on
small plants and that I did not look at the job creation process in the up side of the
business cycle, I think this thesis does not provide any substantial evidence regarding
the role of small firms in job creation one way or the other. We did see that small
firms did have greater plant stability, and from this I drew implications.
In pursuing a strategies of job retention and indigenous development, a state
should focus its efforts on companies that provide well-paying jobs. In Rhode Island,
one-quarter of the jobs lost through plant closings were in the low-wage jewelry indus-
try. The study also suggests that a large number of the local companies were in lower-
paying industries such as jewelry, textiles, and novelty items. Thus, Rhode Island
needs to keep in mind the extent to which there exists a tradeoff between stability and
wage levels. The state's ranking of 50th in value added per production worker does in-
dicate that an intelligent strategy to create better manufacturing jobs is in order. Such
jobs are particularly needed currently because the state has the highest rate of housing
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inflation in the country. Metropolitan Providence housing prices are up 41% from a
year ago.4 As wages have been unable to keep up with housing costs, housing affor-
dability has replaced job displacement as the state's major economic issue. 5
Many firms closed plants out of intent. A state should design development
strategies that minimize vulnerability to intentional closures in which decent jobs are
lost. The fact that between 1978 and 1983 a large number of non-RI headquartered
plants left the state and there were very few plant births under non-RI firms occurred
implies that a state should have a clear awareness of the cost-effectiveness of any plant
attraction strategy. Rhode Island should seek to attract firms which choose the state
because it has a clear and long-term competitiveness with regard to access to particular
factors, e.g., university researchers in particular fields, experienced shipbuilders. On
the other hand, it probably would not want to spend significant resources going after
manufacturers who choose RI on the basis of its low labor costs, because that ad-
vantage is ephemeral.
We saw a number of cases in which plant closures occurred after conglomerates
bought and then sold local companies, and in which non-RI firms acquired local ones
and then moved operations elsewhere. In addition, one case of voluntary firm closure
occurred after the owner could not find a local buyer for several of his operations, so
he closed them and sold the assets to out-of-state interests. The implication of these
findings is that it is in Rhode Island's interest, if not other states as well, to encourage
the retention of in-state ownership of manufacturing plants. Such an objective brings
the state into relatively uncharted economic development waters. It might seek ways of
brokering the sales of local firms to local buyers, and perhaps support such sales with a
development finance program. In addition, the state might explore regulating the
takeover of in-state firms by out-of-state ones in a manner that would inhibit acquisi-
tion and immediate closure by new owners. For instance, it might want to explore the
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idea of using its powers of eminent domain to prevent relocations that occur soon after
an acquisition.
In the study, I could find no statistical evidence that the presence or absence of
workforce union affiliation affected the probability of plant closure. Only one firm
closed plant doors primarily because of a union and the state's "business climate" with
regard to labor (Davol). It seemed that for the other two firms that moved plants for
labor reasons, Rhode Island labor costs relative to those at the new site (Mexico,
Alabama) were the primary motivation, and union presence was secondary. These find-
ings suggests that the state need not attempt to use its powers to diminish the presence
of unions as part of a strategy of plant retention.
A number of findings point to the potential usefulness of an "early warning"
system for anticipating plant closures. As might be expected, the probability of plant
closure was directly related to how employment was faring in a plant's industry nation-
ally. This finding suggests that a state would find it fruitful to track both state and
national trends in key industries to identify those in which closings might occur be-
cause of shifts in demand. New acquisitions, startups, and small plants with larger
sister plants could be targeted for particular attention. An early warning system also
could watch gross job flows for leading indications of potential shifts in the frequency
of plant closures. At the same time, the state, through its field representatives in vari-
ous agencies, could develop contacts in individual companies who could inform the
state if an intentional closure is being considered. The state could then attempt to
forestall a closure, by helping to solve the problem, or plan for post-closure adjustment.
A number of states are experimenting with the operation of early warning systems.
The study findings do not directly shed any new insight regarding the role for
the Federal government in regional economic development policy and programs. As I
said earlier, I think that the role of the Federal government should be to provide
financial and informational support to state and local efforts, e.g., coordinating data
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collection, promoting regional economic analysis, evaluating the effectiveness of vari-
ous development strategies, and providing development funds to hard-hit areas finan-
cial encouragement for innovative regional policies.
This study did not examine the extent to which firms closing plants gave notice
of closure or mass layoff, nor did it look at the particular consequences of layoffs for
displaced RI manufacturing workers. Even so, the depth of manufacturing job loss in
Rhode Island supports the findings of other numerous studies that specific policies and
programs need to be established that aim at easing the adjustment of workers once laid
off. I do think that while states should take the lead in the design and creation of de-
velopment policy, the Federal government should set the standards and provide the
funding for a number of programs and policies designed to aid dislocated workers, in
particular requiring employers to provide adequate notice of intentional layoff and
ensuring that employers and states work together to provide the rapid delivery of ad-
justment services such as outplacement and retraining. States are loathe to enact laws
requiring firms to provide adequate notification because they believe that states
without such laws will be perceived as having a better "business climate" and so have a
competitive advantage in attracting businesses. A Federal law can eliminate these per-
ceptions of disadvantage. The rationale for Federal mandating of adjustment services
is that it is in the fiscal and economic interest of the country to reduce the length of
unemployment and increase the match between available skills and available jobs.
Federal inaction with regard to adjustment policies does not mean that states
need be inactive as well. In the absence of a Federal layoff notification law, states
should consider creating their own, as Hawaii just did. Also, a large number of states
have created "rapid response" teams, incorporating representatives from a variety of de-
velopment, employment, training and social service agencies, that attempt to react to
potential and actual plant closures.
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A Concluding Note
I think that the contributions of this thesis are several. I believe that the analy-
sis has resulted in a new degree of specificity with regard to the dynamics of manufac-
turing plant closures. We see that plant closures indeed are a phenomenon distinct
from job loss through contractions. The descriptive analysis provided what I hope is a
typology of closures which may be useful in further research and policy analysis. Also,
I believe that the analysis demonstrates that plant closures result out of the tension be-
tween institutional, structural and macroeconomic factors. Importantly, institutional
factors never seem to be absent in a plant closing, which means that there is room for
positive programmatic intervention by state and local governments. I demonstrated
that a number of organizational characteristics are strongly related to the probability
of plant closings. The strength of the relationships between characteristics and closures
indicates that governments can use knowledge about characteristics to anticipate, pre-
vent, and plan for plant closures.
The gross flows analysis indicated that plant closures, while a significant con-
tributor to gross job loss, are not as important as previously believed. It also
demonstrated that a substantial amount of "churning" goes on within plants, as jobs get
deleted and created one year after the next. And the analysis showed that gross job
flows have patterns very much tied to the business cycle which may be useful in help-
ing to anticipate future changes.
Finally, I think that this thesis has made a major contribution by developing
replicable methodologies for in-depth economic analysis. The analysis of plant closures
suggests that utilization of a combination of primary and secondary data sources, logit
regressions and descriptive analysis can produce meaningful and rich results. In addi-
tion, I have demonstrated that an accurate gross flows analysis using a linked data base
is quite feasible. In doing so, I have shown that major errors occur in gross flows
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analyses when spurious plant births and deaths are not accounted for, to the detriment
of understanding regarding the workings of the economy.
For too long, researchers and policymakers have had to work with aggregate
data, anecdotes, and establishment data bases inappropriate to the analytic task. My
hope is that other researchers will find the methodologies and results developed here to
be guides and stimuli for undertaking studies which add to the understanding of
regional economies and the design of effective development policies.
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CHAPTER NOTES
1Andrew Reamer, "Testimony before the Subcommittee on Intergovernmental
Relations and Human Resources, Government Operations Committee, U.S. House of
Representatives, December 4, 1985," published in Federal and State Roles in Economic
Development: Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Oper-
ations, U.S. House of Representatives, December 2. 4, and 5, 1985 (Washington, DC:
Government Printing Office, 1986).
2The Oregon Department of Economic Development and the Oregon Employment
Division are jointly undertaking a firm-level gross flows analysis using a linked ES-202
data base. The state will be making the data base available to researchers on the con-
dition that the latter sign a confidentiality agreement.
3Telephone conversation with Catherine Armington, Applied Systems Institute,
Washington, DC, May 4, 1987. Armington suggests that one reason it was not feasible
to link DMI accounts in the past was that D&B reused DUNS numbers.
4 John King, "N.E. house prices continue to soar," Boston Globe, May 12, 1987.
The price increase is measured from March 1986 to March 1987. As of the latter date,
Providence's housing prices were ranked 9th of 51 metropolitan areas. The metro area
includes 86% of the state's population (according to the 1980 census).
5Personal communication with Frederic G. Reamer, Chair, Governor's Human
Services Advisory Council, State of Rhode Island, May 5, 1987.
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